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General Introduction
A The times they are a-changin’ 1
What is fascinating in international economics is how fast paradigms change. Many
old facts turn out to be at odds with new evidence. Some models are challenged,
and become quickly obsolete. This permanent metamorphosis of facts and ideas is a
great source of research and debate. It contributes to fuel our understanding of how,
where, and why our societies produce and trade, and how this impacts on other human
activities.
Of course, changes in the international economic environment raise many questions.
The present thesis addresses four important ones. Along with real world mutations,
the field of international economics has experienced many changes in the last three
decades. Advancement in views, models, and tools are also reviewed. While the thesis
raises four questions, they are all tackled from the same perspective. The last paragraph
of this section presents the approach that has been used in the different chapters.
The international economy (our world) is changing. The most striking change
of the last two decades for all (trade) economists is probably the rise of China. The spec-
1 As the present now // Will later be past // The order is // Rapidly fadin’ // And the first one
now // Will later be last // For the times they are a-changin’. Bob Dylan
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tacular economic performances of China raise concerns among the public who fear for
their jobs and wages.2 A question often asked of trade economists is how its emergence
and that of other low-wage countries has affected manufacturing industries in developed
economies. Unquestionably, employment in manufacturing industry has plummeted in
almost all developed countries since 1980. The last consensus on the question is that
the competition presented by low-wage countries (along with technical change) has
contributed to this decline.3 Surprisingly, however, in those stricken industries, some
firms perform very well. A good example is the French fashion industry. On the one
hand, most firms in this industry have been subjected to low-wage countries competi-
tion, and their economic performances have sharply declined. On the other hand, the
sales of luxury big names have rocketed in the last two decades. The third chapter of
this thesis considers this asymmetrical impact of competition from low-wages countries
on firms in developed economies.
European consumers and firms experienced an important change at the end of the
second millennium: the creation of the Euro. The launch of the single currency in 1999
must be seen as "the world’s largest economic policy experiment" (Baldwin, 2006).
A question often asked is whether the introduction of the Euro has led to price rises
in Europe. Another concern that directly calls out to trade economists is whether the
Euro affects the competitiveness of European firms. However, the main objective of the
single currency was to deepen the economic integration of EU countries. The second
chapter of the thesis tries to evaluate this "policy experiment" and calls into question
the success of the Euro in enhancing European economic integration.
2In 2010, China overtook Japan as the second largest economy. From 1980, its GDP grew 18-fold.
China is also the largest global exporter and the second largest importer. See Feenstra and Wei (2010)
for an extensive study of the integration of China in the global economy.
3See Sachs and Shatz (1994) or Bernard et al. (2006).
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Some changes are more subtle, more painless, and they appear in the eyes of the world
in some rare events. The international fragmentation of production chains is one of
those. Too few studies exist on the question, but all point to the increasing importance
of the fragmentation of production across countries.4 These vertical linkages have
important implications not only to explain the patterns of international trade, but also
to understand the international transmission of shocks.5 The halt of production chains
in Europe and the US after the 2011 earthquake in Japan is a visible consequence of
this new organization of production.
One question raised by monetary policymakers is whether the increasing dependency
of nations on foreign inputs has affected inflation in the US, Japan, and Europe. The
fourth chapter of the thesis examines the impact that imported inputs have on the
dynamic of domestic prices.
It is fair to argue that some aspects of the international economic environment have
not changed. For instance, the effect of distance on shaping trade flows has remained
incredibly strong over time.6 Interestingly, this was expected to change. The facilitation
of travel, the lower costs of flying and shipping, and the improvement of transport
infrastructures should all have contributed to lessen the impact of distance. There
are thousands of studies reporting that distance is a strong impediment to trade flows
across countries and the participation of firms in foreign markets. It is also a strong
impediment to migration, cross-border investments, and financial flows. A particular
aspect that has not been analyzed yet - and which matters to consumers - is how
distance impacts on firms’ pricing decision. It is what the first chapter intends to
4Hummels et al. (2001) are among the first to describe what they call the "dramatic changes [that
occur] in the nature of international trade". They show that in 1990, 20% of total trade involved the
export of goods using imported inputs. This share increased by 30% between 1970 and 1990.
5See Burstein et al. (2008) for instance.
6See Disdier and Head (2008) for a meta-analysis demonstrating the strong and persistent effect of
distance on trade flows over time.
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examine.
International economics is changing. Along with real-world mutations, interna-
tional economics as a field is also changing. Changes in our views, in our understanding,
and in our modeling of international trade are driven by three main factors: i) new
empirical facts, ii) the developments of new tools in other fields of economics, iii) tech-
nological changes.
Our understanding of international trade has changed much these last 40 years. First
year students used to be taught that countries traded because they were different. Then,
one taught that similar countries traded because consumers enjoyed both domestic and
foreign varieties of the same product. Now, one teaches that it is not countries but
firms that trade, and that though those firms are very different, they trade similar
goods. And it seems that the later phrase "firms trade similar goods" is turning into
"firms trade goods of different quality".
The main change in the field was initiated by Paul Krugman and others in the late
1970s. At the time a new facts puzzled those researchers. Namely, Balassa (1966)
and Grubel and Lloyd (1971) were pointing out that countries traded similar types of
products which was at odds with standard trade theory’s predictions.7 The talent of
the 2008 Nobel prize winner and the development of models encompassing increasing
returns to scale in Industrial Organization, have allowed trade economists to build new
models consistent with the newly established patterns of trade.8
A second change in the field occurred in the late 1990s. As noted by Bernard et al.
(2011), the focus has shifted from industries and countries to firms and products.
7Indeed, Ricardian and HOS models predict inter-industry trade, namely countries specialize in
different industries and trade those different products.
8See Krugman’s Nobel Prize speech for an important re-
view of the process of changes that happened during this period
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2008/krugman_lecture.pdf .
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This has first been made possible by the novel availability of a set of data providing
information on trade at the product- and firm-level, as well as the development of
computing facilities that allowed researchers to exploit those data.
Microdata have provided new insights into firm heterogeneity in terms of size, produc-
tivity, or export participation.9 The main evidence from these data has been that only a
few firms serve both domestic and foreign markets, and that they are disproportionably
larger, more productive, and richer than non exporters. In the meantime, other fields
such as macroeconomics introduced firm heterogeneity in their models.10 From these
new facts, building on new theoretical frameworks in closed economy, Melitz (2003)
has proposed a model with firm heterogeneity and selection of firms on the domestic
and foreign markets consistent with the data. This model offers a great framework to
think of reallocation of resources within industry in an open economy context. It has
been extensively used this last 10 years.
Another piece of empirical evidence that renew our views of international trade have
been based on product-level data.11 A careful examination of these data by several
researchers confirmed that countries trade similar type of goods, and this evidence
provided new insights. First, while it was thought that similar trade occurred between
developed countries, it appears that both developed and developing countries trade
similar goods. The most striking example is China whose basket of exported products
to the US is more than 90% similar to the basket of products exported by Germany to
the US. As emphasized in the next section, data also revealed that while Germany and
China exported similar goods to the US, they produced very different quality of these
9See Bernard et al. (2011) for a review.
10A striking example is Hopenhayn (1992) who has sketched a model in closed economy featuring
firm heterogeneity, love for variety and increasing returns to scale. All these ingredients were used ten
years latter by Marc Melitz in an open economy framework.
11This was not firm-level data, but product-level data, that for the most precise ones, reported the
bilateral trade of countries, classified in about 5,000 product categories.
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goods.12
New insight on international economics from prices and quality Most of
the empirical papers on international trade have focused on the value and quantity
of trade flows. Two limits arise from this approach. First, most models share similar
predictions about the patterns of the value and quantity of trade flows. It is thus
difficult to discriminate among them by looking at value and volume only. Second,
focusing on value and quantity makes it difficult to comprehend quality, which seems
to be an important dimension of international trade.
In the 1990s, several international trade researchers started studying trade prices. In
fact, data on prices are very scarce. Instead, they have used unit values (ratio of value
over quantity) on bilateral exports. This type of data is highly detailed, sorting trade
flows in 5,000 to 10,000 product categories depending on classifications. Nevertheless,
unit values are not prices. They better reflect average prices. Using product-level unit
values, researchers have established a set of facts that has questioned existing models,
and emphasized the crucial role quality plays in world trade. The first set of evidence
has been mentioned above: countries trade similar kinds of products, but charge very
different prices for these products.13 This questions the view in the 1980s and 1990s
that countries trade similar products, and rather suggests that countries are vertically
specialized and trade similar type of products of different quality. The second set
of evidence deals with the impact of distance on average prices. Traditional models
predict that only highly productive (low-costs) firms should be able to export to remote
markets. The data show the opposite, suggesting that it is not the low-cost firms that
select in difficult markets, but the high-quality ones.14
12All these fact can be found in Schott (2004), and Fontagné et al. (2008).
13See Schott (2004), and Fontagné et al. (2008).
14See Hummels and Skiba (2004) and Baldwin and Harrigan (2011).
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Micro-prices have also allowed researchers to measure aggregate outcome such as the
degree of economic integrations of countries. In particular, looking at price deviations
of a given product across countries has shed light on the effect of borders, exchange
rates, and language on economic integration.15
Lastly, the study of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT herein) is probably the branch
of international economics that has used the most extensively price data. Until very
recently, most research papers either used highly precise price data for narrow indus-
tries, or they used more exhaustive dataset, but with product-level unit values.16 More
recently authors have used firm-level data set or even dataset of true (not average)
prices with a large coverage to study ERPT.17 An interesting development in this lit-
erature has been to use firm-level data to stress the heterogeneity in ERPT behavior
across firms and to show its aggregate implication (Berman et al., 2011).
The option adopted in this thesis is to use information on prices to shed light on the
four questions presented above; namely, the effect of distance on firms’ pricing policy,
the impact of the Euro on European economic integration, the consequences of low-wage
countries competition on firms in developed nations, and the effect of imported inputs
on domestic inflation.
The empirical analysis makes use of detailed firm-level data for France. The heterogene-
ity of firms’ reaction is carefully examined. Furthermore, from the use of micro-data,
an attempt is made to provide economic context to the results and to give insights into
their macro implications.
In the different chapters of the thesis, we go back and forth between theory and empirics.
Actually, the empirical analysis is always guided by the most recent theoretical frame-
15See Taylor and Taylor (2004) for a survey.
16See for instance Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a review.
17See for instance Berman et al. (2011) for the firm-level data and Gopinath and Rigobon (2008)
for the true price data.
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works. Furthermore, the empirical results are compared to theoretical predictions, which
allow us to discriminate among models and to provide direction for future theoretical
modeling.
B Thesis’ questions, conclusions, and contributions
I present the main questions raised in this thesis and the conclusions that can be drawn
from this work. I then develop four dimensions through which my thesis contributes
to the existing literature.
There are four main questions treated in this thesis.
1. Distance has been shown to have a strong impact on economic outcomes, and
particularly on trade flows and the participation of firms in export markets. One
dimension that has been left unexplored empirically is how distance impacts on
trade prices at the firm-level. In Chapter 1, I ask how distance impacts on the
pricing policy of exporting firms.
2. The introduction of the single currency in Europe has meant a major change
for consumers and firms. The debate about the economic impact of the single
currency remains. In chapter 2, jointly written with Isabelle Méjean (Ecole Poly-
technique), we investigate whether the Euro has enhanced European economic
integration.
3. The rise of China and other low-wage countries raises a number of concerns in
developed countries. In chapter 3, jointly written with Isabelle Méjean (Ecole
Polytechnique), we examine the impact of low-wage countries competition on the
quality content of French exports.
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4. The fragmentation of production chains, and the intensive use of imported in-
termediate inputs suggests strong linkages between countries. These linkages are
likely to enhance the international transmission of shocks. In Chapter 4, I ex-
amine how firms adjust their domestic prices to changes in the price of their
imported inputs.
The main conclusions of the thesis are as follows.
1. Firms charge higher net of transport costs prices on exports to more distant
countries. A large part of the price premium paid by distant consumers is thus due
to firms charging higher net of transport costs price, while the rest is due to higher
transport fees. The positive impact of distance on prices may be rationalized in
models using additive transport costs rather than iceberg ones.
2. The Euro has reduced the dispersion of firms’ prices in the European Monetary
Union. This is particularly true for large firms, which strengthens the aggregate
impact of the single currency. Therefore, one can argue that the creation of the
Euro has enhanced European economic integration.
3. Over the period 1995-2005, the quality content of French exports jumped by 11%
through a reallocation of sales from low- to high- quality firms. This reallocation
has been driven by the increasing competitive pressures of low-wage countries.
4. Firms increase their prices by 1,2% after a 10% increase in the price of their im-
ported inputs. The sensitivity of domestic prices to foreign input prices crucially
depends on the proportion of imported inputs used in the production process.
Changes in the price of inputs imported through a related party have almost no
effects on domestic prices. Imported inputs explain on average 9% of the sectoral
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volatility of domestic prices.
The first contribution of the thesis concerns the pricing strategy of exporting
and importing firms. Chapters 1, 2, and 4 provide new insights into how and why
firms react to changes in transport costs, to the adoption of a common currency, or to
changes in the price of their inputs.
The literature that considers the impact of distance on prices usually uses product-
level unit values. They interpret the positive impact of distance on unit values as
evidence that the proportion of high-quality / high-price firms in total exports was
increasing with distance (Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011). In
the first chapter, I have shown that not only high-price firms export to more distance
countries, but also that those firms charge higher prices to more distant countries.
Strikingly, in parallel works, Bastos and Silva (2010), Manova and Zhang (forthcoming)
and Gorg et al. (2010) have found a similar pattern studying unit values from firm-
level Portuguese, Chinese, and Hungarian data respectively. have found a similar
pattern studying unit values from firm-level Portuguese, Chinese, and Hungarian data
respectively. The first chapter, however, departs from the previous three studies by
providing insights into the economic significance of this finding, and the theoretical
mechanisms that can explain this finding. In particular, it argues that the finding is
consistent with firms charging higher markup (reverse dumping see Greenhut et al.
(1985) for instance) or selling higher quality goods in more distant markets (consider,
for instance, the Alchian and Allen [1964] effect). This can be rationalized in models
with additive rather than iceberg transport costs.
Few studies have investigated how firms have reacted to the creation of the Euro. A
famous paper by Hobijn et al. (2006) has shown that because of "menu costs", all
restaurants have increased their prices following the introduction of the single cur-
xvii
rency. A few papers are able to identify the producing firms, and to test how EMU
has affected their pricing policies. These studies focus on very specific products; the
European automobile market in Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and Gil-Pareja and
Sosvilla-Rivero (2008) and electronic products sold online in Baye et al. (2006). These
studies find contrasting results for the price impact of the Euro. Our contribution is
to provide a more global view of the impact of the Euro on firms’ price discrimination.
Furthermore, we aim to demonstrate for the first time that the effect has been felt het-
erogeneously across firms. In this respect, our work is related to Berman et al. (2011)
who show that firms react differently to changes in exchange rates.
The last chapter contributes to the literature on price dynamics at the firm level by
pointing out the impact of imported inputs on domestic prices. This is related to
Fougere et al. (2010), who look at the impact of changes in the minimum wage on
restaurant prices. It is also closely linked to Nakamura and Zerom (2010) and Goldberg
and Hellerstein (2007), who structurally estimate the determinants of incomplete pass-
through in the coffee and beer industries. The contribution with respect to these papers
is to study the impact on the domestic prices of firm-specific imported cost-shocks, for
a wide range of industries. Furthermore, the data allow for intra-firm prices to be
disentangled from arm-length transactions, which cannot be done in other studies.
The second contribution of this thesis is to emphasize the importance of
firm heterogeneity in shaping aggregate economic outcomes. A relatively
recent albeit burgeoning literature stresses how micro heterogeneity may shape macro
outcomes. Gabaix (2011) is a corner stone of this literature. His paper shows that
idiosyncratic shocks to firms may have aggregate consequences if the distribution of
firms’ size is sufficiently skewed. From an applied perspective, Imbs and Méjean (2009)
maintain that not taking into account micro heterogeneity may lead to an aggregation
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bias.
In Chapter 2, we show that the creation of the Euro has affected French exporters
differently. Namely, large firms have reduced more their price discrimination toward
Euro countries than smaller firms. Taking into account this heterogeneity is important
to measure the aggregate impact of the Euro on price dispersion. In fact, since large
firms account for a larger proportion of sales and are more impacted by the single
currency, giving the same weight to all firms tends to underestimate the effect of the
Euro. In this respect, our paper contributes to new evidence showing that accounting
for firm heterogeneity may have important aggregate implication. Related to this view,
Berman et al. (2011) state that exchange rate pass-through is low in the aggregate
because large firms absorb exchange rate shocks.
In Chapter 3, we emphasize that low-wage country competition impacts firms in de-
veloped countries differently depending on the quality of their goods. In other words,
LWC competition leads to a reallocation of sales from low- to high-quality firms. As
a result, the aggregate quality of developed nations’ exports rises up. While Baldwin
and Harrigan (2011) have shown how firm heterogeneity in quality may shape bilateral
trade flows, we assert in this chapter that the reallocation of sales across heterogeneous
quality firms may shape the dynamic of aggregate exports. In particular, we show that
the growth of exports may be decomposed into the growth of exported quantity, the
growth of individual export prices, or the growth of the quality composition of the
exported basket. The quality composition is a strong determinant of export growths,
especially in sectors facing strong competitive pressures from low-wage countries.
The third contribution of the thesis is to participate in and hopefully fuel the
debate on current policy questions. The effects of the Euro, and the effectiveness of
the single currency to deepen economic integration, are closely discussed within political
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and academic context. In the first chapter, we find that the Euro has significantly
reduced price dispersion within the Euro area. This means that the introduction of
the single currency has contributed to deepen the European economic integration. In
this respect, we contribute to the debate about the economic impact of the creation
of the single currency. The most complete study of the question is by Baldwin et al.
(2008). They find that the Euro has increased trade flows in the Euro area by 5%, and
that trade creation has been mainly driven by the entry of new firms/products. The
study also points to the increasing pricing transparency that favors arbitrage behaviors.
However, this report does not find a clear cut impact of the Euro on price dispersion.
Taking into account firm heterogeneity, we show that the effect of the Euro on price
dispersion is stronger than previously found.
The fear of Chinese products dominating the world production of manufacturing goods
has been an important concern in most developed countries over the past two decades.
Peter Schott (2004, 2008), Bloom et al. (2009) and others have shown that considering
the specialization of countries in high-quality / innovative products is key to figuring out
the implications of this new competition. In Chapter 3, we examine strong evidence
suggesting that competition for LWC has driven a re-allocation of sales from low-
to high-quality producers, increasing the overall quality of French exports. Evidence
in favor of within-industry specialization suggests one way for countries to maintain
their market share in world exports, while increasing the value added content of their
exports. Investing in high-quality production should indeed help countries to insulate
themselves from low-wage foreign competition. Furthermore, as long as producing
higher quality goods requires more capital / high-skilled workers - which is confirmed
by several empirical studies (Verhoogen, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, forthcoming) -
quality upgrading may have strong effects upon labor market equilibria by increasing
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the demand for high-skill workers.
The debate about the impact of globalization on inflation is raging in Europe and in
the US. In some empirical papers the authors contend that the increase in low-wage
countries pressures has pushed down prices in developed countries (Auer and Fischer,
2010). However, more structural studies have shown that the main channel through
which movement in foreign exchange rates or foreign costs affect domestic prices are
imported inputs (Goldberg and Campa, 2010). Chapter 4 contributes to this debate
by providing the first evidence on this imported input channel at the firm level. Our
principal finding is that while changes in imported inputs result in changes in domestic
prices, in most sectors the dynamic of domestic prices does not depend on imported
inputs.
C A more detailed view of the thesis
C.1 How distance shapes the pricing policy of exporting firms
The context. The recent availability of firm-level data has challenged traditional
models of international trade. The standard assumption that firms are similar (Krug-
man, 1980) is strongly rejected by the data, and departing from this assumption in
trade models has strong implication to the allocation of resources in open economies.
Leading empirical papers have actually provided evidence on the heterogeneity in the
size of firms, their decision to exports, the volume they export, as well as the number of
products they sell, or the number of destinations they serve .18 A crucial determinant
of firms’ decisions about exports is the distance separating trade partners. Based on
these new facts, trade theorists have developed new models explaining the selection of
18See Bernard et al. (2007), Bernard et al. (2010) , and Eaton et al. (2004) respectively.
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firms and products within firms in foreign markets.19
A dimension that has remained unexplored both empirically and to a lesser extent
theoretically in the trade literature is the pricing strategy of those firms. In particular,
while the effect of trade costs on most firms’ decisions has been analyzed, the impact
of trade costs on prices attracted much less attention. In workhorse models of inter-
national trade the pricing strategy of domestic and exporting firms has been muted to
favor models’ tractability.20 Some of the literature, however, has built on alternative
frameworks in which firms have less trivial pricing policy. Models based on Ottaviano
et al. (2002) features variable markups. A crucial prediction of this model is that firms
reduce their markups when facing high transport costs. However, this prediction has
never been tested.
The question. The first chapter of this thesis explores the impact of distance on
export prices, and questions the economic significance of the estimates.21 It further
determines what models are consistent with the empirical findings.
Methodology. Firm-level unit values proxy prices. Unit values are reported free-on-
board (herein fob), i.e. net of transport costs. Unit values are computed as the ratio of
values over quantities from French firm-level data describing bilateral trade of French
exporters disaggregated at the (8-digit) product level.22
19See Melitz (2003); Melitz and Ottaviano (2008); Eaton et al. (2011), and Bernard et al. (2010).
20In CES models with monopolistic competition and iceberg transport costs, firms are expected to
charge the same price (net of transport costs) to all the destination countries (Krugman, 1980; Melitz
and Ottaviano, 2008).
21I focus on free-on-board (fob herein) prices. In other words, I consider prices net of transport
costs. This is done for two reasons. First, the firms report fob values, so one can compute fob unit
values only. Second, the models differ in their prediction about fob prices. In all models, the price
including transport costs is higher for more distant countries. However, in CES model, the price net
of transport costs is the same whatever the destination country, while in quadratic models, the price
net of transport costs are lower in more distant countries.
22Unit values are not perfect measures of prices. If the goods sold by a firm on its different markets
(while belonging to the same nomenclature) are slightly different, or that the mix of product reported
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Using the universe of French firms exporting toward more than one destination in
2003, I attempt to measure how a firm, for a given product, adjusts its price depending
on the distance to the destination country. Therefore, firm×product fixed effects are
introduced in the regressions to isolate firms’ own decisions. I further control for other
determinants of prices such as the size and wealth of the destination country, or the
level of competition in that country. Both linear regressions and non parametric ones
are considered. Finally, since the majority of models predicts that distance should not
affect prices, a special focus is placed on the statistical significance of results.
Importantly, once a figure for the elasticity of fob unit values to distance is calculated,
its economic significance should be assessed. One way to do this consists of evaluating
how a change in distance between two countries would affect consumers. Using both
or estimate and estimates from the literature enables computation of the elasticity of
import prices to distance and to discuss the relative importance of changes in fob prices
relative to changes in transport costs.
Results. The main empirical result of this chapter is that firms charge higher free-
on-board unit values for export to more distant countries. This finding hold even after
controlling for the wealth, size, level of competition, and level of trade barriers of the
destination country.
Results indicate that, as distance doubles, the fob unit value charged by an exporter
increases by 3.5%. The estimates imply that more distant consumers pay a price
premium not only because distance increases transport costs, but also because firms
charge higher prices net of transport cost.
by the firm in this nomenclature changes, then differences in unit values cannot be entirely attributable
to markup differentials. Therefore, differences may be due to differences in the costs of production,
or difference in the composition of the basket of goods exported by the firm. This drawback will be
taken into account when interpreting the results.
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The sensitivity of fob prices to distance is economically significant. Indeed, following
a trade facilitation, almost 80% of the price decline on imports enjoyed by consumers
is due to firms charging lower fob prices, the rest being attributable to the drop in
transport costs.23
Different mechanisms can explain why firms charge higher unit values on export to
more distant countries. They may charge higher markups, sell (more expensive) higher
quality goods, or use more expensive packaging for more distant shipments. I maintain
that a critical assumption to get the positive impact of distance on prices in trade
models is to introduce per unit rather iceberg transport costs.
C.2 Looking at the dispersion of prices to evaluate the eco-
nomic integration of the European Monetary Union
The context. More than ten years after the creation of the European Monetary
Union (EMU), it has become possible to assess empirically how the monetary integra-
tion has affected market equilibria in Europe. By furthering market integration, EMU
was expected to impact trade patterns within the monetary zone as well as between
EMU and the rest of the world; this is the well-known Rose effect.24 Another manifes-
tation that has been less investigated in the empirical literature is the impact of EMU
on the dispersion of prices. According to the law of one price (LOOP), an integrated
market should have a unique price for each (properly defined) product. And deviations
from this unique price can be related to the degree of economic integration. Anything
that furthers market integration, notably the creation of a currency union, is expected
to induce a convergence toward the LOOP.
23The small sensitivity of import prices to direct changes in transport costs is due to the tiny share
of transport costs included in import prices
24See Rose (2000) or Baldwin et al. (2008).
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This was one of the ideas that proponents of monetary integration were endorsing.
The EU Commission was thus arguing that the Euro was going to increase price trans-
parency, mute exchange rate fluctuations between members, and increase competition.
Altogether, those effects were expected to ease arbitrage behaviors, reduce markups,
and in turn lower price dispersion.
Question. Chapter 2, jointly written with Isabelle Méjean, proposes an empirical
test of the previous price convergence effect, asking whether the introduction of the
Euro has induced a reduction in the dispersion of prices inside the Euro area. It further
investigates whether firms have been impacted in the same way by the single currency,
and if so, questions the implication of this heterogeneity.
Methodology. The test is conducted using export data describing the prices set
by French exporting firms in each of their destination markets. The sample is quasi-
exhaustive, covering the universe of French exporters over the period from 1996 to 2005.
For each firm, detailed information is provided about its bilateral exports, including
the price set in each single market, before any transportation cost is added. These
"free-on-board" prices are interpreted as reflecting the pricing strategy of the firm.
The dispersion of prices is measured by the coefficient of variation computed at the
firm- and product- level, across countries.
To identify the causal effect of the Euro on price dispersion, we adopt a difference-
in-difference (DID) strategy with the rest of the European Union as control group.
The method accounts for global trends that are disconnected from the shock using
information on a control group that is not directly affected by the shock. More precisely,
the DID strategy we use compares the magnitude of price discrepancies in the EMU
before and after the Euro with that of an appropriately defined control group.
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To account for the heterogeneous impact of the Euro on firms of different sizes, we in-
teract the treatment on treated variable of the DID regression with different measures
of firm size. We also employ a less parametric way to track down the impact of het-
erogeneous behaviors that consists of arranging firms in groups of size and measuring
how firms in those groups react to the single currency.
Results. We find that the creation of the Euro has significantly reduced the relative
dispersion of French export prices toward Euro countries. Price were 24% more dis-
persed in the Euro area than in the rest of the EU before 1999, and this dispersion
drops to 21% after 1999. The effect is robust to the control group we choose as well as
changes in the sample of firms and products we consider.
Moreover, we show that the effect has been felt differently by French exporters. That
is to say, more productive firms have been more strongly affected by the common
currency. This heterogeneity is important in itself. It also has interesting implications
in terms of the aggregate impact of the Euro. Since more productive firms account for a
very large share of total exports, their behavior is crucial in determining the dynamics
of aggregate prices.
We account for the heterogeneity in the behavior of firms as well as in their relative
weight in aggregate exports to estimate the aggregate effect of individual firms adjusting
their pricing strategies. Unsurprisingly, the estimated effect of the Euro is found to be
greater once we account for the relative weight of different firms in aggregate exports.
In this specification, the relative dispersion of within-EMU prices decreases from 27 to
10% following the introduction of the European common currency.
This result suggests that the response of firms to the introduction of the Euro is deeply
heterogeneous and that this heterogeneity has important aggregate consequences. The
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effect of the Euro is underestimated when the heterogeneity is not accounted for.
C.3 The asymmetrical impact of low-wage countries competi-
tion on French firms, and its impact on the quality content
of French exports
Context. One of the most widely discussed phenomena in recent trade literature
concerns the growing share of emerging countries in world exports. This pattern chal-
lenges textbook models of international trade on several grounds. First, recent empir-
ical evidence suggests that emerging economies are becoming competitive not only in
labor-intensive sectors, as the neo-classical theory would predict, but also in capital-
intensive ones.25 Second, both emerging and developed countries export the same bun-
dle of products, but more productive, wealthier countries charge higher unit values,
on average.26. This suggests that countries produce different qualities of the same
products, which goes against the horizontal differentiation view of international trade
discussed in new trade theories. As argued by Peter Schott (Schott, 2004, 2008), these
patterns of international trade are consistent with a specialization occurring within in-
dustries along the quality dimension. International trade leads countries to specialize
in vertically differentiated goods. And developed economies continue exploiting their
comparative advantage by producing better qualities.
In addition to the evidence pointing to the vertical specialization of countries, a growing
number of empirical studies have emphasized that firms, within countries and within
sectors, produce goods of very different qualities.27
25See Amiti & Freund, 2010, on Chinese data.
26See Schott, 2008, Gaulier, Fontagné and Zignago, 2008
27The recent trade literature provides evidence of firm heterogeneity in the quality dimension. See
among others Crozet et al. (forthcoming) on wine exporters producing in France, Verhoogen (2008)
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The interplay between cross-country vertical specialization and within-country hetero-
geneity in quality across firms has not been analyzed yet. However, we could expect
increasing pressures from low-quality developing countries to affect differently firms in
developed countries depending on the quality they produce.
The question. Chapter 4 investigates the impact low-wage countries competition has
on the relative sales of firms in developed countries and how it affects the quality content
of developed countries’ exports. In the theoretical section, we determine the conditions
under which changes in the competitive environment modify the quality composition of
a country’s export basket. The empirical section examines how the quality content of
French exports has been impacted by changes in low-countries competitive pressures.
Methodology. We start the analysis with an illustrative model describing the con-
ditions under which changes in the competitive environment modify the quality com-
position of a country’s export basket. Our framework borrows from the industrial
organization literature, notably Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). In this setting, in-
creased competitive pressures from the low-wage country are disproportionately felt by
the lowest quality producers in the rich country, while the highest quality is somewhat
protected by vertical differentiation. This asymmetry triggers a reallocation of market
shares in favor of the high-quality firm. The mean exported quality improves as a
consequence.
The empirical exercise is conducted using firm-level data on French exports. Our
measure of quality changes relies on the methodology proposed by Aw and Roberts
(1986) and Boorstein and Feenstra (1987). They illustrate how to quantify changes
on Mexican data or Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) in data covering Indian, US, Chilean and Colombian
firms.
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in the mean quality of a consumption basket by comparing time-variations in its unit
value and its ideal price index. We adapt this methodology to our data and measure
quality changes in France’s exports due to market shares being reallocated across firms
producing different qualities of the same product. It is worth noting that with this
index, quality changes are driven by a reallocation of demand across firms serving the
same market with different qualities of the same good.
Then, we relate sectoral changes in the quality of bilateral French exports in 45 countries
to changes in the penetration of goods produced in low-wage countries in France’s
export markets. The most basic regression uses country-specific fixed effects to control
for all macroeconomic evolutions that may explain an aggregate improvement in the
demand for quality. Some regressions also include sectoral fixed effects that control
for overall quality changes in some specific sectors due, for instance, to technological
improvements or composition effects on the supply side. Finally, some regressions
include additional control variables that have the sector and country dimensions. To
reduce the risk of reverse causality, low-wage countries’ market shares are computed
using as reference the rest of the world less French exports. We further instrument the
change in low-wage countries competition to test the robustness of our result to other
possible sources of endogeneity.
We build a second measure of "quality competition" that accounts for competition from
high-wage countries. We use this to test whether competition from high- and low-wage
countries has a symmetric impact on the quality content of French exports.
Results. Results. We show that the quality of the French export basket increased by
more than 11% between 1995 and 2005. Quality upgrading is particularly pronounced
in sectors and countries where French firms face increasing competitive pressures from
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low-quality producers. Interestingly, higher competition from high-wage countries leads
to a decrease in the quality content of French exports. The flight to quality is consistent
with within-industry specialization along the vertical dimension.
C.4 Globalization of inflation: the impact of imported inputs
on the dynamic of domestic prices
The context. Domestic production involves a substantial amount of imported in-
puts. Manufacturing industries exhibit shares of foreign inputs in total costs ranging
from 20 to 67%.28 For this reason, vertical production linkages are crucial in explain-
ing the international transmission of shocks in open macroeconomics.29 Related to this
issue, the intensive use of imported inputs questions the sensitivity of domestic prices
to foreign ones. The strength of these effects depends on the extent to which changes
in imported costs are transmitted to domestic prices.
Problematic. Chapter 4 investigates at the firm-level how movements in the price
of imported inputs are passed on to domestic prices.
Methodology. The analysis relies on a novel dataset that reports monthly individual
quotes for the price of imported inputs as well as production prices. Hence, the micro
prices collected by the INSEE (the French statistical agency) are matched at the firm-
level to compute the French price indices for production, imports and exports. Thus,
one can observe for about 500 manufacturing firms the production prices of goods sold
in the French market and abroad, and the price of their imported inputs. We use it to
28See Goldberg and Campa (2010). These figures are averages across OECD countries.
29di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) find vertical linkages accounts for 30% of trade-induced business
cycle correlation.
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estimate the elasticity of domestic prices to imported input price changes.
Since prices are sticky, changes in domestic output prices are explained by changes in
imported inputs conditional on observing a change in the output price. To figure out
what are the determinants of the sensitivity of domestic prices to foreign ones, several
specifications are tested. First, I investigate what role is played by the proportion of
imported inputs used in the industry. Second, I test the look at the impact of the
market structure, and I compare the transmission of changes in the price of imported
inputs to domestic and export prices to evaluate the role on non constant markups.
Lastly, I compare the transmission of imported input price changes to domestic prices
for intra-firm and arm-length transactions.
I further attempt to check the robustness of our results to the potential endogeneity
of imported costs. Typically, a higher demand for the output may lead to an increase
in demand for inputs, driving up both the price of inputs and the price of output. In
our regressions, we control for changes in sectoral characteristics, including changes in
sectoral demand. In order to limit the potential endogeneity bias, we use the nature of
the transaction associated with every import price that is reported in our dataset. In
particular, I assume that the prices of inputs that importing firms declare as not specific
to one supplier, are exogenous. This assumption is that if a firm can import a given
input from different suppliers, this means the good is highly standardized. And, we
can reasonably argue that the price of such internationally traded good is not affected
by changes in the demand of a given firm.
Results. There are four main results documented in this chapter. First, on average,
the elasticity of domestic prices to imported inputs prices is 12%. A large part of
this incompleteness in pass-through is related to the share of imported inputs used in
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the production process. Yet, there is an important heterogeneity across sectors that
remains unexplained. Second, the transmission is much lower among firms that import
inputs from a related party. Third, movements in imported costs are passed on to the
same extent to both domestic and export prices. Finally, I show that, on average, 9%
of the volatility of production prices at the sectoral level is driven by imported cost
shocks of inputs. Again, there is a significant heterogeneity across sectors, the volatility
explained by imported input prices ranging between 0 and 40%. Importantly, most of
the dynamic of domestic prices is not explained by imported inputs.
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Chapter 1
Markups, Quality, and Transport
Costs 1
1 Introduction
In workhorse models of international trade, exporters either charge the same free-on-
board (fob) price to all destination countries (Krugman, 1980; Eaton and Kortum,
2002; Melitz, 2003), or reduce it for more distant countries (Brander and Krugman,
1983; Ottaviano et al., 2002; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).2 In contrast, the present
paper finds that firms charge higher fob unit values on exports to more remote coun-
tries. I establish this fact using detailed firm-level data describing bilateral trade of
French exporters disaggregated at the (8-digit) product level. This finding is robust to
the inclusion of other determinants of export prices such as the wealth, size, level of
competition, and level of trade barriers of the destination country.
1This chapter is substantially revised version of the CREST Working Paper 2010-17 . It has been
submitted for publication.
2The free-on-board price is the price set by a firm, net of freight and insurance costs.
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Results indicate that, as distance doubles, the fob unit value charged by an exporter
increases by 3.5%. The estimates imply that more distant consumers pay a price
premium not only because distance increases transport costs, but also because firms
charge higher prices net of transportation costs.
The elasticity of import (cif) prices with respect to distance (cifdist) may be written as
a weighted average of the elasticity of fob prices to distance (fobdist) and the elasticity of
transportation costs to distance (cifT ):
cifdist =
(
1− T
pcif
)
fobdist +
T
pcif
Tdist
My estimate of the elasticity of fob prices to distance (fobdist) is 0.05, Hummels and Skiba
(2004) estimate an elasticity of transport costs to distance (fobT ) of 0.26, and Hummels
et al. (2001) estimates that the share of transportation costs in import price (cifT ) is
0.038. As a result, the elasticity of import prices with respect to distance is 0.06.3 This
simple decomposition shows that, following a trade facilitation, almost 80% of the price
decline on imports enjoyed by consumers is due to firms charging lower fob prices, the
rest being attributable to the drop in transport costs. The small sensitivity of import
prices to direct changes in transport costs is due to the tiny share of transport costs
included in import prices (only 3.8% in Hummels 2001).
This suggests a new and important channel - firms charging lower fob unit values -
through which changes in transport costs may affect welfare. This channel adds up
to the mechanisms identified in the literature, namely the direct effect of a drop in
transport costs on consumer prices, the pro-competitive effect, and the love-for-variety
3Using an alternative decomposition and information on the elasticity of cif/fob ratios to distance
leads to an identical elasticity of 0.06. I further show that the elasticity of import prices to transport
costs is 0.23.
3effect.4
Different mechanisms can explain why firms charge higher unit values on export to more
distant countries.5 They may charge higher markups, sell (more expensive) higher qual-
ity goods, or use more expensive packaging for more distant shipments. In particular,
the positive impact of distance on unit values is consistent with the Alchian and Allen
(1964) conjecture stating that the demand for more expensive/ higher quality prod-
ucts should increase with transport costs. I further show that a standard CES model
under monopolistic competition with per unit rather than iceberg transport costs is
constistent with the positive impact of distance on prices found in the data. While
these mechanisms rely on the presence of per unit transport costs, it is worth noting
that alternative explanatory mechanisms such as selection effects can be obtained with
iceberg transport costs. However, I argue that these alternative explanations appear
less convincing.
Interestingly, the positive impact of distance on fob unit values at the firm level is
not limited to French data. In parallel works, Bastos and Silva (2010), Manova and
Zhang (forthcoming) and Gorg et al. (2010) find a similar pattern using bilateral firm
level data on Portuguese, Chinese and Hungarian exports respectively. Here, I find the
same pattern using French data, I further discuss the economic significance of this fact,
and I propose a theoretical explanation. In a related paper, Irarrazabal et al. (2010)
sketch and estimate a Melitz type model with additive transport costs. In their model,
fob prices increase with per unit costs at the firm level. The present estimates are
4Arkolakis et al. (2011) show that recent trade models developed to explain the behavior of firm-
level trade flows have the same implications in terms of the gains from trade as old theories assuming
homogenous or representative firms. By contrast, models with non constant fob prices can provide
new gains as shown by Irarrazabal et al. (2010).
5Models with exogenous (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Hummels and Skiba, 2004) or endogenous
(Verhoogen, 2008; Hallak and Sivadasan, 2009) quality heterogeneity explain price differential among
firms and the impact of distance on average prices but they do not explain why prices, within firms,
increase with distance.
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consistent with theirs. Like in their paper, I point to the importance of per unit costs
to explain this fact.
In addition to the literature cited above, our work is related to empirical studies showing
that average prices are higher in more remote countries.6 In particular, Hummels and
Skiba (2004) and Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) show that product level unit values
increase with distance, and they propose two distinct models explaining this feature
of the data. But, in both papers, fob prices are not observed at the firm level and
are assumed identical within firms, and across destinations. Complementary to the
literature, this paper focuses on the impact of distance on the dispersion of prices
within firms and products across destinations, i.e. on individual rather than average
prices. More generally, the present paper connects to the recent literature describing
exporting firms’ behavior. Most studies provide evidence on firms’ export status and
size (Bernard et al., 2007), the number of products they sell (Bernard et al., 2010) or
the number of destinations they serve (Eaton et al., 2004). The present paper focuses
on unit values charged by those exporting firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the
econometric strategy. Section 3 presents some stylized facts, the results, and provides
insights concerning the economic significance of the estimates. Section 4 discusses the
different explanations consistent with the empirical finding. Last, Section 7 concludes.
6See Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Mayer and Ottaviano (2007), Baldwin and
Harrigan (2011), Hummels and Skiba (2004), or Fontagné et al. (2008).
52 Data and strategy
2.1 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on a French customs database.7 The
database covers yearly bilateral shipments of firms located in France in 2003. Data are
disaggregated by firm and product at the 8-digit level of the Combined Nomenclature
(CN8). The raw data cover 96,467 firms and 10,050 products for a total exported value
of 3.5 hundred billions euro. Since this paper focuses on the dispersion of prices within
firms and products, only products sold by a firm on at least two markets are considered.
This restriction reduces the number of observations. Actually, only 46 % of firms export
toward several destinations. However, these multi-destination exporters realize more
than 74% of French exports (in value). For each flow, the fob value and the shipped
quantity (in kg) are reported. A flow is described by a firm number, a product category
(CN8), and a destination country. Unit values are computed as the ratio of the value
over the quantity of the flow. The unit value set by firm f for product k exported
toward country j is:Pfjk =
Vfjk
Qfjk
where Vfjk and Qfjk are the value and quantity of
good k exported by firm f to country j.
Unit values are known to be a noisy measure of prices. The main criticism was formu-
lated by Kravis and Lipsey (1974) and more recently Silver (2007). The authors state
that unit values do not take into account quality differences among products. The high
level of disaggregation of the data and their firm dimension limits the main drawback
of unit values and more particularly the mixed-quality effect. Actually with more than
10,000 products, the possibility of having goods with highly different characteristics
7Berthou and Fontagné (2008), Méjean and Schwellnus (2009), Crozet et al. (forthcoming) or
Berman et al. (2011) use the same source.
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within these unit values is limited.8
There are some errors in declarations or in reporting. To deal with outliers, we follow
Méjean and Schwellnus (2009) and drop observations for which the unit value is 10 times
larger or lower than the median unit value set by the firm on its different markets. This
procedure retains 73% of total exports.
Like most of the papers in the literature, distance is used as a proxy transport costs. I
also use GDP and GDP per capita as a control for the size and wealth of the destination
country. Another control used in the empirical analysis is the average multilateral
import unit value of destination countries to control for the level of competition on
each market.9 To investigate the impact of product differentiation on the link between
unit values and distance, I use the elasticity of substitution computed at the product
level by Broda and Weinstein (2006). Last, as an additional control, the tariff faced by
French exporters is introduced in some regressions. All these variables are described in
the appendix.
2.2 Econometric strategy
First, we estimated the following equation:
log(Pfkj) = αlog(distj) + βcontrolsj + FEfk + fkj (1)
8For instance, product CN8 52081296 has this description: Woven fabrics of cotton, containing
85 % or more by weight of cotton, unbleached, Plain weave, weighing more than 100 g/m2 but not
more than 130 g/m2 and of a width not exceeding 165 cm . For a deeper discussion on the use of this
database’s unit values as a proxy for prices, see Méjean and Schwellnus (2009).
9Because international trade data are harmonized at the HS6 level, the multilateral unit values are
measured at the 6-digit level while the firm-level export unit values are measured at the 8-digit level.
For EU countries, the COMEXT nomenclature allows us to build multilateral unit values at the 8-digit
level. As a robustness, 8-digit COMEXT multilateral unit values are compared with 6-digit BACI
ones. The correlation is very high: 0.79. Furthermore, I obtain very similar results in regressions on
the EU sample using the 6- or 8- digit multilateral unit values. In regression including COMEXT
data, the impact of distance on prices is even stronger. Results are available upon request.
7where Pfkj is the unit value computed at the firm and product level, distj is the distance
between France and country j, FEfk is a firm and product fixed effect, controlskj is a
vector of control variables, and  is the error term. Three different samples of countries
are used to test the robustness of the results: all the countries, the OECD countries,
and the euro members. The OECD sample allows comparison of prices toward countries
with similar levels of development. Focusing on euro members is a way to get rid of
the firm price discrimination due to (i) incomplete exchange rate pass-through and (ii)
country specific tariffs.
The impact of distance on prices can be non-linear. Non-parametric regressions of the
logarithm of prices on dummies for different intervals of distance are run to tackle this
problem. With firm×product fixed effects, interval coefficients yield average prices set
by each firm in each distance interval.10
Part of the trade literature emphasizes the impact of the size and the wealth of countries
on bilateral unit values. GDP and GDP per capita are used to control for these effects.11
The expected signs are as follows. In large countries, competition is tougher, which
should reduce prices. By contrast, wealthy countries are expected to have a higher
willingness to pay, which should contribute to higher prices.12
Models with quadratic utility functions suggest that prices depend on the average
price on the market. Those average prices reflect not only the level of competition in
the destination country but also its relative remoteness. Hence, they depend on the
10This method is used at lower levels of disaggregation by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) or Eaton
and Kortum (2002) among others.
11Using manufacturing output instead of GDP leads to similar results.
12Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) use these controls and Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009) bring the-
oretical foundations to these explanatory variables in a generalized model of ideal variety. One can
also interpret the GDP per capita coefficient with respect to trade costs. If the cost of selling a good
abroad includes a distribution cost, then trade costs are expected to increase with the wealth of the
destination country, because wages are higher there for instance (Corsetti and Dedola, 2005; Berman
et al., 2011, see).
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number of firms serving the market, the fob price of those firms, but also the average
transport cost paid by firms exporting to this country. Multilateral average unit values
of imported products for the different countries are introduced in regressions to control
for this. They are computed as the value-weighted average of import prices in the
destination countries.
Most models of international trade predict that the elasticity of price to distance is
nil.13 Therefore, the statistical significance of estimated coefficients is important. In
the regressions, standard errors can be biased by the correlation within groups of ob-
servations. To deal with this bias, estimated standard errors are clustered in the coun-
try dimension. However this clustering procedure assumes a large number of clusters
whereas in our dataset the number of clusters (number of countries) is rather small
compared to the number of observations (Harrigan, 2005; Wooldridge, 2005, see). Re-
sults with clustered standard errors are in the main text. In Appendix, we describe the
methodology proposed by Harrigan (2005) to tackle this issue and the results it yields.
3 Empirical Results
This section presents empirical findings concerning the relationship between prices and
distance at the firm level. The first section provides graphical evidence on the link
between prices charged by exporters and distance. The following section reports the
results of our estimations. The results unambiguously suggest that firms charges higher
free-on-board prices on exports to more distant countries.
13This is true for all the CES models with monopolistic competition and iceberg transport costs like
Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003).
93.1 Stylized facts
Before investigating the impact of distance on individual prices, the variance decom-
position of individual prices is investigates. Most of the literature has focused on the
dispersion of unit values, within product across destinations (Baldwin and Harrigan,
2011; Hummels and Skiba, 2004). The analysis focuses on the dispersion of unit val-
ues within firms and products across destinations. Thus, the variance of individual
prices for each product category is decomposed as the sum of the variance of individual
prices within firms across destinations, and the variance of firms’ average prices across
destinations, plus a covariance term. Namely, the following decomposition is made:
∑
f,j
(pfj − p)2 =
∑
f,j
(pfj − pf )2 +
∑
f,j
(pf − p)2 + 2
∑
f,j
(pfj − pf ) (pf − p) (1)
Where pfj is the price charged by firm f on exports to country j, p is the average price,
and pf is the average price charged by firm f . The first term on the right hand side
gives the within-firm price dispersion, the second term gives the between-firms price
dispersion, and the last term gives the covariance between the previous two sources of
variation. We compute those terms for each CN8 product. Then, the RHS terms are
divided by the left hand side term. This provides us with a measure of the contribution
of the within and between terms to individual price dispersion. Table 1 gives the differ-
ent percentiles of the within and between contributions by products. On average, about
half of the dispersion in individual prices is explained by within firm price dispersion.
The previous variance decomposition shows that a large part of price dispersion occurs
within firms and products across destinations. I now investigate whether this price dis-
persion is related to the distance to the destination country. As preliminary evidence,
Figure 1 plots the logarithm of individual prices against the logarithm of distance. To
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Table 1: Within and between components of price dispersion
Percentiles P5 P25 P50 P75 P95
Contribution
Within 0.03 0.26 0.48 0.72 1
Between 0 0.20 0.48 0.77 1.05
This table reports the contribution of the within and between firms component of
price dispersion for each CN8 product category. Namely for each product the fol-
lowing equation is estimated:
∑
f,j (pfj − p)2 =
∑
f,j (pfj − pf )2+
∑
f,j (pf − p)2+
2
∑
f,j (pfj − pf ) (pf − p) where pfj is the price set by firm f on exports to country
j, pf is the average price set by firm f , and p is the average price across firms
and destinations. The within and between contribution are computed for each CN8
category. PX is the contribution for the Xth percentile. For instance, 48% of
the dispersion for the median product is due to within firm price dispersion. The
other 48% percent is due to between firm price dispersion. The last two percent is
attributable to covariance effects.
focus on within firms and products patterns, the firm and product mean are removed
from the two variables. I keep firm-product pairs present in at least 5 markets. Since
the figure is unreadable with too many observation, 5% of observations are randomly
drawn from the sample. The figure shows a positive relationship between prices and
distance. However, the correlation is not systematic. The slope is 0.04, and we ob-
serve an important dispersion of prices, which is is not explained by distance. Distance
is destination-specific whereas unit values have the three dimensions: firm, product
and destination. Thus, destination-specific variables cannot explain the whole price
dispersion. Next, I investigate the importance of distance among destination-specific
determinants in explaining individual price dispersion. Figure 2 presents another
piece of evidence supporting distance as an important determinant of individual prices.
To build the figure, country fixed effects are estimated by regressing the logarithm of
prices on country fixed effects and firm-product fixed effects. A large country fixed
effect means that on average, a firm charges a higher price to this country than to the
other destinations it exports to. Then, those country fixed effects are regressed on the
11
Figure 1: Price and distance at the firm level, random sample, 2003
−2
−1
0
1
2
lo
g.
 p
ric
e 
 (d
ev
iat
ion
 fro
m 
the
 m
ea
n)
−2 −1 0 1 2
log. distance (deviation from the mean) 
ln_p_ Fitted valuesThe graphs plots the logarithm of prices at the firm and product level against the
logarithm of distance. Both variables are purged of firm×product fixed effects. The
slope of the linear fit line is 0.039 and the standard deviation is 0.006. The exercise is
done on a sample of 14,387 observations based on 1,195 couples of firms and products
(5%) randomly drawn from the initial sample.
logarithm of distance. The figure also indicates the country names and their GDP per
capita. We can see a clear positive relationship between estimated fixed effects and
distance. This suggests that firms, on average, charge higher fob prices toward the
more distant markets. Furthermore, distance alone explains one half of the dispersion
of country fixed effects. Thus it appears as one of the main country-specific determi-
nants of prices.14 There are however some outliers. The most visible is Switzerland.
French exporters seem to charge relatively high prices to this neighbor country. This
may be explained by the high GDP per capita of Switzerland.
14Adding GDP per capita or average unit value increases the R2 to 0.62 only.
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Figure 2: Country fixed effects, distance, and GDP per capita, 2003
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effects and firm×product fixed effects. the correlation between distance and country
fixed effects is 0.7. A regression of country fixed effects on the logarithm of distance
yields an R2 of 0.5.
3.2 Regressions results
We now turn to the regression analysis investigating the determinants of export prices.
Results confirm the previous stylized facts: firms charge higher unit values on exports
to more distant countries.
Table 2 presents regressions of the logarithm of the price on the logarithm of distance.
In all the regressions, the estimated elasticity of prices to distance is positive and
almost always significant. In column (1), the sample contains all destination markets
of French exporters. The estimated elasticity is 0.042. If the distance doubles, the
average exporter increases its fob price by 3% (20.042 − 1). Focusing on the OECD
sample (column 2), one observes that the elasticity is larger. The estimated elasticity
reaches 0.45. Column (3) focuses on the euro sample. This sample is interesting because
13
the pricing to market in the euro area cannot be due to incomplete exchange rate pass-
through, and there are no country specific tariffs for French goods. The elasticity is
much lower and weakly significant but still positive (0.011).
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In columns (4-6) regressions control for market characteristics by introducing the size
(GDP) and the wealth (GDP per capita) of the destination country. One can see
that the size of the country has no significant impact on prices whereas wealth has a
positive impact. The distance coefficient remains positive, significant, and even higher
than without controls. This is particularly true for the Eurozone, where the distance
elasticity is greater and more significant (column 3 vs column 6). Within the Eurozone,
the countries closest to France are also the countries with the highest GDP per capita,
which has a positive impact on fob prices.
The average unit value takes into account the competition on the market. Columns (7)
to (9) present the results once the average unit value is introduced. As expected, the
mean unit value coefficient is positive (even though it is not significant for Eurozone
sample regressions). Actually, in highly competitive markets (where the multilateral
unit value is low), firms set relatively lower prices. However, even with this control, the
distance coefficient remains positive and significant. Namely, the regression including
all the control variables indicates that doubling the distance implies a 3.5% increase of
the fob price charged by firms (Table 2, column 7: 20.05 − 1 = 0.035).15
Table 3 presents the non-parametric version of the previous regressions. The logarithm
of unit values are regressed on distance interval dummies. Since the dummies are
collinear with the constant and the fixed effects, the first interval is dropped. For
the reasons mentioned previously, firm×product specific fixed effects are added. To
obtain a sufficient number of observations in each interval, regressions are run on the
entire sample of countries. Overall, the regressions suggest that prices increase with
distance. The only noteworthy point is that this increase is not always significant
15Table C.1 in Appendix presents the results obtained when applying the two-step methodology
developed by Harrigan (2005). With this methodology, estimated coefficients are still positive and
significant and of even higher magnitude.
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Table 3: Price and distance intervals
Dependent variable: Price (log)
(1) (2) (3)
1500 < distance < 3000 0.024 0.026 0.026
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
3000 < distance < 6000 0.085a 0.108a 0.108a
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
6000 < distance < 12000 0.115a 0.136a 0.135a
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
12000 < distance 0.145a 0.141a 0.140a
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
GDP (log) -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
GDP per capita (log) 0.022a 0.021a
(0.007) (0.006)
Mean UV (log) 0.018a
(0.005)
Fixed effects Firm × Product
Sample: All All All
Observations 1,199,711 1,199,711 1,198,282
R2 0.004 0.005 0.006
rho 0.911 0.911 0.910
This table investigates the impact of distance on firms’ export prices. It
uses the variance of prices across destination country within firm-product
pairs by including firm×product fixed effects. The dependent variable is
the log free on board export unit value by firm, destination and CN8 prod-
uct. Explanatory variables are the distance to the destination country, the
wealth of the destination country measured by GDP per capita, the size
of the destination country measured by GDP, and the level of competition
in the destination country measured by the average unit value of imports
to this country. Distance is measured using distance interval. Dummy is
equal to 1 if the destination country belongs to the interval and 0 elseother-
wise. Reported standard errors are clustered by country. c, b, a indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Figure 3: Price and distance deciles at the firm level, 2003
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toward countries lying at a distance of between 1,500 and 3,000 kilometers. Exporting
to closer countries (less than 3,000 km) increases prices by 2 log points, while exporting
to remoter countries (more than 12,000 km) increases prices by 14 log points. In
the three regressions, an F-test allows rejection of the equality of distance intervals’
coefficients.16
As a last graphical evidence, Figure 3 presents the evolution of prices by distance
deciles. Namely, prices at the firm level are regressed on deciles of distance, the log-
arithms of GDP per capita, GDP, multilateral unit values, and firm×product fixed
effects. Figure 3 unambiguously suggests that firms charge higher prices in more dis-
tant countries. The previous regressions are run on the pooled sample. To gauge how
16In Appendix, Table C.2 presents the results when introducing country random effects instead of
clustering at the country level. Coefficients are still significant and increasing with distance which
reinforces the previous results. Even close intervals become statistically significant.
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systematic is the impact of distance on prices, the sample is split into several bins
grouping firms according to their size (measured by total exports) or the substitution
of products (measured by the elasticity of substitution provided by Broda and Wein-
stein (2006)). Actually, most models predict that the reaction of markups or quality
as well as the strength of composition effects are stronger in more differentiated in-
dustries.17 Furthermore, the recent trade literature emphasizes the importance of firm
heterogeneity, which suggests that the reaction to distance may differ across firms.
Table 5 investigates whether their is a heterogeneity in the response of prices to distance
depending on the degree of differentiation of te products. It appears that within more
differentiated industries (industries with a low elasticity of substitution), unit values
are more responsive to changes in distance. This result is confirmed by the negative
and significant coefficient that shows up when interacting the logarithm of distance
with the elasticity of substitution of the good sold by the firm. In more differentiated
sectors, firms have more room to adjust their markups or the quality they sell across
destination countries.
Table 4 presents a similar exercise in which regressions are run on different samples of
firm sizes. The total value of exports is used as a proxy for firm sizes or performances.
There is no significant difference between estimated coefficients for the different samples
of firm sizes. The interaction between the log of distance and the log of firms’ size is not
significant either. This suggests that firms of different size react in the same fashion
to changes in distance.18 Before, attempting to explain the positive impact of distance
on prices, let’s compare the previous findings in light of the extant empirical literature,
17Even if it is not emphasized, this prediction is in models by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Otta-
viano et al. (2002) or Hummels and Skiba (2004).
18Table A.3 presents regressions including the quality of institution in the destination country as
well as the market potential of the destination country, computed at the 3 digit sectoral level. Those
controls impact neither the statistical significance of the distance coefficient nor their magnitude.
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Table 4: Price, distance, and firms’ size
Dependent variable: Price (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firms’ size: Small Small-Med Med-Large Large All
Sales×100, 000 (euro) [0, 9] [9, 56] [56, 315] > 315
Distance (log) 0.076a 0.052a 0.039a 0.042a 0.074b
(0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.037)
GDP (log) -0.002 -0.003 -0.007b -0.006 -0.004
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP per cap. (log) 0.039a 0.027a 0.012b 0.010c 0.018a
(0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Mean UV (log) 0.012b 0.014a 0.021a 0.026a 0.018a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Dist. (log)×Size (log) -0.002
(0.002)
Fixed effects Firm × Product
Sample: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All
Observations 299,532 299,631 299,544 299,575 1,198,282
R2 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005
rho 0.922 0.905 0.908 0.906 0.910
This table investigates the impact of distance on firm’s export prices. It uses the variance of prices
across destination country within firm-product pairs by including firm×product fixed effects. The
dependent variable is the log free on board export unit value by firm, destination and CN8 product.
Explanatory variables are the distance to the destination country, the wealth of the destination
country measured by GDP per capita, the size of the destination country measured by GDP, the
level of competition in the destination country measured by the average unit value of imports in this
country, and firms’ total sales. The first four columns present the regressions run on subsamples
of the data. Subsamples group firms belonging to the same quartile range in terms of total export
sales. Q1 is for the small, Q2 for the small-medium, Q3 for the medium-large, and Q4 for the large
firms. In the last column, we interact the log of distance with the log of firms’ size measured as total
sales. Reported standard errors are clustered by country. c, b, a indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level.
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Table 5: Price, distance, and elasticity of substitution
Dependent variable: Price (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Elasticity: Small Small-Med Med-Large Large All
[1, 4.3] [4.3, 5.1] [5.1, 5.8] [5.8, 27]
Distance (log) 0.073a 0.045a 0.042a 0.037a 0.066a
(0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014)
GDP (log) -0.001 -0.012a -0.010a 0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP per cap. (log) 0.027a 0.019a 0.006 0.025a 0.018a
(0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Mean UV (log) 0.012 0.025a 0.016a 0.022a 0.018a
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Dist. (log)× -0.003a
Elasticity (log) (0.001)
Fixed effects Firm × Product
Sample: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All
Observations 320,882 308,396 258,696 293,680 1,181,654
R2 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005
rho 0.880 0.883 0.914 0.908 0.907
This table investigates the impact of distance on firms’ export prices. It uses the variance
of prices across destination country within firm-product pairs by including firm×product fixed
effects. The dependent variable is the log free on board export unit value by firm, destination
and CN8 product. Explanatory variables are the distance to the destination country, the wealth
of the destination country measured by GDP per capita, the size of the destination country
measured by GDP, the level of competition in the destination country measured by the average
unit value of imports in this country, and product level elasticity of substitution. The elasticity
of substitution is computed at the HS6 product level by Broda & Weinstein (2004). The first
four columns present the regressions run on subsamples of the data. Subsamples group products
belonging to the same quartile range in terms of elasticity of substitution. Q1 is for products
with a small elasticity, Q2 for the small-medium, Q3 for the medium-large, and Q4 for the large.
In the last column, we interact the log of distance with the log of the elasticity of substitution.
Reported standard errors are clustered by country. c, b, a indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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and assess its economic significance.
3.3 Comparison with the literature
Three papers are highly comparable in terms of methodology. Bastos and Silva (2010),
Manova and Zhang (forthcoming) and Gorg et al. (2010) also explore the determinants
of individual fob unit values. In doing so, they use bilateral firm level data on Por-
tuguese, Chinese and Hungarian exports respectively. The most comparable estimates
are those for the manufacturing sample in 2005 for China and Portugal, and 2003 for
Hungary. The estimated elasticity of fob prices to distance is 0.052 for Portugal (Table
6, column 11 in Bastos & Silva), 0.056 for Hungary (Table 2, column 5 in Gorg et
al.), and 0.014 for China (Table 8, column 1 in Manova & Zang). Those estimates - in
particular for Hungary and Portugal - are very close to the elasticity of 0.050 estimated
in the previous section (Table 2, columns 7-8).
Another paper addressing similar issues is Irarrazabal et al. (2010). The authors study
the importance of the form of transport costs in a Melitz type model. In particular,
they develop a model combining per unit and iceberg trade costs, and then bring it to
the data to estimate the prevalence of per unit costs. They use Norwegian firm-level
data and structurally estimate their model using a minimum distance estimator. They
find per unit trade costs account on average for 35% of consumer prices. However, the
main results emerging from their empirical exercise are not directly comparable with
the estimates obtained in the previous section. To obtain a comparison, the elasticity
of fob prices to distance implied by their estimates is derived.
In their model, the elasticity of fob prices to distance is firm specific. Therefore, it is
necessary to write down the average elasticity, and then compute it using their esti-
mates. Computations are described in Appendix D. Their estimates yield an elasticity
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of fob prices to transport costs of 0.23. The implied elasticity of fob price to distance
is the product of this elasticity and the elasticity of transport costs to distance. They
estimate an elasticity of transport costs to distance of 0.07. This implies an elasticity of
fob price to distance of 0.016 (0.23×0.07). The elasticity is a bit smaller to what is find
this paper (and what is found in the literature) but has the same order of magnitude.19
Overall, those results suggest that the elasticity of fob prices to distance is positive and
around 0.05. This seems quite robust to the sample, and the method used to compute
it.
3.4 Economic significance
This section discusses the economic significance of the estimates. We have measured
an elasticity of fob prices to distance of 0.05. What does this mean for consumers?
To better interpret our estimates, the elasticity of import (cif) prices with respect to
distance and transport costs are computed.20 Two alternative formulas are used to
compute the elasticity of import prices to changes in distance.
First, the logarithm of the cif price is decomposed in two parts: the logarithm of the
fob prices and the logarithm of cif/fob margins. Using this decomposition yields the
following formula for the elasticity of import prices to distance:
δlog(pcif )
δlog(dist)
=
δlog(pfob)
δlog(dist)
+
δlog(pcif/pfob)
δlog(dist)
(2)
19Another prediction from Irarrazabal et al. (2010) is that the dispersion of quantities within prod-
ucts, should decrease in more distant countries. Measuring dispersion by the P90/P10 ratio of quan-
tities, I regressed the dispersion measured for every product and country on distance, GDP, GDP per
capita, and product fixed effects. Consistent with the prediction, distance is found to have a negative
and significant impact on dispersion. Results are available upon request.
20For simplicity, we refer to cost, insurance and freight (cif) prices as import prices. The consumer
price is composed of the import price and the local costs. Conclusions for consumer prices would be
similar to the ones for import prices if local costs such as VAT or distribution margins affect import
prices in a multiplicative way.
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The first term on the right hand side of the equality is the elasticity of fob prices to
distance, the second term is the elasticity of the cif/fob margins to distance. From
the previous section, the elasticity of fob prices to distance is 0.05, and Hummels and
Lugovskyy (2006) estimate an elasticity of the cif/fob margins of 0.01 (table 6, national
data, US imports). Therefore, the implied elasticity of firm-level cif prices to distance
is 0.06 (0.05 + 0.01).21
The second formula build from the definition of import prices. The import price (pcif )
is the sum of the fob price (pfob) and freight costs (T ):
pcif = pfob + T (3)
Taking the first derivative of this expression with respect to distance, multiplying by
distance, dividing by the price, and rearranging yield:
∂pcif
∂dist
× dist
pcif
=
(
∂pfob
∂dist
× dist
pfob
)
× pfob
pcif
+
(
∂T
∂dist
× dist
T
)
× T
pcif
(4)
In words, the elasticity of import prices to distance is a weighted average of the elasticity
of fob prices to distance and the elasticity of transport costs to distance. Each elasticity
is weighted respectively by the share of the fob price and the freight costs in the import
price. The intuition for this formula is straightforward. The sensitivity of import prices
to distance not only depends on the elasticity of its components but also on the relative
importance of those components in the final price. Hummels and Skiba (2004) estimate
an elasticity of transport costs to distance of 0.26.22 Furthermore, Hummels et al.
21The elasticity of the cif/fob margins for all countries is estimated to be 0.045 (Hummels and
Lugovskyy, 2006, table 6). This yields to an elasticity of import prices to distance of almost 0.10. The
elasticity of cif/fob margins is considered for the US because the second formula uses information for
the US only. Furthermore US cif/fob ratios are based on DOTS, which are of better quality than the
IMF-COMTRADE cif/fob ratios (Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2006).
22Hummels et al. (2001) estimates an elasticity of 0.27. However, freight costs are measured as the
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(2001) shows that for in the US, the share of freight costs in import prices is 3.8%.
Using this information and the elasticity of fob prices to distance give an elasticity of
cif prices to distance of: 0.06 (0.038× 0.26 + 0.962× 0.005 = 0.058). This means that
more than 80% of the change in import prices is due to the indirect effect of distance
on fob prices (0.05× 0.962/0.06).23
Using the elasticity of import prices to distance and the elasticity of transport costs to
distance, it is easy to compute the elasticity of import prices to transport costs. It is
equal to 0.23 (0.06/0.26 = 0.23). This means that about one fourth of the changes in
transport costs are passed on import prices.
Welfare gains from trade liberalization emphasized by the literature are mainly due
to two effects: an increase in the number of varieties available to consumers and a
decrease in the prices paid by consumers. Traditionally, two mechanisms explain the
drop in prices. First, the direct effect linked with the drop in transport costs. Since
part of the import price paid by consumers includes the cost of shipment, reducing
this cost mechanically reduces the consumer price. Second, there is an indirect "pro-
competitive" effect. Actually, in models with variable markups, the decline in transport
costs increases competition and the pressure on firms’ markups. The present results
suggest that a third mechanism explains the fall in consumer prices following a trade
facilitation. Following a decline in transport costs, firms react by charging a lower price
net of transportation costs. Moreover, it appears this channel is far from negligible:
after a drop in transport costs, 80% of the import price decline enjoyed by consumers
is due to firms charging lower prices. The rest is attributable to the direct effect of
ratio between freight expenditure and the value of imports. Hummels and Skiba’ s estimation relies
on the ratio of freight expenditure over quantities. This is exactly T .
23We can see how important is the share of freight costs in import prices. For instance, if it was a
bit higher, say 10%, the elasticity of import prices to distance would be 0.07 (0.9× 0.05 + 0.1× 0.26),
and changes in freight costs would contribute to 1/3 of the change (0.1× 0.26/0.07).
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transport costs on import prices.24
The direct effect of transport costs is very small since those costs account for a tiny
share of final prices. By contrast, the indirect effect of a change in transport costs
through fob prices is small, but changes in fob prices are almost entirely transmitted
to import prices (96% of the change is passed on). Therefore in economies in which
transport costs account for a tiny share of import prices, most of the action comes
from changes in fob unit values. The next section discusses through which theoretical
mechanisms distance and transport costs may affect those unit values.
4 Theoretical mechanisms
In most models of international trade, firms are expected to charge the same fob price
to all countries or to reduce their markups to more distant ones.25 This section reviews
the different theoretical mechanisms that may explain the positive impact of distance on
unit values found in the data. As noticed in Section 2, unit values are imperfect proxy
for prices. As a result, one cannot interpret differences in unit values as differences in
markups only.
First, firms may simply charge higher markups to more distant countries. This arises
naturally if the elasticity of demand is increasing with distance, like in a CES model
with additive transport costs.26
Second, firms may choose to sell upgraded versions of their product to more dis-
24The effect of a drop in transport costs on prices through a change in competition is not considered
in the estimation.
25Some papers focus on dumping strategies: firms reduce their markup when exporting toward more
distant countries to remain competitive (Brander, 1981; Brander and Krugman, 1983; Ottaviano et al.,
2002; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). But most of the international trade literature gets rid of price
discrimination in the interest of tractability. In models à la Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003), firms
charge the same markup across countries.
26See Greenhut et al. (1985), and Hoover (1937).
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tant countries. Such quality upgrading is consistent with a CES model with additive
transport costs where firms endogenously choose a destination-specific quality for their
goods.
Third, if firms are multi-products within CN8 categories, the positive impact of distance
on fob unit values may reflect the fact that the share of more expensive, higher quality
varieties within firms and 8 digit level categories increases with distance. Such an
explanation is consistent with both a composition effect due to additive transport
costs as in Alchian and Allen (1964) and a selection of higher quality varieties (within
firms) to more difficult markets. The selection effect may be driven by the presence of
fixed costs, paid by multi-product firms, for each of their products. The mechanism is
similar to Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), but the selection occurs within firms among
products rather than among firms. Since only high qualities are sold in more difficult
markets, the average price is higher in those markets.
Last, higher unit values in more distant markets may simply reflect some additional
costs of shipping such as packaging costs included in the free-on-board prices.
It is worth emphasizing that most of these mechanisms are connected to the Alchian-
Allen conjecture: the relative demand for more expensive/higher quality goods in-
creases with transport costs. Interestingly, this demand-driven mechanism builds on
the hypothesis of non-multiplicative transport costs. This hypothesis may explain the
first two mechanisms. Actually, both the markup and the quality upgrading mecha-
nisms can easily be sketched in a monopolistic competition CES model with per unit
transport costs (rather than (multiplicative) iceberg ones). The intuition is straightfor-
ward. A higher per unit cost implies that the share of the producer (fob) price in the
final price paid by the consumer reduces. Therefore, the perceived impact of producer
price changes is also lessened. This offers some room for firms to increase their prices.
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More formally, the introduction of a per unit cost changes the results concerning the
relationship between prices and transport costs (in some models) because it introduces
a disconnection between the elasticity of demand to the cif price and the elasticity of
demand to the fob price. Assuming that the transport cost has both an additive and a
multiplicative component, it is easy to show that the elasticities of demand to cif and
fob prices are linked by the following equation.
fob = cif/(1 +
T
τpfob
) (1)
where m = ∂log(demand)
∂log(pm)
with m ∈ (cif, fob). In the case of pure iceberg transport
cost, T is nil and the elasticities of demand to fob and cif prices are the same. By
contrast, for a given elasticity of demand to the cif price, the elasticity of demand to
fob price decreases in T . All else equal, with an additive transport cost, the demand is
less responsive to changes in prices. Therefore, remote firms are able to set higher fob
prices, which allows them to compensate a part of the loss due to the lower demand
they face because of freight costs.
The last discussion assumes that distance impacts the fob price only through T . How-
ever, in a lot of models such as quasi linear demand models, the elasticity of demand to
cif prices positively depends on the cif price itself. Consequently with additive trans-
port costs, two opposite forces are at stake. The elasticity of demand to fob price tends
to decline due to the additive cost, but it also increases because the cif price increases
due to higher transport costs. In linear demand models, the price effect dominates,
therefore the elasticity increases with transport costs and distance and prices decrease
with distance. This results holds if prices not only depend on markups but also on the
quality of the exported product. This is shown more formally for the CES and quasi
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linear models in Appendix E. In particular, in a CES model in which firms endoge-
nously choose the (costly) quality they serve in every market, the quality is higher in
more distant countries only if firms face per unit transport costs. By contrast, in a
quadratic model, firms choose to sell lower quality in more distant markets whatever
the structure of transport costs.
The composition mechanism is even more closely related to Alchian-Allen’s original
statement. If firms are multi-product within CN8 categories, in the presence of per
unit transport costs, the relative demand for higher quality varieties is expected to
increase with distance. By contrast, the selection mechanism is a supply mechanism
that does not require per unit transport costs.
5 Conclusion
Using highly detailed data on bilateral trade of French exporters, this paper finds that
firms charge higher free on board unit values on exports to more distant countries.
This result is robust to the inclusion of other determinants of export prices such as the
wealth, the size, the level of competition, and the tariffs faced by French exporters in
the destination country.
The positive impact of distance on free-on-board unit values is far from negligible. After
a drop in transport costs, about 80% of the import price decline enjoyed by consumers
is due to firms charging lower prices net of transport costs. The rest is attributable
to the direct effect of a drop in transport cost on consumer prices. This suggests a
potential new channel through which changes in transport costs may affect welfare.
However, several mechanisms may explain the positive impact of distance on fob unit
values: higher markups, higher quality, composition effects, selection effects, or costs of
29
packaging. Understanding the contribution of these mechanisms is the next step before
we can evaluate precisely the gains from trade linked with this feature of the data.
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A Appendix. Data.
Distances are from the dataset developed by Mayer and Zignago (2006). 27
Real GDP and GDP per capita in PPP, from the IFS database, are used as control
variables. We also use average imported unit values by country. These unit values
are computed from BACI, the database of international trade at the product level
developed by Gaulier and Zignago (2008).28
For each hs6 product and country, average unit value weighted by the quantities are
computed. For product k in country j :UV (kj) =
∑
wijkUVijk. Where UVijk is the unit
value of the good k imported from country i to country j. And wijk is the weight of good
k exports from country i. Then these hs6 unit values are merged with customs data.
Thus for each product exported from a French firm in 2003, we have the corresponding
average unit value in each potential destination market.
In our empirical analysis we also investigate the interplay between distance and product
differentiation. Product differentiation is measured by the elasticity of substitution
between products within narrowly defined sectors. Information on this comes from
Broda and Weinstein (2006).
As a robustness check, I control for the Real market potential in the destination market.
I use the Head and Mayer market potential computed for 144 countries at the industry
level (ISIC rev2, 3 digit). See Mayer (2008) for details on the computation of the
market potentials and the database.
Last, a measure of the quality of institution is introduced as a control variable. I use
the ICRG index which is a composite score giving the risk exposition of countries. More
details are available at the following address:
27Data are available on CEPII’s website: http : //www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
28For a description of the database, see http : //www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm.
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http : //www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx.
B Appendix. Methodology.
The alternative methodology to clustering proposed by Harrigan (2005) consists in a
two way error component model. The basic idea is to introduce both firm× product
fixed effects and country random effects. Since one cannot run such a regression, one
first removes the firm and product means from all variables and then runs the random
effects regressions on the transformed variables as indicated in this paper.
C Appendix. Empirical Results.
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D Appendix. Comparison with the literature
I build on the following equations from Irarrazabal et al. (2010). The authors define
Bkn = t
k
n ×
(
τ kn/z¯
k
n
)
, where t is the per unit transport cost, τ is an iceberg trade cost
and z¯ is the productivity of the least efficient exporter. For simplicity it is assumed
τ = 1. The fob price charged by a firm with productivity relative to the cutoff z is:29
pkn(z) =
σwtkn
σ − 1
(
1
zBkn
+ 1/σ
)
where p is the fob price, w is the unit cost, σ is the elasticity of substitution among
goods, and z is the productivity of the firm measured relative to the cutoff.
The elasticity of fob price to transport cost for firm with relative productivity z is
simply:
δlog(pkn(z)
δlog(tkn)
= 1/
(
1 + σ/(z ×Bkn)
)
(D.1)
The average elasticity is:
δlog(pkn)
δlog(tkn)
=
∫
1
1/
(
1 + σ/(z ×Bkn)
)
dF (z) (D.2)
where F (z) is the distribution of firm productivity.
Computing it requires some values for σ, Bkn and to know the distribution F . I follow
the authors and assume an elasticity σ of 4 and a Pareto distribution with a parameter
of 1.31. We derive Bkn using their estimate of the trade cost relative to average consumer
prices. Namely, they estimate:
wtkn
p¯kn
=
σ − 1
σ
Bkn(γ + 1)
γ +Bkn(γ + 1)
29Notice that the focus is on the fob price and not the cif price as in the paper.
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where γ is the Pareto parameter. B is solved given the authors’ assumptions σ = 4,
γ = 1.31 and their estimation: wt
k
n
p¯kn
= 0.35. This gives B = 0.496. Then, I solve
equation D.2 numerically which yields an average elasticity of fob price to transport
costs of 0.23.
E Appendix. Theory.
This section discusses the impact of transport costs on markups, quality and prices
depending on the structure of transport costs, the nature of demand and the capacity
of firms to adapt the quality of their products. In particular, it focuses on CES and
quasi linear demands, with exogenous or endogenous quality choices, in presence of
both iceberg and per unit costs.
Framework
No assumption is made on who pays or how transport costs are passed-on to the
consumer, but the structure of transport cost is specified:
Transport Cost = pciffj − pfobfj = (τfj − 1)pfobfj + Tfj (E.1)
where f and j denote respectively the firm and the destination country, pfob is the fob
price, pcif is the price faced by the consumer, w is the marginal cost of production and
T and τ are the additive and multiplicative components of the transport cost. If T is
nil the transport cost has an iceberg form whereas if τ is one, it is a per unit transport
cost.30 As long as T is strictly positive, the transport cost is less than proportional to
30This formulation is restrictive, but it allows us to highlight the different predictions one can get
when modifying τ and T . It is similar to Hummels and Skiba (2004) but here it is assumed that
both the ad-valorem and the additive parts increase with distance. In Harrigan and Deng (2008), the
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the fob price. Several assumptions common in trade models bear on firms behavior.
First, the firm’s strategy in a given market is supposed to be independent from its
strategy in other markets. The second assumption is that in market j, the firm faces a
mixed transport cost (see Equation E.1). Last, it is assumed that the firm maximizes
the following operational profit:
piif =
[
pfobfj − wf
]
qfj =
[
(pciffj − Tfj)/τfj − wf
]
qfj (E.2)
where qfj is the quantity sold on market j (that depends on the cif price) and w is firm
specific but constant across markets.We further assume that firms are in monopolistic
competition.
CES demand
In Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003) type models, firms face the following inverse
demand:
pciffj = kjq
−1/σ
fj λ
(σ−1)/σ (E.3)
with k a positive parameter, exogenous for the firm, and σ the elasticity of substitution,
greater than 1. In this type of model, k is in general a function of the size of the
destination country and the price index in the destination country. λ is a taste/quality
parameter. A high quality shifts up the demand for the variety. In a first step, λ is
supposed to be exogenous.
Since λ is exogenous, it is dropped this paragraph. Firm f maximizes its operational
profit (eq. E.4) on market j considering a CES demand (eq. E.3). The program is
transport cost also depends on physical characteristics of the good. Here we implicitly assume that
physical characteristics of a product sold on different markets by a firm are identical.
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given by:
arg maxpcif
[
(pciffj − Tfj)/τfj − wf
] [pciffj
kj
]σ
(E.4)
The first order condition of the maximization program yields:
pfob =
1
σ − 1(
T
τ
) +
σ
σ − 1w (E.5)
If the transport cost has the standard iceberg structure (T = 0), the fob price is a
constant markup over marginal costs. This is the textbook case of a large part of trade
models (Krugman, 1980; Melitz, 2003; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011).
By contrast, if the transport cost is per unit (τ = 1), then the markup is increasing in
transport costs. That is the first possible channel through which prices may increase
with distance.
Firms may also adjust the quality of their product depending on market characteristics.
Here we focus on the distance to the destination market. If quality is costly, then the
relationship between prices and transport costs could be driven by changes in the
quality of the exported product.31
The inverse demand is given by equation E.3. In a first step, the optimal price is
computed. The first order condition of the maximization of firm’s profit with respect
to price gives the same result as the exogenous quality case but the marginal cost now
depends on the quality level:
pfob =
1
σ − 1(
T
τ
) +
σ
σ − 1w(λ) (E.6)
Here one sees that the price depends on transport costs through τ and T but transport
cost could also impact the price indirectly by affecting λ and so w(λ).
31An existing model where the quality is explicitly destination specific is Verhoogen (2008).
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To find the optimal level of quality, the firm maximizes its profit with respect to λ,
replacing price by the expression of the first step. Firms maximize the following profit:
Π =
σ−σ
(σ − 1)1−σ
kσλσ−1
τ
(T + τw(λ))1−σ (E.7)
Assumption that w is exogenous is relaxed when considering that quality is market
specific. Producing a better quality increases your demand but is costly. Thus, one
considers that the marginal cost w(λ) is a function of quality. The following assump-
tions are made. The marginal cost is increasing in quality and convex (∂w(λ)/∂λ > 0
and ∂2w(λ)/∂λ2 > 0). If marginal cost does not increase in quality then a price in-
crease cannot be thought as a quality upgrading phenomenon. This assumption is in
line with recent empirical evidence showing that quality requires high skilled workers
and higher quality inputs.32 The second assumption ensures that it is sufficiently costly
to produce quality to not choose an infinite quality. The third assumption, w(0) > 0,
states that even if the firm produces a nil quality, it faces a positive cost. Under this
assumption, the elasticity of costs to quality is not a constant which is a necessary
condition to have a finite solution. Last, the elasticity is supposed to be greater than
or equal to one for all positive levels of quality (∂ln(w(λ))/∂ln(λ) ≥ 1,∀λ ≥ 0). This
last assumption is in fact a combination of assumptions on convexity of costs and non
nil marginal costs. It is useful to check the second order condition.
The first order condition with respect to λ is equivalent to:
∂Π
∂λ
= 0⇔ T/τ + w(λ)− λw′(λ) = 0 (E.8)
Let’s consider the function H(λ, τ, T ) = T/τ + w(λ) − λw′(λ). The function H is a
32See Kugler and Verhoogen (forthcoming).
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decreasing function of λ (∂H/∂λ = −τλw′′(λ)) because costs are convex in λ. H() is a
positive function of T . It is a negative function of τ if T is non nil and does not depend
on τ else.33
H(0, τ, T ) is positive. When λ tends to infinity, the limit of H(λ, τ, T ) is negative. And
H is a decreasing function of λ. Therefore there exists a unique point λ∗ such that
H(λ∗, τ, T ) = 0. To understand how λ changes with per unit and iceberg transport
costs we use the property that in the neighborhood of λ∗ the total derivative of H with
respect to τ or T should be equal to zero. Hence:
∂H(λ, τ, T )
∂τ
+
∂H(λ, τ, T )
∂λ
∂λ
∂τ
= 0 (E.9)
and
∂H(λ, τ, T )
∂T
+
∂H(λ, τ, T )
∂λ
∂λ
∂T
= 0 (E.10)
Since H is decreasing in λ and τ and increasing in T , for the two identity to hold one
must have: ∂λ/∂τ < 0 if T is strictly positive, ∂λ/∂τ < 0 if T is nil, and ∂λ/∂T > 0.
Therefore under CES demand, if they have the possibility, firms increase the quality
of exported product when per unit transport costs are higher. Since i) prices depend
positively on marginal costs, ii) marginal costs increase with the level of quality, and
iii) the level of quality itself increases with per unit transport costs, then prices increase
with per unit transport costs. However, neither the quality nor the markup vary when
transport costs have an iceberg formulation. Neither does the price.
33Note that the derivative of H with respect to τ is negative if the elasticity of costs to quality is
equal to or greater than 1. If not, there is no solution to this equation. The first order condition
cannot be verified but if λ = 0 which implies a nil demand.
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Quasi linear demand
While CES models are omnipresent in international trade, several papers consider quasi
linear demand (Ottaviano et al., 2002; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). In such models,
firms face the following inverse demand function:
pciffj = zj − kjqfj (E.11)
where j and f denote the firm and the destination country respectively, and z and k
are a positive parameters, exogenous for the firms. z includes the price index.34 k is a
positive parameter capturing the degree of differentiation across varieties. In the rest
of the paper, we drop the subscripts f and j.
It is first assumed that quality is exogenous. The program of the firm is to maximize
its operational profit (eq. E.4) given the linear demand (eq. E.11). The first order
condition yields:
pfob =
1
2
(
z
τ
− T
τ
) +
w
2
(E.12)
The price net of transport cost negatively depends on transport costs whatever their
structure. This has already been verified in the literature: Ottaviano et al. (2002) use
a per unit transport cost whereas Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) use an iceberg one and
in both models firms absorb part of the transport costs.
The link between prices and transport costs is explored in a quasi linear demand model
in which firms choose the level of quality they produce. Quality is introduced in this
framework through an additive shifter as in Antoniades (2008):
pcif = z − kq + αλ (E.13)
34For expositional ease, we consider a population of size 1.
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In Antoniades (2008) the marginal cost does not depend on the level of quality. Instead,
the fixed cost is increasing in quality. In what follows, it is assumed the marginal cost
is increasing and convex in quality. Furthermore, it is assumed that w′(0) = 0 which
is a sufficient condition for the second order condition to be verified.
In the first step, firms set their optimal price, taken quality as given. The price is the
same as without quality.
pfob =
1
2
(
z + λ
τ
− T
τ
) +
w(λ)
2
(E.14)
In a second step, the firm maximizes its profit with respect to quality level. Firm’s
profit is:
Π =
1
4kτ
(z − T + λ− τw(λ))2 (E.15)
The first order condition with respect to λ yields:
H(λ, τ, T ) = 1− τw′(λ) = 0 (E.16)
Function H is positive if λ = 0 and the limit of H tends to negative infinite when
λ tends to positive infinity. There exist a optimal point in which H is nil. At the
neighborhood of this point, the derivative of H with respect to τ has to be nil:
− ∂w(λ)
∂λ
− ∂
2w(λ)
∂λ2
∂λ
∂τ
τ = 0 (E.17)
Since costs are increasing in λ and convex, the equality holds if ∂λ/∂τ is negative.
Thus, in quasi-linear demand models, firms reduce the quality they export when iceberg
transport costs increase. The level of quality is independent of per unit costs. Since
under this framework firms reduce their markup, the overall effect of transport costs
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on prices is negative, whatever the structure of transport costs.
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Table C.2: Price and distance intervals, mixed effects
Dependent variable: Price (log)
(1) (2) (3)
1500 < distance < 3000 0.024a 0.026a 0.026a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
3000 < distance < 6000 0.085a 0.108a 0.108a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
6000 < distance < 12000 0.115a 0.136a 0.135a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
12000 < distance 0.145a 0.141a 0.140a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP (log) -0.006a -0.006a
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP per capita (log) 0.022a 0.021a
(0.001) (0.001)
Mean UV (log) 0.018a
(0.001)
Fixed effects Firm × Product
Random effects Country
Sample: All OECD Eurozone
Observations 1,199,711 1,199,711 1,198,282
rho 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table investigates the impact of distance on firms’ export prices.
It uses the variance of prices across destination country within firm-
product pairs by including firm×product fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the log free on board export unit value by firm, destina-
tion and CN8 product. Explanatory variables are the distance to the
destination country, the wealth of the destination country measured
by the GDP per capita, the size of the destination country measured
by the GDP, and the level of competition in the destination country
measured by the average unit value of imports in this country. Dis-
tance is measured using distance interval. Dummy is equal to 1 if the
destination country belongs to the interval and 0 otherwise. Country
random effects are added to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Ro-
bust standard errors in parenthesis. c, b, a indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table C.3: Price and distance, robustness
Dependent variable: Price (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dist (log) 0.050a 0.052a 0.017a 0.065a 0.077a 0.013
(0.010) (0.012) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
GDP (log) -0.005 -0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.007) (0.001)
GDP cap (log) 0.027a 0.060b 0.029a 0.010 0.017 0.018b
(0.008) (0.026) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006)
Mean UV (log) 0.017a 0.010c 0.003 0.016a 0.010a 0.005b
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
IRCG index -0.034 -0.047 -0.040a
(0.020) (0.038) (0.007)
Market potential 0.008 0.017b 0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003)
Fixed effects Firm × Product
Sample: All OECD EU All OECD EU
Observations 1,170,543 909,398 591,268 818,563 672,936 428,236
R2 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.009 0.000
rho 0.911 0.922 0.933 0.907 0.916 0.926
This table investigates the impact of distance on firms’ export prices. It uses the variance
of prices across destination country within firm-product pairs by including firm×product
fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log free on board export unit value by firm,
destination and CN8 product. Explanatory variables are the distance to the destination
country, the wealth of the destination country measured by GDP per capita, the size of
the destination country measured by GDP, the level of competition in the destination
country measured by the average unit value of imports to this country, the quality of
institution measured by the ICRG index, and the Head and Mayer market potential of the
destination country (computed at the 3 digit level). Distance is measured using distance
interval. Dummy is equal to 1 if the destination country belongs to the interval and 0
otherwise. Reported standard errors are clustered by country. c, b, a indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Chapter 2
Price dispersion and the Euro 1
1 Introduction
More than ten years after the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), it be-
comes possible to empirically assess how the monetary integration has affected market
equilibria in Europe. By furthering market integration, EMU was expected to impact
trade patterns within the monetary zone as well as between EMU and the rest of the
world; this is the well-known Rose effect.2 Another manifestation that has been less
investigated in the empirical literature is the impact of EMU on the dispersion of prices.
According to the law of one price (LOOP), an integrated market should have a unique
price for each (properly defined) product. And deviations from this unique price can be
related to the degree of economic integration. Anything furthering market integration,
notably the creation of a currency union, is expected to induce a convergence toward
1This chapter is based on two papers written with Isabelle Méjean (Ecole Polytechnique). The
first paper has been published in French in Economie et Statistique in 2011 under the title "Euro
et dispersion des prix à l’exportation". The second paper is a new version of the paper in French,
with two new sections devoted to firm heterogenity, and the macroeconomic consequences of this
heterogeneity.
2See Rose (2000) or Baldwin et al. (2008).
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the LOOP.
This idea was one of the arguments that proponents of the monetary integration were
pushing forward. On its website, the EU Commission was thus assessing that the Euro
was going to increase price transparency, mute exchange rate fluctuations between
members, and increase competition.3 Altogether, those effects were expected to ease
arbitrage behaviors, reduce markups, and in turn lower price dispersion. This paper
proposes an empirical test of the previous price convergence effect, asking whether the
introduction of the Euro has induced a reduction in the dispersion of prices inside the
Euro area.
The test is conducted using export data describing the prices set by French exporting
firms in each of their destination markets. The sample is quasi-exhaustive, covering
the universe of French exporters over the period from 1996 to 2005. For each firm,
detailed information is provided about its bilateral exports, including the price set in
each single market, before any transportation cost is added. These “Free On Board”
(FOB) prices are interpreted as reflecting the pricing strategy of the firm.
At the firm- and product-level, the data exhibits quite a huge amount of price dispersion
across (OECD) destination markets. Surprisingly, the magnitude of price discrepan-
cies is almost unchanged once the sample is restricted to EU destinations. These price
discrepancies are attributable to French exporters discriminating their foreign markets,
even within a fairly well integrated area. Would arbitrage be perfect, such price differ-
entials would be unsustainable. We thus interpret the dispersion of prices as evidence
of deviations from the LOOP. Based on this, we ask whether the introduction of the
European common currency has reduced such deviations, leading to a convergence of
prices between European markets, within firms.
3See: http : //ec.europa.eu/economyf inance/euro/why/consumer/indexen.htm
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Our results indicate that the Euro adoption has significantly reduced the price discrim-
ination of French firms toward EMU countries. Using a difference-in-difference strategy
with the rest of the European Union as control group, we show that the relative price
dispersion in the Euro area is reduced by about 3 percentage points due to the single
currency. Though significant, the quantitative effect we obtain is thus small. However,
we also document an heterogeneity across firms in the size of price discrimination and
the effect of the Euro. In particular, we show that large firms have been more im-
pacted by the single currency: while they tend to discriminate more than the average
firm before EMU, the dispersion of their prices has strongly reduced after the Euro has
been introduced. Given that these firms account for the lion’s share of French exports,
their behaviors are likely to matter at the aggregate level. When we account for the
heterogeneity across firms, we indeed find a much larger impact of the Euro on price
dispersion. Namely, the single currency lowered by 17 percentage points the relative
dispersion of prices with the euro area.
This empirical analysis is related to a large literature testing how market integration
affects the magnitude of deviations from the LOOP. With respect to this literature,
our main contribution is to provide empirical evidence that are directly interpretable in
terms of micro-level price strategies. This is not the case of product-level studies4 that
are not able to identify the producer of the goods which prices are observed. In such
studies, the price effect of the monetary integration identified in the data is related to
mean prices of a given product category converging across countries after the common
currency has been introduced. But the convergence can be due to two alternative
factors: either did the common currency change the extent of price discrimination, or
did it affect the composition of the local supply, with an end effect on mean prices.
4See among others Lutz (2003) and Engel and Rogers (2004). Both find that the introduction of
the Euro has had a small to negligible effect on price dispersion and price convergence.
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Both explanations are observationally equivalent at the product-level, while they are
not at the firm-level. The price convergence we observe in our data can directly be
interpreted as evidence of exporting firms adjusting their pricing strategies following
the institutional shock.5
In the literature, a few papers are able to identify the identity of the producing firms,
and test how EMU has affected their pricing policies. These studies focus on very
specific products, the European automobile market in Goldberg and Verboven (2001)
and Gil-Pareja and Sosvilla-Rivero (2008) and electronic products sold online in Baye
et al. (2006). These studies find contrasted results for the price impact of the Euro.
Namely, EMU is found to increase the convergence of prices in the automobile industry
but not for electronic products. While cars and electronics are interesting products, the
drawback of using data on a single product is clearly related to the lack of generality
for the results. Our results instead cover a very broad array of products.
The paper is also in line with recent studies evaluating the gain from EMU integration
using firm-level trade data (Fontagné et al., 2009). The novelty of this approach is
that it allows asking how institutional shocks are perceived by firms and whether their
individual responses are heterogenous. In that respect, our paper is closely related
to Méjean and Schwellnus (2009). They study the convergence of prices within and
outside the EU and how it is affected by extensive versus intensive adjustments. We
instead explicitly focus on the natural experiment of monetary integration that EMU
provides and study price differentials across countries rather than the dynamics of
relative prices.
Finally, our paper is related to Berman et al. (2011). Their estimates suggest that
5As a related advantage over the literature, our dataset provides us with price data which level
is interpretable. Instead, a number of papers is forced to focus on the time path of relative prices,
based on price indices (Engel, 1993; Engel and Rogers, 1996). Crucini et al. (2005) emphasize that the
LOOP is better suited for an interpretation in terms of levels rather than in terms of price changes.
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more productive exporters adjust more their markup and less their volume than less
productive ones following an exchange rate shock. We also document such an het-
erogeneity in firms’ pricing strategies following macroeconomic shocks. In particular,
our estimates suggest that large firms have been more impacted by the facilitation of
arbitrage behaviors that followed the introduction of the Euro.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical
channels through which the introduction of the Euro may impact the extent of price
discrimination. Section 2 describes the data and provides some stylized facts. Section
5 presents the empirical strategy and details the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
This section details the different mechanisms through which the introduction of the
Euro may impact firms’ price discrimination. By definition, a firm price discriminates
if she sets different prices depending on the market she serves. According to Knetter
and Slaughter (1999), price discrimination is due to i) differences in characteristics of
demand across markets that provide incentive to discriminate, and ii) the ability of
firms to exploit those differences in presence of arbitrage costs. There is no obvious
reason why the introduction of a single currency should affect consumer preferences,
thus the incentive for firms to price discriminate. However, monetary integration is
expected to affect the cost of arbitrage over markets, therefore the ability of firms to
price discriminate.
Arbitrage behaviors are the main barriers to price discrimination. As noticed by As-
plund and Friberg (2001), the introduction of the Euro is expected to enhance these
behaviors for two reasons. First, price comparisons are made easier when prices are
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expressed in the same currency. Second, transaction costs, such as conversion costs,
decrease or disappear. The strengthening of arbitrage behaviors should dampen the
ability for firms to price discriminate and reduce price discrepancies.
These convergence forces may not be felt identically by all firms, however. In particu-
lar, the impact of reducing currency-related barriers to arbitrage is going to be all the
stronger since these barriers are an important component of overall barriers to arbi-
trage for consumers of the firm’s product. If, on the contrary, arbitrage is complicated
because of physical reasons (high transportation costs), or the differentiation of prod-
ucts (e.g. instructions for the product to be edited in the local language), there is no
reason to believe that price convergence will be severely affected by EMU. Since the
nature of barriers to arbitrage is product and even firm-specific, one can expect EMU
to have a heterogenous impact on different firms.
This effect is potentially amplified by greater competition resulting from the monetary
integration. If it pushes new firms to enter the market, monetary integration may
have a pro-competitive effect.6 This will force firms to price closer to their marginal
costs, which mechanically reduces price dispersion. Once again, the impact of such a
pro-competitive effect is likely sector- and even firm-specific.7
In addition to its effect on the ability of firms to price discriminate, the Euro may
affect the propension of firms to adopt such behavior. Friberg (2003) sketches a model
in which firms have to pay a fixed cost to segment markets. In this framework, firms’
optimal price is a function of the exchange rate and the option value of investing in
6See Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) for the theory, and Chen et al. (2009) for empirical evidence on
the pro-competitive effects of European integration.
7A additional channel through which EMU may induce a convergence of prices across countries is
the harmonization of psychological prices. This argument is discussed by Friberg and Matha (2004).
The intuition behind is straightforward. Psychological prices differ depending on the currency in
which the price is expressed. Adopting a single currency standardize those psychological prices, thus
withdrawing this source of price dispersion.
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the "segmentation" technology depends on the expected volatility of the exchange rate.
The adoption of a single currency thus reduces firms’ incentive to pay the fixed cost, and
to price discriminate. Méjean and Schwellnus (2009) show that, in this context, price
discrimination is not only a function of current macroeconomic conditions but also of
the firm’s characteristics. Once again, this suggests that the optimal reaction of firms
to enhance market integration is likely heterogenous. To strengthen this argument,
let’s sketch a highly stylized model in which heterogenous firms endogenously choose
to segment markets or not.
Let’s assume that firms (indexed by s) have a monopoly power on their variety. Firms
serve two markets (1 and 2) and choose whether to pay a fixed cost of segmenting the
two markets, or to charge the same price to all consumers, whatever the market. The
cost of segmenting is denoted F , the profit of segmenting firms is piS and the profit
of non segmenting firms is piNS. Firms face a (quasi) linear demand and differ by the
consumers’ willingness to pay for their product. Namely, they draw a demand shifter
that can be interpreted as a quality parameter (DiComite et al., 2011).
The demand faced by firm s in country i is:
di(pis) = αsβi − γipis (1)
For simplicity we assume that β1 = 1, β2 = β > 1, γi = 1, and that the marginal
cost of production (c) is the same across firms. We further assume that all firms serve
the two markets. They choose whether to segment markets or not and the price(s)
and quantities sold on each market. They compare their profit with and without
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segmentation, namely they compare the following two profits:
piS = (p1s − c)(αs − p1s) + (p2s − c)(αsβ − p2s)− F (2)
piNS = (p1s − c)(αs − p1s) + (p2s − c)(αsβ − p2s) s.t. p1s = p2s (3)
(4)
The gains to segment the market for firm s are given: G(s) = piS−piNS. Maximizing the
profit with segmentation with respect to p1 and p2, and the profit without segmentation
with respect to p, and taking the difference of the two profits yields:
G(s) =
α2s
4
(
3
2
+
3
2
β2 − β
)
− F (5)
We see that firms with a high αs - enjoying larger sales - are more likely to segment
markets. Furthermore, the incentive to segment markets is a positive function of β
meaning the gains to segment markets increase with market differentiation. Last,
the incentive to segment markets is a decreasing function of the cost of segmentation
F . As reviewed above, the introduction of the single currency was expected to ease
arbitrage behavior and, as a result, reduce the segmentation of markets. In the context
of our model, the facilitation of arbitrage behaviors maybe seen as a rise in the cost of
segmenting markets. In such case, the introduction of the euro is expected to reduce
firms’ gains from market segmentation. Of course, the only firms that are affected
by the euro, are firms that used to segment markets. For those firms, we expect the
variance of prices to decline to 0 after the introduction of the common currency.
The previous model implies that the incentive to discriminate is heterogeneous across
firms of different sizes but that the costs of segmenting is the same. Another mechanism
that would yield to an heterogeneity in the response of firms to the creation of the Euro
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is that the single currency has increased more the cost of segmentation for large firms
than for small firms. This may happen in a model in which arbitragers are supposed
to pay a fixed costs for each variety they re-export. If they face such a fixed costs plus
a variable cost, they are more likely to re-import large volume, ie. to re-import goods
produced by large firms. In such case, the introduction of the Euro, by lowering the
variable cost of conversion, could disproportionably increase the incentive of arbitragers
to re-exports large volume. As a result the segmentation cost for large firms increases.
Thus, large firms should reduce relatively more their level of price discrimination.
The different mechanisms stressed in this section suggest that (i) the Euro should
dampen firms’ price discrimination and (ii) this effect may differ across firms. The
remaining of the paper tests these two predictions.
3 Data and stylized facts
3.1 Data
We use an individual database of export flows provided to us by the French customs.
The dataset covers the 1996-2005 period, which allows us to study export prices before
and after the introduction of the Euro. Data are disaggregated by firm and product,
at the 8-digit level of the Combined Nomenclature (CN8).8
Our measure of export prices is based on unit values, defined as the ratio of value over
quantity for each bilateral flow:
Pfkjt =
V alfkjt
Qtyfkjt
8The CN nomenclature is regularly updated, which is an issue when we want to follow products
over time. Before starting working on the data, we thus apply the Pierce and Schott (2011) algorithm
to harmonize CN8 categories over time.
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where f , k, j and t respectively design a firm, a CN8 product, a destination market and
a year between 1996 and 2005. Using firm and product data is particularly convenient
when working on unit values because this price proxy is well-known to be biased by
composition effects (Kravis & Lipsey, 1974). The more disaggregated trade data are,
the more accurate the price proxy.
Even when working at the firm and product level, it may be the case that export unit
values are biased. For instance, mis-declarations by French firms or reporting errors
by the customs transmit into unit value errors. To account for this, we first apply an
outlier treatment procedure to the raw data. Namely, we compute the median unit
value for each product declared by a given firm in a particular year. We then delete
unit values that are 5 times higher or lower than the firm and product-specific median.
At this stage, the sample includes 205,689 firms declaring a total exported value of 2.91
trillion Euros. We however reduce it further, to OECD destinations. Since we want
to compare export prices in the eurozone with that of an appropriate control group,
it is convenient to keep countries of comparable development level. Besides, we drop
Greece from our sample. Greece entered the Euro area in 2001 which raises issues
when building our treatment and treated groups. The resulting database contains
12,997,607 observations, over 10 years (1996-2005), covering 28 countries (OECD less
France, Greece, and Luxembourg, which is merged with Belgium in the customs data),
195,208 firms and 8,987 products. The total export value is 2.39 trillion Euros.
Our measure of price dispersion aggregates the previously described firm- and destination-
specific unit values at the level of the region. Namely, we compute the coefficient of
variation of prices within the Euro area and in a control group:
cvfkrt =
stdev({Pfkjt}j∈r)
mean({Pfkjt}j∈r)
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where r is the region under consideration (either the EMU or the control group),
stdev({Pfkjt}j∈r) is the standard deviation of prices, computed over the set of countries
in r, and mean({Pfkjt}j∈r) is the average price in r. This statistics thus indicates the
extent of price discrepancies set by a given firm for a particular product across countries
of the considered area, which we assimilate to a measure of price discrimination.
3.2 Stylized facts
As a first description of the extent of price discrimination, Figure 1 illustrates the time
evolution of the average price dispersion for different geographic areas (namely the
EMU, the rest of the OECD, and the rest of the EU15). Here, each bar corresponds
to the simple average, computed over firms and products, of the price discrimination
indicators obtained for the corresponding zone. Its size is thus correlated with the
“mean” level of price discrepancies within the area.
Figure 1: Average coefficient of variation, EMU vs Rest of the OECD
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(a) Raw data (b) Controlling for market access and wealth
For every region the average coefficient is computed on the universe of French exporting
firms. In panel (b), prices are purged from wealth and market access effects.
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This graphs shows that the dispersion of prices set by a given firm is low, on average,
in the EMU. Namely, the mean coefficient of variation is equal to 43% outside the
European Union. Price discrepancies are marginally smaller in the eurozone and even
more in the rest of the European Union. On average, the mean coefficient of variation
is equal to 32% in the EMU and 30% in the rest of the EU.
At first sight, it may seem surprising that the dispersion of prices is higher in the EMU
than inside the rest of the EU15. Other sources of price heterogeneity, that are orthog-
onal to the monetary integration, may however explain the counter-intuitive result.
Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009) thus show that export prices depend on both the size
and the wealth of the destination country. Within a group of countries, heterogeneity
in these two country-specific characteristics may thus create some price dispersion. We
control for these determinants of price discrepancies in panel (b) of Figure 1. Namely,
we first regress unit values on the country’s GDP, its distance to France and its GDP
per capita. The residuals of this regression can be interpreted as the component of
prices that is unrelated to size, market access and wealth effects. They are used to
compute price dispersion indicators that are orthogonal to the previously described
structural determinants. Once the correction is applied, the counter-intuitive result
disappears. Namely, the residual price dispersion is the lowest in the EMU, followed
by the rest of the European Union and the rest of the OECD.
The ranking of areas in terms of aggregate price dispersion seems to hold throughout
the period. However, Figure 2 depicting the distribution of intra-EMU price discrep-
ancies over countries and time shows a process of gradual convergence. Here, each bar
corresponds to the average price deviation with respect to the EMU average for the
corresponding member of the eurozone. The negative number obtained for Spain thus
suggests individual firms tend to set lower prices, on average, on their Spanish market
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than in other EMU countries. Comparing these histograms over time shows that both
negative and positive country-specific deviations reduce throughout the period. This
suggests that intra-EMU prices tend to converge.
Figure 2: Price deviations with respect to the EMU mean, French sample
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These average statistics thus suggest that French firms price discriminate across mar-
kets, that price deviations are lower toward EMU countries, and that, within the Euro
area, price dispersion has decreased over time. Figure 3 goes deeper into the data,
studying how these price behaviors vary across firms. Namely, we plot the size of price
discrimination toward the Euro area by 50-quintiles of firms, ranked according to their
value added, in 1996.9 Within the population of French firms, more productive ones
9The relationship is robust to other firms characteristics such as TFP, employment or total sales.
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seem to have the most pronounced price discrimination strategies as measured by more
dispersed prices. This is consistent with the pricing behavior of firms being heteroge-
nous, in our sample. The heterogeneity may also translate into a heterogenous response
of firms to the monetary integration. We consider this possibility in section 4.2.10
Figure 3: Firms’ size and price discrimination
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CV  This graph plots the average price dispersion toward the Euro area in 1996 computed by
50-quintile bins of value-added against the (logarithm of the) average value added of firms in
those bins. Average dispersion is computed at the firm and product level and then average
by bins. The linear fit indicates a positive relationship between firms’ size and the size of
price dispersion.
10Note that the link between firms’ size and price dispersion might be due to an omitted variable
bias. In particular, large firms export to many markets which mechanically increases price dispersion.
Firm-product fixed effects correct such bias.
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3.3 Estimation strategy
This subsection describes the difference-in-difference (DID) strategy we adopt to study
the evolution of price discrimination.
The DID estimation is a useful tool when trying to measure the quantitative impact
of a shock (here, the introduction of the Euro) on a specific group (EMU members).
The method accounts for global trends that are disconnected from the shock using
information on a control group that is not directly affected by the shock. More precisely,
the DID strategy we use compares the magnitude of price discrepancies in the EMU
before and after the Euro with that of an appropriately defined control group. For the
effect to be interpretable in terms of the monetary integration impact, the control group
has to be as similar as possible to the treatment group (the Euro area). We successively
take the non-EMU members of the European Union (i.e. Denmark, Sweden and the
United Kingdom) and the rest of the OECD. In theory, the first group is better suited to
serve as control group since these countries have experienced the same economic policies
aimed at increasing market integration as EMU members. However, the number of
countries composing the reference group is small, this explains why we also test the
robustness of our results using the rest of the OECD as control.
In the DID methodology, the variable of interest (the coefficient of variation here) is
regressed on an intercept and three binary variables. The first dummy variable, called
Euro, is equal to one for EMU members. The second one (Post99) takes a value of
one in the years following the introduction of the Euro.11 Last, the third dummy
(Euro×Post99) interacts the Euro and Post99 binary variables. It is thus equal to one
11Here, we consider that the introduction of the Euro takes place in the beginning of 1999, i.e. when
European exchange rates have been irrevocably fixed. An alternative date for the treatment could be
January 2002, when bank notes and coins have been introduced. We ran the DID regressions with
this treatment date. However, results are less accurate in this case because the treatment period is
strongly reduced.
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for EMU members since the introduction of the Euro. The estimated equation is:
cvrfkt = αfk + βEURO + γPOST99 + δEURO × POST99 + urfkt (1)
The interpretation of estimated coefficients is the following. The constant gives the
average size of price discrimination for non EMU countries before 1999. It is possible
to let it vary over firms and/or products in order to account for pre-existing hetero-
geneity in pricing behaviors. The Post99 dummy corresponds to the general trend in
the magnitude of price discrepancies, after 1999. The Euro dummy captures the char-
acteristics shared by all EMU members that should make price discrimination different
within this set of countries over the pre-1999 period. Last, the Euro×Post99 dummy
captures the impact that the introduction of the Euro has had on price discrimination
toward EMU members.
The DID strategy is particularly suitable for our study because it allows us to clean out
all the shocks that may affect the dispersion of prices but which are not specific to Euro
countries. For instance, the surge in Chinese competition may discipline prices and
reduce price dispersion. As a result a simple look at the dispersion of prices before and
after 1999 could simply reflect the effect on dispersion of the surge in Chinese exports.
The DID strategy allows us to purge out our estimates from such macroeconomic shocks
common to countries of the treated and treatment groups.
There are of course some drawbacks associated with this method. In particular, if
outcomes are serially correlated, the standard errors are often underestimated in DID
regressions as pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004). To limit such bias, we introduce
firm×product fixed effects to get rid of firms specific trend. Furthermore, we use two
techniques proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004) to limit the underestimation of standard
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errors. First, we ignore the time series information of the data. Namely, we pool the
data in the time dimension before and after the introduction of the Euro. Second, we
apply variance-covariance matrix corrections by computing robust or clustered standard
errors.
4 Results
4.1 Difference in difference estimates
To evaluate whether the introduction of the Euro in 1999 has reduced price discrimina-
tion strategies of exporting firms, we apply the difference in difference method (DID)
with the non-EMU members of the European Union as control group.
Results are presented in Table 1. We first run benchmark regressions (columns 1 and
4) in which the DID dummies are the only control variables. In the second and fifth
columns we control for the variance in market access and wealth of the bundle of
countries served by the firm. Finally, Columns 3 and 6 cluster the standard errors in
the area dimension. In all specifications we control for unobserved heterogeneity using
product fixed effects (columns 1-3) or fixed effects for each firm × product combination
(columns 4-6).
Consistent with panel (a) of Figure 1, results confirm that the dispersion of prices is
higher in the EMU than in the rest of the EU. The first regression documents an average
positive gap of 12% (0.036/0.294 + 1=1.12) before 1999. Without the introduction of
the Euro, the gap would have reached 13% after 1999 ([0.036+0.001]/[0.294+0.001]+1=1.13).
Instead the relative price dispersion within the Eurozone has declined. Indeed, in the
Euro period, price deviations become 7% higher in the EMU than in the rest of the
EU ([0.036+0.001 -0.015]/[0.294+0.001]=1.07).
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The effect is robust to the inclusion of control variables for the heterogeneity of coun-
tries within groups. In particular, when we control for the dispersion of group members’
GDP and GDP per capita in column (2), we find that more dispersion in the charac-
teristics of the destination countries increases the dispersion of export prices at the
firm level. But those controls do not impact previous findings. The coefficient on the
Euro×Post99 dummy remains negative and highly significant. Finally, when we con-
trol for heteroscedasticity within areas (column 3), the coefficient of interest remains
negative and significant at the 5% interval.
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the firm-product dimension reduces the
magnitude of the estimated EMU effect (columns 4 to 6). Once heterogeneity across
firms in the magnitude of the average dispersion of their prices is accounted for, the
remaining difference between the EMU and the rest of the EU in terms of their rel-
ative price dispersion strongly increases. Namely, for a typical firm in the pre-Euro
period, the dispersion of export prices is 18% higher in the Euro area than in other EU
countries (column 4). After the introduction of the Euro, the relative price dispersion
decreases to 14%. Compared with the product fixed effects specification, this represents
a smaller decline in EMU relative price dispersion of 3.5%. The effect even becomes
non significant when standard errors are clustered in the area dimension (column 6).
The fact that our result is not significant in regression in which standard errors are
clustered may mean that in other regressions, those standard errors are under esti-
mated because of serial correlation. To check whether this effect plays a role, and
to test the robustness of our results we apply the Bertrand et al. (2004) correction.
Namely, we ignore the time dimension of our data by pooling observation before and
after the treatment. Results are presented in Table A.1. The coefficients are close to
what is estimated using the time dimension. Furthermore, the effects of the euro on
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price discrimination is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level in all the
specifications. Thus, it seems that, while small, the effect of the Euro is statistically
significant.
To evaluate the robustness of our results to the choice of the control group, Table A.2 in
Appendix presents results obtained when EMU is compared to the rest of the OECD.
Overall results are consistent to those of Table 1. Namely, the impact of the Euro
remains negative and significant in all specifications. Before the introduction of the
single currency, prices are 12% less dispersed in the Euro area than in the rest of the
OECD (Table A.2, column 1). After the introduction of the Euro, the gap increases to
reach 17%. Absent the Euro, the gap would have declined to 10%.
The comparison of the Euro effect estimated using different control groups suggests
that the price dispersion reduction attributable to the Euro is stronger when the control
group is the rest of the OECD than when it is the rest of the European Union. For
instance comparing columns 5 of Tables 1 and A.2, we find a reduction in the relative
price dispersion of 2.5% when the control group is the rest of the EU against 3.5%
when the control group is the rest of the OECD. One reason for the limited effect of
the Euro obtained with EU as a control group might be related to the integration of
good and service markets within the EU that also reduced price dispersion while being
orthogonal to the monetary integration.
Overall, the DID results suggest that the Euro significantly reduced the price disper-
sion of French exports toward Euro countries relative to other destinations. However,
the magnitude of the effect is sensitive to the specification, and is small in the most
restrictive ones. One explanation for this small effect is that most of the integration
actually occurred along the nineties, as notably argued by Engel and Rogers (2004).
The limited effect of the Euro that we identify suggests that the remaining barriers to
64 CHAPITRE 2 : Price dispersion and the Euro
Table 1: Difference in difference, control group: rest of the EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient of variation of prices
Post99 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.012a 0.009a 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Euro 0.036a 0.048a 0.048c 0.050a 0.056a 0.056c
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Euro×Post99 -0.015a -0.010a -0.010b -0.009a -0.005a -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CV(GDP/dist) 0.035a 0.035 0.036a 0.036b
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002)
CV(GDPc) 0.017a 0.017 -0.013a -0.013
(0.004) (0.051) (0.002) (0.045)
Constant 0.294a 0.247a 0.247c 0.272a 0.237a 0.237b
(0.001) (0.002) (0.027) (0.001) (0.002) (0.018)
Control Rest of EU15
Fixed effects product firm×product
Cluster No No Zone No No Zone
Obs. 1,886,920 1,886,920 1,886,920 1,886,920 1,886,920 1,886,920
rho 0.182 0.181 0.181 0.572 0.572 0.572
Relative dispersion of Euro prices
Before 99 1.12 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.24 1.24
After 99 1.07 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.21 1.21
This table investigates the impact of the introduction of the Euro on the evolution of firms’ price
dispersion across countries using a difference-in-differences strategy. We consider the sample of
French firms exporting between 1996 and 2005 toward at least two countries in the Eurozone and in
the rest of the EU. The explained variable is the coefficient of variation of prices computed at the
firm-product-year-area level. Here we consider two areas, namely the Euro countries and the rest
of the EU. The main explanatory variables are three dummy variables: Post99 equals to one after
1999, Euro is 1 for Euro countries, and the interaction term Euro × Post99. As control variables,
we use the dispersion in GDP per capita CV (GDPc) and GDP over distance CV (GDP/dist) of
countries served by the firm, within each group. We add product or firm-product fixed effects in
our regressions. Robust standards errors in parenthesis. In columns (3) and (6), standard errors are
clustered in the area dimension. Superscripts c, b, a indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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arbitrage did not entirely vanish with the Euro.
Another, potentially complementary, explanation is that the effect of the Euro has
been felt differently by the firms depending on their characteristics. Given that the
previous regressions implicitly assume the impact of the Euro to be the same across
firms, estimates may be affected by a heterogeneity bias. We explore this possibility in
the next section.
4.2 Heterogeneity and selection bias
Results of section 4.1 implicitly assume an homogenous impact of the Euro on the
firms’ pricing strategies. When we control for unobserved heterogeneity in the firm-
product dimension, the impact of the Euro is however dampened. Figure 3 indeed
highlights a strong heterogeneity across firms in the magnitude of price discrimination,
with large firms’ prices exhibiting more variance across markets. It is possible that this
heterogeneity transmit into the effect of EMU on firms’ pricing strategies. On top of this
behavioral heterogeneity, it is possible that our results are biased by composition effects.
In particular, the previous estimates are based on the pooled sample of exporters,
without distinguishing firms that export throughout the whole period from firms that
enter and/or exit the market during the period of observations. In the following, we test
the robustness of our results in those two dimensions. We first consider whether they
are sensitive to extensive margin effects, before accounting for heterogenous behaviors
at the intensive margin.
Extensive margin adjustments. A number of recent papers discuss extensive mar-
gin adjustments related to market integration. Berthou and Fontagné (2008) thus show
that EMU induced a net entry of firms/products in the European market. If those new
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firms have different pricing behaviors as incumbents, it may be that the effect captured
in previous section’s estimations is due to extensive adjustments rather than changes
in the pricing strategy of stayers. Méjean and Schwellnus (2009) find an important
effect of those extensive adjustments on the convergence of prices induced by the EU
integration.12 To test whether such composition effects also trigger the previously
described results, we estimate the impact of the single currency on an "intensive" sub-
sample made of firms with positive export flows before and after the Euro has been
introduced.
Results are displayed in Table 2. Overall, they are consistent with estimates provided in
Table 1, obtained on the whole sample of exporters. Most of the time, the EMU effect
is negative and significant, but small. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect identified
in this sub-sample is not significantly different. This suggests that the results discussed
in section 4.1 are not triggered by composition effects.
Firms’ heterogeneity. Beyond the extensive effects, it may be that the response
of firms to the Euro introduction is itself heterogenous. This is all the more likely
since ex-ante pricing strategies are heterogenous, as illustrated in Figure 3. Moreover,
this would be consistent with Berman et al. (2011) who show how firms’ response to
exchange rate shocks is strongly heterogenous across firms.
We thus pursue the analysis by studying the link between firms’ characteristics and
their strategic adjustment to EMU. In table 3, we interact the treatment on treated
variable of the DID regression with different measures of firm size. We use three
different proxies, namely the firm’s value-added, its total sales, and its export sales.
We compute these different measures using firm-level data obtained from the fiscal
12The heterogeneity across firms in the length of their participation to export markets is somewhat
controlled for in regressions with firm × product fixed effects, though.
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Table 2: Difference in difference, intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient of variation of prices
Post99 0.008a 0.006a 0.006b 0.013a 0.009a 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Euro 0.043a 0.052a 0.052 0.051a 0.056a 0.056c
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
Euro×Post99 -0.012a -0.008a -0.008 -0.011a -0.007a -0.007c
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CV(GDPc) 0.006 0.006 -0.019a -0.019
(0.005) (0.056) (0.003) (0.044)
CV(GDP/Dist) 0.030a 0.030 0.038a 0.038c
(0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.004)
Cons. 0.291a 0.253a 0.253c 0.281a 0.244a 0.244c
(0.001) (0.003) (0.033) (0.001) (0.002) (0.021)
Control Rest of EU15
Fixed effects product firm×product
Cluster No No Zone No No Zone
Obs. 931351 931351 931351 931351 931351 931351
rho 0.213 0.212 0.212 0.447 0.447 0.447
Relative dispersion of Euro prices
Before 99 1.15 1.20 1.20 1.18 1.23 1.23
After 99 1.10 1.17 1.17 1.14 1.18 1.18
This table investigates the impact of the introduction of the Euro on the evolution of firms’ price
dispersion across countries using a difference-in-differences strategy. We consider the "intensive"
sample of French firms exporting before 1998 and after 1999, between 1996 and 2005 toward at least
two countries in the Eurozone and in the rest of the EU. The explained variable is the coefficient
of variation of prices computed at the firm-product-year-area level. Here we consider two areas,
namely the Euro countries and the rest of the EU. The main explanatory variables are three dummy
variables: Post99 equals to one after 1999, Euro is 1 for Euro countries, and the interaction term
Euro × Post99. As control variables, we use the dispersion in GDP per capita CV (GDPc) and
GDP over distance CV (GDP/dist) of countries served by the firm, within each group. We add
product or firm-product fixed effects in our regressions. Robust standards errors in parenthesis.
In columns (3) and (6), standard errors are clustered in the area dimension. Superscripts c, b, a
indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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administration for 1996. Table 3 shows that the negative effect of the Euro has been
disproportionably felt by the largest firms. In particular, the effect is negative for firms
that exhibit a value added greater than 148 (exp(0.010/0.002)). Since a bit less than
95% of the firms have a value added greater than this threshold, the effect of the Euro
is in fact negative for almost all firms. But it is more pronounced for the largest ones.
This finding is robust to other measures of firms’ size.
It is worth to note that our measure of price discrimination depends on the number of
destinations served by the firm. To ensure that the stronger effect we get for large firms
is not only due to an artefact linked with the number of observation used to measure
price discrimination, Table A.3 offers some controls for the number of destinations
served by firms. In column 1, the number of destinations served by the firm, in each
area, is added, as well as the number of destinations interacted with the treatment
dummy. As expected, the level of discrimination is positively linked to the number of
destinations served by the firm. However, the interaction term is not significant. In
column, the same specification is used, but the interaction with firms’ size is added.
The latter is negative and statistically significant, while the interaction with the number
of destinations is not. This suggests that the results are not driven by the difference in
the number of destinations served by the firms.
To illustrate the quantitative impact of the single currency on firms of different size,
compare two hypothetical firms, exporting toward the same set of countries but being
heterogenous in terms of their size. The value added of the two firms corresponds to the
first and the ninth deciles of the distribution of value added, namely 270 and 54,176,
respectively. Our estimates predict the Euro to reduce the relative dispersion of prices
by less than 1% for the less productive firm. On the other hand, the effect is expected
much stronger for the most productive one, which relative price dispersion reduces by
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3.8% (column 1). A less parametric way to track down the impact of heterogenous
behaviors consists in ranging firms in size groups and measuring how firms in those
groups react to the single currency. In this spirit, figure 4 presents the effect of the
Euro on price dispersion depending on firms’ value-added where firms are grouped by
decile of value added. Namely, we first estimate:
cvrfkt = αfk + βEURO + γPOST99 + δEURO × POST99
+
∑
i≥2
ηi (EURO × POST99×Di) + urfkt (1)
where Di is a dummy equal to one is the firms belong to the ith decile of value added.
Firms in the first decile of the distribution of value-added are used as reference. The
coefficient ηi thus measures the additional impact of EMU on the dispersion of prices
of firms in the ith decile, in comparison with firms in the first decile. The total impact
of the Euro for decile i is then measured by δˆ + ηˆi.
The figure offers a clear-cut message: the impact of the Euro on firms’ pricing dispersion
is significantly stronger for firms from the seventh decile of value-added. On the other
hand, the impact is estimated non-significant for firms in smaller deciles of the value
added distribution. This means that small firms do not adjust their pricing strategies
because of the Euro, while the price dispersion of large firms shrinks.
This phenomenon has two (complementary) explanations. First, in presence of ex-
change rate volatility, large firms have a stronger incentive to price discriminate (a
shown in the model of section 2). Therefore, their prices are more dispersed, every-
thing else equal. This explains the heterogeneity observed before 1999. Provided that
the introduction of the common currency reduces their ability to price discriminate, it
is not surprising that the reduction in price dispersion is more pronounced for firms
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Table 3: Difference in difference, size effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. of variation of prices
Post99 0.009a 0.010a 0.010a 0.007a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro 0.057a 0.057a 0.057a 0.062a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro×Post99 -0.006a 0.010a 0.024a 0.013a
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Euro×Post99×log(VA) -0.002a
(0.000)
Euro×Post99×log(Sales) -0.003a
(0.000)
Euro×Post99×log(Exports) -0.001a
(0.000)
CV(GDP/dist) 0.036a 0.036a 0.036a 0.039a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CV(GDPc) -0.013a -0.015a -0.015a -0.018a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.243a 0.243a 0.243a 0.267a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed effects firm×product
Observations 1,542,210 1,542,210 1,542,130 1,219,400
rho 0.563 0.564 0.565 0.540
This table investigates the impact of the introduction of the Euro on the evolution of firms’
price dispersion across countries for different type of firms. We consider the sample of French
firms exporting from 1996, between 1996 and 2005 toward at least two countries in the Eu-
rozone and in the rest of the EU. The explained variable is the coefficient of variation of
prices computed at the firm-product-year-area level. Here we consider two areas, namely the
Euro countries and the rest of the EU. The main explanatory variables are: Post99 equals to
one after 1999, Euro is 1 for Euro countries, the interaction term Euro× Post99, and triple
interaction term Euro × Post99 × log(size). Where firms’ size is measured by total sales,
value added and total exports in 1996. As control variables, we use the dispersion in GDP per
capita CV (GDPc) and GDP over distance CV (GDP/dist) of countries served by the firm,
within each group. We add firm-product fixed effects in our regressions. Robust standards
errors in parenthesis. Superscripts c, b, a indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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which ex-ante propensity to price discriminate is the stronger.
A second explanation relies on the behavior of arbitrageurs. One mechanism through
which the Euro was expected to impact prices was the strengthening of arbitrage be-
haviors. If the arbitrageurs’ activity is featured by scale economies, one can expect
them to be more active in trading products that are sold in larger volumes. In such
case, large firms are also more likely to be subjected to arbitrage behaviors, which
forces them to strongly reduce the dispersion of their prices.
A raw way to discriminate among these two explanations is to control for the ex-
ante level of price discrimination. The firm-product fixed effect introduced in some
regressions account for the level of this variable. However, the impact of the Euro
may differ across firm depending on their ex-ante level of price discrimination. To
control for such effect, we interact the ex-ante level of price discrimination with the
treatment effect dummy. To limit endogeneity, the level of discrimination is proxied by
the associated 50-quantile of price discrimination to which the firm belongs to in 1996.
Table A.3, columns 3-4 present the results. The first regression present the interaction
of the treatment with the ex-ante level of price discrimination. The coefficient is positive
and statistically significant. It suggest that after the Euro introduction, firms that
discriminated the most, increase their relative price discrimination. In column 4, the
interaction between the treatment and the ex-ante level of price discrimination is added
along with the interaction between the treatment and firm size. Both are statistically
significant. The interaction with firms’ size is negative while the interaction with firms’
ex-ante level of discrimination is positive. This suggests that the stronger effect of the
Euro on price discrimination of large firms is not due to the higher level of dispersion
per-se, but to the higher difficulty - due to the Euro introduction - for firms to segment
markets when they trade large volumes.
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Figure 4: Euro, price discrimination and firms’ size
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This graph plots the impact of the Euro on price dispersion by decile of firms’ value-added.
Reported coefficients are the linear combination of the Euro effect irrespective of firms’size
and the specific impact of the Euro for each decile of value-added. The estimated impact
is relative to the first decile. The underlying coefficients are estimated using a difference
in differences augmented by interaction terms with value-added decile dummies. The grey
area is the confidence interval at 10 percent.
5 Aggregate implications
We finish the analysis discussing the aggregate implications of the heterogeneity we
just identified in the data. Previous section indeed shows that, in terms of price dis-
crimination, large firms have been more impacted by the introduction of the single
currency. From recent advances in international trade (Bernard et al., 2007; Mayer
and Ottaviano, 2007), we also know that those large firms account for the lion’s share
of international trade flows. In our estimates we gave the same weight to all firms, ir-
respective of their contribution to international trade. Thus, we measured the average
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impact of the Euro on French firms. In terms of the aggregate consequences of the
Euro, it however makes sense to put a larger weight on those firms that accounts for
the bulk of international trade flows. In what follows, we propose two methods that
use the relative weight of goods in the consumption basket to quantify the impact of
the Euro on aggregate price discrepancies.
A first way to measure the aggregate impact of the Euro is to use the results of the
DID regression with decile-specific coefficients, described in equation (2). This equation
estimates the degree of heterogeneity in the response of different classes of firms to the
Euro. The simple average of the coefficients obtained for each decile is equal to -0.006,
once again a very limited effect. However, the weighted average implies a twice as large
effect, equal to -0.012.
A second way to deal with heterogeneity relies on the comparison of OLS results with
weighted least squares. This comparison is illustrated in Table 4. The weights used in
the WLS regression correspond to the share of each firms in total exports in 1996.13
Without weighting, the relative dispersion of export prices in the Euro area is found
to drop from 1.23 to 1.20 because of the monetary integration. Once we give more
weight to the behaviors of larger firms, however, we find a bigger effect. The relative
dispersion of prices is found to fall from 1.27 to 1.1.
Both sets of results show that accounting for the heterogenous response of firms to a
common macroeconomic shock modifies the quantitative assessment one can make of
the shock’s aggregate impact.
13We are not the first ones to weight observations by sales to study price discrimination at the firm-
level. Fitzgerald and Haller (2010) adopt this strategy in their study of pricing-to-market behaviors.
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Table 4: Ordinary versus weighted least squares
(1) (2)
Coef. of variation of prices
Post99 0.009a -0.031a
(0.001) (0.009)
Euro 0.057a 0.087a
(0.001) (0.010)
Euro×Post99 -0.006a -0.028a
(0.001) (0.010)
CV(GDP/dist) 0.036a 0.041a
(0.001) (0.012)
CV(GDPc) -0.013a -0.032c
(0.003) (0.018)
Constant 0.243a 0.322a
(0.002) (0.016)
Fixed effect firm×product
Method OLS WLS
Observations 1,219,400 1,219,400
Rel. dispersion of Euro prices
Before 99 1.23 1.27
After 99 1.20 1.10
This table investigates the impact of the introduction
of the Euro on the evolution of firms’ price disper-
sion across countries using a difference-in-differences
strategy. We consider the sample of French firms ex-
porting between 1996 and 2005 toward at least two
countries in the Eurozone and in the rest of the EU.
The explained variable is the coefficient of variation of
prices computed at the firm-product-year-area level.
Here we consider two areas, namely the Euro coun-
tries and the rest of the EU. The main explanatory
variables are three dummy variables: Post99 equals
to one after 1999, Euro is 1 for Euro countries, and the
interaction term Euro×Post99. As control variables,
we use the dispersion in GDP per capita CV (GDPc)
and GDP over distance CV (GDP/dist) of countries
served by the firm, within each group. We add prod-
uct or firm-product fixed effects in our regressions.
In the second column, observations are weighted by
firm’s share in total exports. Robust standards errors
in parenthesis. In columns (3) and (6), standard er-
rors are clustered in the area dimension. Superscripts
c, b, a indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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6 Conclusion
This papers studies the impact of the creation of a monetary union on the magnitude
of deviations to the law of one price. We identify the impact of the single currency by
measuring the relative dispersion of French export prices toward Euro countries before
and after 1999, allows us to
We find that the Euro significantly reduced the relative dispersion of French export
prices. Price were 24% higher in the Euro area than in the rest of the EU before 1999,
and this dispersion drops to 21% after 1999. The effect is robust to the control group
we choose as well as changes in the sample of firms and products we consider.
Moreover, we show that the effect has been felt differently by French exporters. Namely,
more productive firms have been more strongly affected by the common currency. This
heterogeneity is important in itself. It also has interesting implications in terms of
the aggregate impact of the Euro. Since more productive firms account for a very
large share of total exports, their behavior is crucial in determining the dynamics of
aggregate prices.
We account for the heterogeneity in the behavior of firms as well as in their relative
weight in aggregate exports to estimate the aggregate effect of individual firms adjusting
their pricing strategies. Unsurprisingly, the estimated effect of the Euro is found larger
once we account for the relative weight of different firms in aggregate exports. In this
specification, the relative dispersion of within-EMU prices decreases from 27 to 10%
following the introduction of the European common currency.
This results suggest that the response of firms to the introduction of the Euro is deeply
heterogenous and that this heterogeneity has important aggregate consequences. The
effect of the Euro is underestimated when the heterogeneity is not accounted for.
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Table A.1: Difference in difference (pooled sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. of variation of prices
Post99 0.011a 0.012a 0.009a 0.010a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro 0.010a 0.010a 0.056a 0.057a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro×Post99 -0.010a 0.013a -0.022a -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Euro×Post99×log(VA) -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000)
Euro×Post99×# dest. -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Euro×Post99×Price disc. 96 0.001a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.000)
# destinations 0.015a 0.015a
(0.000) (0.000)
CV(GDP/dist) 0.015a 0.015a 0.036a 0.036a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CV(GDPc) -0.002 -0.004 -0.013a -0.015a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Fixed effects firm×product
Observations 1542210 1542210 1542210 1542210
R2 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.007
rho 0.563 0.565 0.555 0.555
This table investigates the impact of the introduction of the Euro on the evolution of firms’
price dispersion across countries. We consider the sample of French firms exporting between
1996 and 2005 toward at least two countries in the Eurozone and in the rest of the EU. The
explained variable is the coefficient of variation of prices computed at the firm-product-year-
area level. Here we consider two areas, namely the Euro countries and the rest of the EU. In
this specification, we ignore the time dimension of the data to limit the issues induced by the
serial correlation of variables. Namly, we pool observation in the time dimension, before and
after the treatment. The main explanatory variables are: Post99 equals to one after 1999,
Euro is 1 for Euro countries, the interaction term Euro×Post99. Where are respectively the
number of destinations served by the firms, the value added of the firm and the level of price
discrimination of the firm in 1996. As control variables, we use the dispersion in GDP per
capita CV (GDPc) and GDP over distance CV (GDP/dist) of countries served by the firm,
within each group. We add firm-product fixed effects in our regressions. Robust standards
errors in parenthesis. Superscripts c, b, a indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table A.2: Difference in difference, control group: OECD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient of variation of prices
Post99 0.007a 0.009a 0.009c 0.020a 0.020a 0.020b
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro -0.047a -0.026a -0.026 -0.020a -0.004a -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Euro×Post99 -0.021a -0.018a -0.018c -0.017a -0.014a -0.014c
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CV(GDPc) 0.026a 0.026 0.027a 0.027
(0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.006)
CV(GDP/Dist) 0.099a 0.099c 0.097a 0.097a
(0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.000)
Cons. 0.383a 0.317a 0.317b 0.353a 0.290a 0.290a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Control OECD countries excepted Euro countries
Fixed effects product firm×product
Cluster No No Zone No No Zone
Obs. 2211700 2211700 2211700 2211700 2211700 2211700
rho 0.170 0.169 0.169 0.558 0.558 0.558
Relative dispersion of Euro prices
Before 99 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.86 0.86
After 99 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.83 0.83
This table investigates the impact of the introduction of the Euro on the evolution of firms’ price
dispersion across countries using a difference-in-differences strategy. We consider the sample of
French firms exporting between 1996 and 2005 toward at least two countries in the Eurozone and in
the rest of the OECD. The explained variable is the coefficient of variation of prices computed at the
firm-product-year-area level. Here we consider two areas, namely the Euro countries and the rest of
the OECD. The main explanatory variables are three dummy variables: Post99 equals to one after
1999, Euro is 1 for Euro countries, and the interaction term Euro × Post99. As control variables,
we use the dispersion in GDP per capita CV (GDPc) and GDP over distance CV (GDP/dist) of
countries served by the firm, within each group. We add product or firm-product fixed effects in
our regressions. Robust standards errors in parenthesis. In columns (3) and (6), standard errors are
clustered in the area dimension. Superscripts c, b, a indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table A.3: Difference in difference, size effect, robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. of variation of prices
Post99 0.011a 0.012a 0.009a 0.010a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro 0.010a 0.010a 0.056a 0.057a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro×Post99 -0.010a 0.013a -0.022a -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Euro×Post99×log(VA) -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000)
Euro×Post99×# dest. -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Euro×Post99×Price disc. 96 0.001a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.000)
# destinations 0.015a 0.015a
(0.000) (0.000)
CV(GDP/dist) 0.015a 0.015a 0.036a 0.036a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CV(GDPc) -0.002 -0.004 -0.013a -0.015a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Fixed effects firm×product
Observations 1542210 1542210 1542210 1542210
R2 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.007
rho 0.563 0.565 0.555 0.555
This table investigates the impact of the introduction of the Euro on the evolution of firms’
price dispersion across countries for different type of firms. We consider the sample of French
firms exporting from 1996, between 1996 and 2005 toward at least two countries in the Eu-
rozone and in the rest of the EU. The explained variable is the coefficient of variation of
prices computed at the firm-product-year-area level. Here we consider two areas, namely the
Euro countries and the rest of the EU. The main explanatory variables are: Post99 equals to
one after 1999, Euro is 1 for Euro countries, the interaction term Euro× Post99, and triple
interaction term Euro × Post99 × X. Where are respectively the number of destinations
served by the firms, the value added of the firm and the level of price discrimination of the
firm in 1996. As control variables, we use the dispersion in GDP per capita CV (GDPc)
and GDP over distance CV (GDP/dist) of countries served by the firm, within each group.
We add firm-product fixed effects in our regressions. Robust standards errors in parenthesis.
Superscripts c, b, a indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Chapter 3
Low-Wage Countries’ Competition,
Reallocation Across Firms, and the
Quality Content of Exports 1
1 Introduction
One of the most widely discussed phenomena in the recent trade literature concerns
the growing share of emerging countries in world exports. This pattern challenges text-
book models of international trade on several grounds. First, recent empirical evidence
suggest that emerging economies are becoming competitive not only in labor-intensive
sectors, as the neo-classical theory would predict, but also in capital-intensive ones.2
Second, both emerging and developed countries export the same bundle of products but
more productive, wealthier countries charge higher unit values, on average (See Schott,
1This chapter is revised version of CEPR Discussion Papers 2011-8231, jointly written with Isabelle
Méjean (Ecole Polytechnique). It has been submitted for publication.
2See Amiti & Freund, 2010, on Chinese data.
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2008, Gaulier, Fontagné and Zignago, 2008). This suggests that countries produce
different qualities of the same products, which goes against the horizontal differentia-
tion view of international trade discussed in new trade theories. As argued by Schott
(Schott, 2004, 2008), these patterns of international trade are consistent with a spe-
cialization occurring within industries along the quality dimension. International trade
leads countries to specialize in vertically differentiated goods. And developed economies
continue exploiting their comparative advantage by producing better qualities.
This paper uses firm-level data to test whether increased competition from low-wage
countries induces such a shift in the specialization of rich nations in favor of better
qualities. Our methodology quantifies changes in the mean quality of a country’s
export basket due to a reallocation of market shares across firms producing different
qualities. In a world of within-industry specialization, this reallocation is driven by
changes in competitive pressures faced by exporting firms in international markets. To
test this assumption, we relate the magnitude of quality changes in French exports
to various measures of international competition. We show that quality upgrading is
more pronounced in markets where French exporting firms face increased competitive
pressures from low-wage countries. In the meantime, competition from high-income
countries has the opposite impact, driving the quality of French exports down. To
the extent that low-wage countries have a comparative advantage in the production of
standardized, low-quality varieties, these patterns are consistent with within-industry
specialization along the quality dimension. To our knowledge, we are the first ones to
identify such dynamic specialization patterns in firm-level data.
We start the analysis with an illustrative model describing the conditions under which
changes in the competitive environment modify the quality composition of a country’s
export basket. Our framework borrows from the industrial organization literature,
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notably Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). We consider a highly simplified economy in
which two firms located in a high-income country compete in international markets with
a low-wage country’s producer. Firms are differentiated along the quality dimension
and the low-wage country is assumed to offer the lowest quality.3,4 In this setting,
increased competitive pressures from the low-wage country are disproportionately felt
by the lowest quality produced in the rich country while the highest quality is somewhat
protected by vertical differentiation. This asymmetry triggers a reallocation of market
shares in favor of the high-quality firm. The mean exported quality improves as a
consequence.5 If competitive pressures instead come from a high-quality producer, the
mean quality that is exported is predicted to go down. The model thus emphasizes a
potential relationship between the mean quality of a country’s exports and the nature
of competition it faces in foreign markets. In particular, increased competition from
low-quality producers in emerging countries should induce a quality upgrading in rich
countries’ exports.
The empirical exercise is conducted using firm-level data on French exports. Our mea-
sure of quality changes relies on the methodology proposed by Aw and Roberts (1986)
and Boorstein and Feenstra (1987).6 They show how to quantify changes in the mean
3The recent trade literature provides evidence of firm heterogeneity in the quality dimension. See
among others Crozet et al. (forthcoming) on wine exporters producing in France, Verhoogen (2008)
on Mexican data or Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) in data covering Indian, US, Chilean and Colombian
firms.
4Results in Schott (2004), Hallak (2006), Hallak and Schott (forthcoming) and Khandelwal (2010)
suggest that it is indeed the case that low-income countries tend to export goods of worse quality.
5In our example, quality adjustments occur at the intensive margin - the low-quality firm loses
market shares - and through extensive adjustments - the low-quality eventually exits export markets.
This differentiates us from previous models of trade with quality heterogeneity, e.g. Baldwin and
Harrigan (2011), Helbe and Okubo (2008), Johnson (2008), Verhoogen (2008), Hallak and Sivadasan
(2009). In these models, the reallocation of market shares is solely driven by the selection of firms into
export markets. Beyond these extensive margin adjustments, our model shows how changes in the
competitive environment may rebalance sales between firms that are different in terms of the quality
they produce.
6This method has been recently used by Harrigan and Barrows (2009) on sectoral data.
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quality of a consumption basket by comparing time-variations in its unit value and its
ideal price index. We adapt this methodology to our data and measure quality changes
in France’s exports due to market shares being reallocated across firms producing dif-
ferent qualities of the same product. In firm-level data, particular attention has to be
paid to entries and exits of firms from the export market. Namely, we disentangle
quality improvements due to a reallocation of market shares toward high-quality pro-
ducers from those caused by a net entry of better qualities in the export market. Our
estimates suggest that, over the 1995-2005 period, the overall quality of French exports
has improved by 11%. Three quarters of the improvement are attributable to extensive
margin adjustments.
Despite the trend in aggregate quality, our data exhibit a huge amount of heterogene-
ity in the direction and magnitude of quality changes. In particular, the variance in
quality patterns is high between sectors, and across destination markets within sectors.
We test whether this heterogeneity is related to changes in the nature of competition
faced by French firms in foreign markets. Namely, we show that quality upgrading is
significantly more pronounced in markets where the penetration of low-wage countries
has increased the most. By contrast, the quality content of French exports tends to
reduce in those markets where other high-wage countries have increased their position.
This is consistent with competitive pressures in foreign markets driving a reallocation
of market shares among vertically differentiated firms. Over the considered period, low-
wage countries, in particular China, have doubled their share in world trade. Their
increased penetration in France’s export markets explains around 15% of the quality
upgrading identified in the data. We interpret these results as evidence in favor of
factor-proportion specialization within products, with France being increasingly spe-
cialized in high-quality goods.
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The result that low-wage country competition induces a flight to quality has important
macroeconomic implications. A specialization of rich countries in high-quality goods is
expected to modify the relative demand of skilled and unskilled workers with an end
effect on wage inequality and employment rates. This may help explain the increased
wage premium between skilled and unskilled workers observed in a number of developed
countries.7 A change in the mix of exported products could also affect long-run growth,
as discussed in Hausmann et al. (2007). If high-quality goods are associated with higher
productivity levels, a country specialization toward high qualities should increase its
aggregate prospects. Finally, quality upgrading may be a way for developed countries
to maintain their level of exports in a world of increasing competitive pressures from
low-wage countries. Specializing in high-quality goods will insulate them from wage
movements in developing countries (Khandelwal, 2010).
Our paper is related to a growing literature analyzing the impact that competition
from low-wage countries has on developed countries’ performance. In particular, a
number of recent papers study North-South trade and its heterogeneous impact on
firms located in developed countries. Bernard et al. (2006) show that competition
from low-wage countries reallocates production towards capital-intensive plants while
labor-intensive ones are pushed out of the market. This is consistent with evidence
discussed in this paper if the production of better qualities is more capital intensive.8
7The within-industry shift in demand away from unskilled and toward skilled workers is documented
in a number of papers. See, among others, Berman et al. (1994) and Bernard and Jensen (1997) for the
US, Strauss-Kahn (2004) and Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) for France and Machin and Reenen (1998)
and Berman et al. (1998) for a panel of developed countries. Berman et al. (1994), Machin and Reenen
(1998) and Berman et al. (1998) interpret the evidence as the result of skilled-biased technological
change. Results in Bernard and Jensen (1997) rather suggest that the lion’s share of the raise in
wage premia comes from shifts from production to non-production intensive establishments within
the same industry. Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and Strauss-Kahn (2004) relate the phenomenon to
international trade.
8Verhoogen (2008) provides evidence of a positive link between the capital intensity of a firm and
the quality of its output.
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Our results allow us to go one step further and interpret the reallocation as driven by
quality differentiation across firms.
Recently, the literature has focused on within-firm technology upgrading induced by
Chinese competition. These papers show that increased competitive pressures from
China make firms adopt production processes that are more intensive in skilled and
non-production workers (Mion and Zhu, 2011) and rely more on innovation (Bloom
et al., 2009). Such technology upgrading may be related to the firm increasing the
quality of its products. Our methodology neglects this possibility. Namely, we assume
quality to be constant at the firm-level and focus on aggregate quality upgrading driven
by a reallocation of sales across firms. The previous papers suggest that within-firm
quality upgrading goes in the same direction as the reallocation we measure. Our
estimate of the impact of low-wage countries’ competition on the aggregate quality of
French exports is thus probably a lower bound.
Finally, the paper the most closely related to ours is Khandelwal (2010). Using esti-
mates of the relative quality of products exported by different countries in the US, he
shows that Chinese competition is more painful - in terms of employment in the US -
in sectors with less quality heterogeneity (shorter “quality ladders”). This suggests that
vertical differentiation protects the most developed economies against competition from
low-wage countries. We go one step further and argue quality upgrading is a natural
consequence of competition from emerging countries. We show that the mean quality
of a country’s exports increases when firms face competitive pressures from low-quality
producers. Countries climb the quality ladder which in turn reduces their sensitivity
to competitive pressures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the mechanism we have in mind to
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explain the link between low-wage countries’ competition and the aggregate quality of
exports. Section 3 presents the strategy and data we use to test the prevalence of this
mechanism. We discuss the results in Section 5. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 An Illustrative Model
We present a stylized model illustrating how increased competition from low-wage
countries can affect the quality composition of developed countries’ exports. Our logic
is based on the assumptions that goods are vertically differentiated and that low-wage
countries have a comparative advantage in the production of low-quality goods. If
this is indeed the case, competitive pressures coming from emerging markets is felt
disproportionately by low-quality producers in developed countries. One thus observes
a redistribution of market shares in favor of high-quality varieties when competition
from low-wage countries becomes more intense.
Our example builds upon a model of quality differentiation based on Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979) and Tirole (1988). There are three firms in the economy that compete in
prices to sell goods in the same import market. Two firms are located in a rich country,
called North, while the third one is in a low-wage country, called South. Firms are
assumed to be endowed with a quality level, while they are able to choose their prices
strategically. In the following, we use L, M and H to denote the low, medium and
high-quality, respectively. We assume the Southern firm offers the lowest quality L.9
In this framework, we consider what happens to the relative sales of Northern firms
when competition from the low-wage country becomes more intense. Stronger compe-
9A technical appendix available on-line considers the other two possibilities, namely that the South-
ern firm offers the intermediate, or the high-quality.
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tition is modeled as an exogenous reduction in the export price of the Southern firm.
The relative price shock can come from various sources, e.g. the Southern firm be-
coming more productive, its cost of exporting reducing, Southern wages decreasing, or
the country’s currency depreciating. The nature of the shock is irrelevant from our
standpoint. We do not try to explain why emerging markets represent an increasing
share in world markets but what consequence this has on the mean quality and price
of developed countries’ exports. In the following, we use the term “trade cost shock”
as a shortcut.
Demand side: Following Tirole (1988), the demand side of the market consists of a
large number of consumers with discrete preferences. Utility is increasing in the quality
of the consumed variety. Consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their marginal rate
of substitution between income and quality. This assumption is equivalent to supposing
income is heterogeneous across consumers: a higher marginal rate of substitution can
be interpreted as the consumer being poorer.
The utility of the consumer, with marginal rate of substitution 1/θ, is equal to U =
si − 1θτipi if she consumes the quality si. With sL < sM < sH , utility is increasing in
quality. The price τipi of the variety is the product of an ad-valorem cost τi (> 1) that
is exogenous to the firm and the price pi that is strategically chosen. In the following,
τi is assumed country-specific: τM = τH = τ , τL = τ ∗ where τ (respectively τ ∗) is the
exogenous cost faced by Northern (resp. Southern) firms.
There is a mass one of consumers with marginal rates of substitution uniformly dis-
tributed over [θ, θ]. Following Tirole (1988), it is assumed that i) the market is cov-
ered, i.e., all consumers consume the differentiated good, and ii) all qualities are sold
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in equilibrium.10 In this framework, the poorest consumers choose the lowest quality
L, while the richest ones buy the highest quality H. The consumer with θ = θ˜LM is
indifferent between consuming the lowest and the medium quality, with θ˜LM such that
U(θ˜LM , sM , τpM) = U(θ˜LM , sL, τ
∗pL). Similarly, the consumer with a θ just equal to
θ˜MH is indifferent between consuming the medium and the high-quality.
The demand faced by each producer can be expressed as a function of the distribution
of incomes, called F (.), and the previously defined income thresholds. For the high,
medium and low-quality producers, respectively,
DH = sup−F (θ˜MH) (1)
DM = F (θ˜MH)− F (θ˜LM) (2)
DL = F (θ˜LM)− inf (3)
with θ˜LM =
τpM − τ ∗pL
sM − sL , θ˜MH =
τpH − τpM
sH − sM .
Supply side: Firms are differentiated in terms of the quality they sell, and compete
in prices. As in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), we assume quality is an exogenous
characteristic of the firm.11 Each quality level is associated with a marginal cost ci,
which is increasing in si. Without loss of generality, the maximum quality gap is
normalized to unity: sH − sL = 1. We further call: sH − sM = α and sM − sL = 1−α.
The profit function of firm i is given by pii = (pi − ci)Di(τ ∗pL, τpM , τpH). Using the
10In analytical terms, the first condition is fulfilled as long as there exists at least one variety i the
poorest consumer is willing to buy. This occurs if θsi > τipi. The second condition is met when the
delivered price per unit of quality increases in quality:
τ∗pL
sL
<
τpM
sM
<
τpH
sH
.
11We do not seek to endogeneize quality choices since our empirical strategy assumes that, at the
firm-level, quality is constant over time.
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demands (1)-(3), one can compute the best response functions associated to each firm:
BRH =
cH
2
+
1
2τ
[
τpM + αθ
]
BRM =
cM
2
+
1
2τ
[ατ ∗pL + (1− α)τpH ]
BRL =
cL
2
+
1
2τ ∗
[τpM − (1− α) inf] .
This implicitly defines optimal mark-ups as a function of the firm and its competitors’
marginal and ad-valorem costs (see details in the Technical Appendix).
Relative price shock: Using the optimal price strategies just derived, it is easy to
show how Northern firms react to a change in the Southern relative competitiveness.
Here, we model the shock as a drop in the Southern ad-valorem cost τ ∗. The shock is
exogenous from all firms’ standpoint. It increases the relative price of Northern firms
and induces a strategic reaction. In particular, the response of Northern firms is
dpH
dτ ∗
=
αcL
6τ
> 0 and
dpM
dτ ∗
=
αcL
3τ
> 0.
Both Northern firms reduce their price following the shock in order to partially coun-
teract increased competitive pressures from the Southern firm.12 However, the price
adjustment is more pronounced for the firm producing the medium quality: dpH
dτ∗ <
dpM
dτ∗ .
This firm is directly hurt by increased competitive pressures induced by the Southern
shock and must reduce its mark-up. On the other hand, the highest quality producer
is only indirectly impacted, through the price adjustment of its local competitor.
Despite price adjustments, the demand faced by Northern firms diminishes following
12The shock has no impact on the mark-up of the southern firm: dpLdτ∗ = 0.
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the shock:
dDH
dτ ∗
=
cL
6
> 0 and
dDM
dτ ∗
=
cL
3(1− α) > 0.
and is redistibuted to the Southern firm, which market share thus increases:
dDL
dτ ∗
= − 3− α
6(1− α)cL = −
dDH
dτ ∗
− dDM
dτ ∗
Once again, the medium-quality firm is more strongly affected than its high-quality
competitor. As a consequence, its market share loss is more pronounced: dDH
dτ∗ <
dDM
dτ∗ .
In some circonstances, the medium quality can even be pushed out of the market. This
happens if the shock is large enough (see details in the Technical Appendix).
When the Southern firm produces the lowest quality in the market, our example thus
shows that an improvement in the South competitiveness reduces the aggregate market
share of Northern firms in foreign markets to the benefit of the Southern one. Moreover,
as they also contract their mark-up while the Southern one is left unchanged, North’s
aggregate market share loss is even more pronounced in nominal terms.
Besides its negative impact on the North’s market share, the shock also modifies the
allocation of sales between firms located in the North. Namely, market shares are
redistributed in favor of the high-quality firm, as the medium-quality producer is more
vulnerable to competitive pressures exerted by the Southern low quality. Once again,
this is true in real and in nominal terms (since both the price and the demand of the
medium-quality firm reduce more than those of the high-quality producer). This result
also holds true at the extensive margin: when Southern costs continue to go down, the
medium-quality producer is the first one to exit the market.
All in all, these results suggest that stronger competition from low-quality producers
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induces an improvement in the mean quality exported by the rich country. As discussed
in the Technical Appendix, the opposite holds true when competitive pressures come
from a high quality producer. In this case, the mean quality goes down. Those quality
adjustments are driven by intensive margin adjustments, a redistribution of market
shares in favor of high-quality producers, and by extensive margin adjustments, the
exit of the lowest qualities from export markets. This differentiates us from most
of the literature that discusses the aggregate consequences of firms heterogeneous in
quality selecting into export markets (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011)eg.. In these models,
quality changes are solely explained by extensive margin adjustments.
3 Measuring Quality Changes in the Data
3.1 Definition
In our example, quality changes are driven by a reallocation of demand across firms
serving the same market with different qualities of the same good. There are two chal-
lenging issues to deal with when it comes to measuring this in the data. First, one
obviously needs firm-level data to capture the reallocation of demand across hetero-
geneous firms. Second, one needs a method that measures aggregate quality changes
induced by such reallocation.
Because we want to have a method that is general enough and covers the whole set of
exporting firms, we choose to measure quality changes using the approach developed
by Aw and Roberts (1986) and Boorstein and Feenstra (1987). Boorstein and Feenstra
(1987) define the “quality” of a basket of goods as the mean utility its consumption
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induces per unit of goods:
Qt =
g(c1t, ..., cIt)∑I
i=1 cit
,
where Qt is the quality index, cit is the consumed quantity of variety i, g(.) is an aggre-
gate of the I consumed varieties, and
∑I
i=1 cit is the aggregate volume of consumption.
This definition is general in the sense that it does not associate the “quality” of a variety
to any specific observable characteristic. Instead, it relies on revealed preferences and
considers a variety that induces more utility to consumers, conditional on the quantity
consumed, as being of better quality.
A nice feature of Boorstein and Feenstra’s quality index is that its computation requires
little information on the considered set of varieties. Namely, changes in the aggregate
quality index can be inferred from the comparison of the unit value and ideal price
indices computed over the set of varieties under consideration:
∆ lnQt = ∆ lnUVt −∆ lnpi(pt), (1)
where ∆ is the first-order difference operator. Here, ∆ lnQt is a percentage change in
the quality composition of the considered basket of goods, ∆ lnUVt is the growth of
its unit value and ∆ lnpi(pt) denotes changes in the ideal price index as a function of
the vector of prices pt = {pit}.13
The intuition surrounding the decomposition is the following. The unit value computed
over a basket of varieties can be written as the weighted average of individual prices:
13The decomposition is detailed in Boorstein and Feenstra (1987). It crucially relies on two assump-
tions. First, g(.) must be homogeneous of degree one. Second, the considered basket of goods has to be
separable from other consumptions in the aggregate utility function. In particular, the consumption
of varieties produced in France is assumed separable from the consumption of goods produced in other
countries. This assumption is necessary in the absence of firm-level data on non-French export flows.
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UVt ≈
∑I
i=1witpit, where pit is the price of variety i and wit its share in aggregate
consumption (in real terms). Thus, a change in the unit value either reflects price ad-
justments (changes in pit) or a change in the relative weight of each variety in aggregate
consumption (changes in wit). With a well-defined ideal price index, price adjustments
are captured by the ∆ lnpi(pt) term in equation (1).14 The remaining changes in the
composition of the consumption basket are then assigned to quality changes (∆ lnQt).
This decomposition thus says that any increase in the unit value index that is not
matched by an equivalent price increase is the result of consumption being reallocated
toward more expensive varieties. From the point of view of consumers, the reallocation
is optimal only to the extent that these varieties are of better quality. The aggregate
quality index increases as a consequence.
Quality improvements captured by Boorstein and Feenstra (1987)’s index are thus the
result of consumption being reallocated across varieties of different quality. In their
model as in Section 2, the quality produced by a given firm is assumed exogenous.
It may well be the case that changes in competitive pressures also induce within-firm
quality adjustments. Such changes in the nature of exported goods are not accounted
for in our measure of quality upgrading. Instead, they are captured by the price term
in equation (1) which is thus upward biased in case of within-firm quality upgrading.15
If changes in the mean quality induced by within- and between-firm adjustments go in
the same direction, our measure of quality upgrading is thus a lower bound.
Finally, it has to be noted that this definition of quality changes crucially relies on
14The way price adjustments are controlled for crucially depends on the definition of the ideal
price index. Its functional form varies depending on the underlying assumption on the consumer’s
preferences over the set of varieties (the assumption on g()). In the empirical exercise, we use two
alternative assumptions for the functional form of g(), namely that it is a CES or a translog function.
See details in Section 3.2.
15See Feenstra (1994) for a discussion of the bias induced by within-firm quality changes in the
measure of the CES price index.
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the assumption that goods and firms are vertically differentiated. This assumption is
consistent with the recent empirical trade literature showing that quality is a critical
dimension of firms’ heterogeneity within sectors.16 If they are not, however, increases in
the quality index simply reflect a reallocation of consumption in favor of more expensive
varieties (e.g. less productive plants). The fact we later observe aggregate “quality”
improvements and these adjustments are stronger where competitive pressures from
low-wage countries are more intense let us favor the quality interpretation. The link
between changes in Qt and the intensity of competition would indeed go the other way
round if the index was solely reflecting a reallocation of demand among heterogenously
productive firms. Competition from emerging countries would then mostly affect low
productive firms which would push the index down.
3.2 Data
We measure changes in the quality composition of French exports using firm-level data
provided to us by the French customs. The dataset exhaustively describes exports by
French firms toward each of their export markets between 1995 and 2005. The empirical
analysis however focuses on the sub-sample of partner countries that represent at least
1% of French exports, less Taiwan, Nicaragua, Kuwait, Kazakhstan for which we were
unable to construct the explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis. The
restriction insures that our sample contains destination markets that are served by a
large enough number of French firms, even at the disaggregated sectoral level. Together,
those markets represent 85% of French exports.
We also drop exports in non-manufacturing industries that are less likely to be vertically
16See Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (forthcoming), Crozet et al. (forthcoming), Manova
and Zhang (forthcoming).
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differentiated, as well as the tobacco industry, which is very concentrated in France,
and the industries of “Other food products, not elsewhere classified” and “Miscellaneous
products of petroleum and coal.” These restrictions leave us with a sample of 49
countries and 24 ISIC sectors that covers 65% of French exports. In this sample,
observations are identified by a firm ID (f), a product category (p) defined at the 8-
digit level of the combined nomenclature (cn8), a destination market (c) and a time
period (t). We call “variety” a firm × product × destination triplet and assume the
quality of each variety to be constant over time. The dataset is a panel describing how
the exported value and quantity of these varieties evolve between 1995 and 2005.
The time-series can be aggregated across firms selling the same good in a given mar-
ket to compute a sector- and market-specific quality index Qkct. The index measures
changes over time in the quality of French exports in sector k and country c due to a
reallocation of demand across “varieties” (i.e. across firms and/or products). As the
measure of quality upgrading is an index, it can be compared across sectors and/or des-
tination countries to study the relative evolution of quality in different export markets.
It has to be noted however that it does not say anything about the absolute quality
level in market (k, c).
For varieties to be comparable in terms of the utility they induce and the quantity con-
sumed, they have to be similar enough. In what follows, quality indices are computed
at the 6-digit level of the harmonized system (hs6). A “good” is thus a hs6 sector, while
a variety is the product sold by a particular firm in that sector.17 Since the analysis
17It may be that the same firm serves the same market with several cn8 varieties within the same
hs6 “sector”. These varieties are assumed as substitutable from each other as two varieties produced by
different firms. These “multi-product” companies represent a very small share of our sample, however.
More than 90% of the firms (that represent more than 80% of French exports in values) we consider
produce a single product within a given hs6 category. The reallocation we focus on thus mostly occurs
across firms.
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uses the time dimension of the panel, particular attention has to be paid to potential
changes in the nomenclature. Before computing the quality indices, product data are
concorded over time using a procedure similar to the one used by Pierce and Schott
(2011) for the US “hs” nomenclature. After the harmonization, the data cover 238,842
firms producing goods in 7,741 cn8 categories.
For each bilateral flow (each “variety”), the customs data record the “free-on-board”
value in Euros (vfpct) as well as the exported quantity in tons (qfpct). This allows us
to compute the unit value index for good k, defined as
∆ ln(UVkct) = ∆ ln
∑
(p,f)∈Ikct vfpct∑
(p,f)∈Ikct qfpct
= ∆ ln
∑
(p,f)∈Ikc vfpct∑
(p,f)∈Ikc qfpct︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive component
+ ∆ ln λ˜kct −∆ lnλkct︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive component
(2)
with λkct ≡
∑
(p,f)∈Ikc vfpct∑
(p,f)∈Ikct vfpct
, λ˜kct ≡
∑
(p,f)∈Ikc qfpct∑
(p,f)∈Ikct qfpct
where Ikct is the set of varieties of good k exported to country c in year t. The unit
value index is the log-difference of the total value of exports divided by the total
quantity. One can easily show that this index can be decomposed into an intensive
and an extensive components as in equation (2). The intensive component is computed
from the sub-sample of firms that export in a given market over two consecutive periods
(Ikc = Ikct ∩ Ikct−1). The extensive component is the difference between the value and
the volume shares of new varieties in the overall sample of bilateral trade flows at time t
minus the difference between the value and the volume shares of disappearing varieties
at time t− 1 .
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As is clear from equation (1), our measure of quality changes is crucially affected
by the assumption on preferences, that determines the form of the ideal price index
(∆ lnpi(pt)). In order to check the robustness of our results to this assumption, we
construct two alternative series of quality changes, based on two alternative preference
assumptions.
As in Harrigan and Barrows (2009), the ideal price index for good k is first built using
the Sato-Vartia-Feenstra formula. This makes the assumption that preferences over
varieties (i.e. the g() function in Section 3.1.) are CES:18
∆ lnpikc(pt) =
∑
(p,f)∈Ikc
wfpct(Ikc)∆ ln(pfpct)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive component
+
1
σk − 1∆ lnλkct︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive component
(3)
where wfpct(Ikc) ≡
(
sfpct(Ikc)−sfpct−1(Ikc)
ln sfpct(Ikc)−ln sfpct−1(Ikc)
)
∑
(p,f)∈Ikc
(
sfpct(Ikc)−sfpct−1(Ikc)
ln sfpct(Ikc)−ln sfpct−1(Ikc)
)
with sfpct(Ikc) ≡ vfpct∑
(p,f)∈Ikc vfpct
.
The first component of equation (3) is the ideal price index computed over the sub-
sample of intensive trade flows. The second part of equation (3) corrects the price index
for extensive margin effects. The magnitude of extensive adjustments is decreasing in
σk, the (constant) elasticity of substitution between varieties. In the empirics, we use
a homogeneous value of 5 to calibrate σk.
We also compute quality adjustments based on an alternative form of preferences,
18See Sato (1976), Vartia (1976) and Feenstra (1994).
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namely a translog function. As shown by Feenstra and Weinstein (2010), the ideal
price index with translog preferences is defined as follows
∆ lnpikc(pt) =
∑
(p,f)∈Ikc
1
2
(sfpct(Ikc) + sfpct−1(Ikc))∆ ln(pfpct)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive component
+
−1
2δk
 ∑
(p,f)/∈Ikc
[
s2fpct(Ikct)− s2fpct−1(Ikct−1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive...
+
1
Ikc
 ∑
(p,f)/∈Ikc
sfpct(Ikct)
2 −
 ∑
(p,f)/∈Ikc
sfpct−1(Ikct−1)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
...component
(4)
where sfpct(Ikc) ≡ vfpct∑
(p,f)∈Ikc vfpct
and sfpct(Ikct) ≡ vfpct∑
(p,f)∈Ikct vfpct
Once again, it can be decomposed into an intensive and an extensive components,
with the intensive side being a Tornqvist index computed on the sub-sample of “in-
tensive” firms ((p, f) ∈ Ikc) and the extensive side measuring the welfare effect of
new/disappearing varieties. While the welfare effect of extensive flows is scaled by
the elasticity of substitution σk in the CES case, extensive price changes in (4) are
conditional on the δk parameter that determines the magnitude of the own price and
cross-price elasticities in the translog case (Feenstra and Weinstein, 2010)see details
in . Based on the median estimate obtained by Feenstra and Weinstein (2010), we
calibrate the value of δk to 0.5.
The ideal price indices (3) and (4) aggregate price adjustments observed at the variety
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(firm) level. These individual prices are proxied by unit values: pfpct ≡ vfpctqfpct . As
noted by Kravis and Lipsey (1974), unit values are a biased measure of prices because
of quality composition effects. In our data, changes in the quality composition of
a firm’s exports in one particular product are indeed assigned to price adjustments.
Our indicator of quality assumes away those within-firm changes in quality and is
downward biased, in absolute terms. Given the very high level of disaggregation,
however, we expect these measurement errors to be small. At least in the medium run,
most quality adjustments should occur between rather than within firms. Unit values
may however be polluted by other measurement errors, notably misleading reports on
the value or quantity of exports. We account for this possibility using a trimming
procedure. Namely, we drop from the sample annual growth rates in unit values larger
than 300% (in absolute value). The number of observations shrinks by less than 3% as
a consequence.
Using the previous unit value and ideal price indices computed at the product-level,
(2) and (3) or (4), we can infer a quality index from the decomposition in (1). For each
index, the annual growth in aggregate quality is computed on the whole sample, and
on the “intensive” sample, i.e., on the sub-sample of trade flows that are present in the
data over two consecutive years. The comparison of the aggregate and intensive quality
indices conveys information about the sources of aggregate quality changes. Namely,
the evolution of the intensive quality indicator can be attributed to the demand being
reallocated between firms producing different quality levels. Additional movements in
the aggregate quality indicator come from the relative quality of firms entering/exiting
the market being different than the mean quality of firms already in the market.
In what follows, the product- and market-specific quality indices (Qkct) are either used
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as regressors or aggregated at the country- or sector-level to obtain a broader picture
of aggregate quality changes. The aggregation of hs6-specific quality indices into more
aggregated indicators either uses a Sato-Vartia formula (when the quality index is based
on the price index in (3)) or a Tornqvist formula (when it is based on (4)). Finally, we
measure quality changes on a year-by-year basis. We then chain-weight quality indices
to compute the growth rate in quality over the whole 1995-2005 period.
4 Results
4.1 Patterns in the Quality of French Exports
At the ISIC level, our sample contains 1,453 (market- and sector-specific) time-series.
Table D.1 gives summary statistics on the corresponding end-period quality indices, as
well as their components. The top panel in Table D.1 corresponds to quality indices
computed under a CES preference assumption, while the bottom panel assumes translog
preferences. The comparison of both panels illustrates the robustness of our results to
the preference assumption. Over 1995-2005, the mean quality has increased by 18%.
This decomposes into a 7% increase at the intensive margin, and a 11% raise related to
the net entry of firms into export markets.19 In the meantime, firm-level export prices
grew by 7.5% on average.20
These summary statistics do not account for the composition of the French export
basket across sectors and destinations. Figure 1 aggregates the 1,453 series into a
multilateral quality index, using a weighting scheme that reflects the specialization of
19The evolution in the number of French flows is depicted in Figure C.2.
20Note that the unit value index, which the literature uses as an indicator of either price or quality
competitiveness has increased by 21% over the period. This is consistent with Khandelwal (2010)
whose results suggest sectoral unit values are poor indicators of either prices or qualities.
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French exports. The evolution of quality is compared to the price index (expressed
in the currency of the importer), over the whole sample (panel (a)) and over the “in-
tensive” sub-sample that abstracts from entries and exits (panel (b)). The left panel
corresponds to the results based on the CES assumption while translog preferences are
assumed in the right panel. Once again, results are very similar whatever the pref-
erence assumption. They show a monotonous improvement in the quality of French
exports over the period, both at the intensive and at the extensive margins. Prices, on
the other hand, are much more volatile, and correlated with exchange rate fluctuations
(see Figure C.3 in the Appendix).21
To be sure that our measure of quality is not too specific to the method present above,
we compare the quality indices with quality indices computed from another method.
The method borrows from Khandelwal et al. (2011) to estimate the relative quality of
individual firms and products. Then, it aggregates the information at the HS6 level and
at the country level. The method is described in Appendix B. The correlation between
the two quality indices computed at the hs6 and destination country level is 0.76. At
the aggregate level, the correlation is more than 0.9. Figure C.1 plots the quality index
over the period 1995-2005 and the alternative quality index named "KSW" on the
graph. We see how close the two indices are, suggesting that our measure of quality is
not too specific to the method we have chosen.
These aggregate evolutions hide a strong degree of heterogeneity, however, as shown
by the large distribution of quality growth rates around the mean (first row of each
panel in Table D.1). Despite the average upward trend, the quality of the French
21Between 1995 and 2000, export prices decreased by 6%, in part because of the depreciation of the
effective exchange rate (3.7% over the period). After 2000 however, the price index started increasing
while the euro was appreciating (+4.7% between 2000 and 2005 when the effective exchange rate
appreciates by 7.8%). The correlation between the price and exchange rate index is equal to -.87 in
our data (-.79 at the intensive margin).
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Aggregate Price and Quality of French Exports
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Notes: The multilateral quality index is obtained from an aggregation of sectoral and
country-specific quality indices (Qkct). The aggregation weights are either the Sato-Vartia
ones under the CES assumption (left panel) or the Tornqvist ones under the translog as-
sumption (right panel). The multilateral price index aggregates the corresponding ideal
price indices. The “Intensive margin” sample is defined has the set of firms present in the
considered market over two consecutive years. Price indices are corrected from exchange
rate fluctuations affecting the price of French products in the destination market (source:
IMF-IFS ).
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export basket thus reduces in about 40% of the 1,453 destination markets we consider.
The variance decomposition based on the sector- and country-specific quality indices
reveals that more than 75% of the total sum of squares is due to determinants that have
the double geographic and sectoral dimension (see Table D.2). However, our results
suggest that quality changes are also affected by determinants that are market-specific
within a given sector.
To further illustrate the heterogeneity of quality changes and the way it affects export
performances, we then compute the following decomposition of export growth, in value
term:
∆ lnVt = ∆ lnQyt + ∆ lnpi(pt) + ∆ lnQt, (1)
In equation (1), ∆ lnVt, ∆ lnQyt, ∆ lnpi(pt) and ∆ lnQt respectively denote the growth
rates of the export value, the export quantity, the price of exports and the quality of
exports. This says that an increase in the value of French exports can be explained
by French firms exporting a larger quantity, by their prices increasing, or by demand
being reallocated in favor of more expensive, better qualities. Based on this equation,
Figure 2 decomposes the export growth by destination country (panel a) and by sec-
tor (panel b).22 The size of the quality component reflects the magnitude of quality
changes over the 1995-2005 period. Its relative size with respect to the overall growth
rate of exports further conveys information on the contribution of quality to export
performances. This contribution is especially important for richer countries, notably
Germany, Japan and Switzerland. At the other side of the spectrum, quality is rel-
atively less important in explaining France’s export performance in poorer countries
like Poland, Spain, Portugal and Greece. For these countries, the growth of exports is
22For sake of conciseness, panel a is restricted to France’s 14 main partners. Results covering the
rest of the sample are available upon request.
105
mainly due to French firms increasing the quantity they export. At the industry level,
quality is especially important in explaining the growth of French exports in electrical
machineries, other machineries, footwear, leather and glass products. In these sectors,
the quality component explains more than 50% of export growth.
Incidentally, those sectors have also encountered tough competitive pressures from low-
wage countries. For instance, the quality content of leather products increased tremen-
dously (by 25% over the period 1995-2005. See Figure C.4 in Appendix) while the
penetration of low-wage countries raised by 20 percentage points.23 In a micro-analysis,
the INSEE (the French statistical institute) explains that since 1995, while a few big
name brands have pushed French exports of leather products up, low/medium-quality
producers in the sector have been severely hit by low-cost’s Asian competition.24 This
example supports our intuition that higher quality firms (the big brand names) are rela-
tively less exposed to low-wage countries competition. This heterogeneity is the source
of aggregate quality upgrading. Next section provides more systematic evidence based
on the information on exports’ quality changes and low-wage countries’ competition
for a wide range of industries and markets.
4.2 Determinants of Quality Changes
4.2.1 Low-Wage Countries’ Competition
This sections investigates whether the quality upgrading measured in the data is a
consequence of the increasing penetration of low-wage countries in world exports. We
23We won’t do a narrative of each sector, but the evolution of quality in the different ISIC rev2 3
digit sector can be found in Figure C.4. Note that leather products, but also footwear products or
machinery experienced a boom in the quality content of their exports. In the mean time, we know
those sectors faced a intense competition from LWC countries.
24See the SESSI report on the French fashion industry:
www.insee.fr/sessi/publications/dossiers_sect/pdf/mode.pdf (page 29).
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Figure 2: Decomposition of Changes in the Value of Exports
(a) By country
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Notes: The decomposition is based on equation (1), computed at the hs6 level for each
destination market. Data are then aggregated at the country level (panel (a)) and at the
sectoral level (panel (b)) using Tornqvist weights. Each bar measures the growth rate of
French exports (in value) between 1995 and 2005. The growth rate is decomposed into a
price, a quantity and a quality components. The relative size of the quality component
conveys information on the importance of quality upgrading in explaining French export
performances.
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use the heterogeneity in the intensity of quality changes across sectors and destination
countries and ask how it relates to measures of the quality competition.
Our first measure of “quality competition” relies on the growing penetration of goods
produced in low-wage countries in France’s export markets. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, the share of low-wage countries in world trade has dramatically increased
over the last two decades, from less than 8% of world exports in 1995 to more than
16% in 2005.25 If low-wage countries produce lower qualities on average, it must be
true that the increased penetration of their products exerts competitive pressures on
French exporters that induce a quality upgrading.
As preliminary evidence, Figure 3 plots the change in the quality of French sectoral
exports against the change in low-wage countries’ market share.26. It shows a positive
relationship between quality upgrading and increased competition from low-wage coun-
tries, for the whole sample (panel (a)), as well as for the sub-sample of intensive trade
flows (panel (b)). This suggests that the mean quality of French exports increases more
over the period in those industries that are more exposed to low-wage countries.
We now use regression analyses to ask whether the previous correlation reflects a causal
impact from changes in competitive pressures exerted by low-wage countries to the
quality of French exports in each destination market. Our baseline estimated equation
is
∆95−05 lnQltykc = α ∆95−05Mshlwckc +Xkc + kc, (2)
where k and c refer to the sector and the destination country, respectively, and ∆95−05
25We follow Bernard et al. (2006) and define low-wage countries as countries which GDP per capita is
less than 5% of the US one. Market shares data are averaged over France’s export markets considered
in the empirical exercise. They are computed using the information on bilateral trade flows of the
UN-ComTrade database. Alone, China accounts for two thirds of the increase.
26Both measures are averages across destination markets
108 CHAPITRE 3 : Competition and Exports’ Quality
Figure 3: Quality & Low-Wage Countries’ Competition, Across Industries
(a) Whole sample
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(b) Intensive sample
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Notes: The change in low-wage countries’ market shares is a weighted average that
reflects the composition of France’s trade. It is computed as ∆95−05Mkslwck =∑
c w
fra
kc ∆95−05Mks
lwc
kc where w
fra
kc is the weight of country c in French exports for sec-
tor k and ∆95−05Mkslwckc is the change in low-wage countries’ market share in sector k and
country c. For the whole sample an OLS estimation gives
∆95−05lnQltyk = 0.51b
(0.26)
∆95−05Mkslwck + 0.04
b
(0.02)
with a R2 of 0.14. For the intensive sample we obtain
∆95−05lnQltyk = 0.50a
(0.16)
∆95−05Mkslwck − 0.16
(0.02)
with a R2 of 0.34. a and b denote significance at the 1 and 5% level, respectively.
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denotes the first difference between 1995 and 2005. ∆95−05 lnQltykc is the log change
in the quality of French exports toward country c in sector k over the period 1995-
2005. ∆95−05Mkslwckc is the variation in low-wage countries’ market share. Finally, Xkc
is a vector of controls. The most basic regression uses country-specific fixed effects to
control for all macroeconomic evolutions that may explain an aggregate improvement
in the demand for quality expressed by market c. For instance, these effects capture
the possibility that the country becomes richer, which tends to increase its aggregate
demand of high-quality goods. Some regressions also include sectoral fixed effects
that control for overall quality changes in some specific sectors, due for instance to
technological improvements or composition effects on the supply side. With country
and sector fixed effects, the α coefficient is identified within sectors between countries,
which is quite demanding. Finally, some regressions include additional control variables
that have the sector and country dimensions. The variance decomposition of Table D.2
indeed underlines the impact of sector and market-specific determinants in explaining
the heterogeneity in quality changes.
A potential caveat of the previous regression framework is that changes in market shares
may be endogenous to the evolution in the mean quality of French exports because of
reverse causality or omitted variables. Reverse causality may arise if positive changes in
the quality composition of French exports allow low-wage countries’ firms to increase
their market shares abroad. Omitted variables may also create endogeneity if these
determinants of quality changes are also correlated with low-wage countries’ market
shares.
To reduce the risk of reverse causality, low-wage countries’ market shares are computed
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using as reference the rest of the world less French exports:
Mksikct ≡
IMPikct∑
l 6=France IMPlkct
andMkslwckct =
∑
i∈lwc
Mksikct,
where IMPlkct is the value of good k country c imports from l at time t. Based on the
assumption that the evolution of these market shares is exogenous to France’s quality
changes, we estimate equation (2) using OLS.
Changes in low-wage countries’ market shares may still be endogenous, however. We
thus run a set of 2SLS estimations. Namely, we estimate predicted values for changes
in low-wage countries’ market shares using two instruments. The first one measures
changes in the market share of the considered emerging country in other destinations
(i.e. it averages Mksikdt over all destinations d but c). This instrument conveys in-
formation about the aggregate “performance” of the low-wage country in sector k over
the period under consideration. Since the variable does not use information on sales
in country c, it is independent from changes in the market structure of that country,
notably due to France increasing the quality of its exports. In comparison with the
instrumented variable, the within-sector/cross-country variability of the instrument is
small, however. To improve the fit of the first stage regression, we thus use a sec-
ond instrument that measures the relative proximity of the country to the destination
market. It is constructed as
RelDistick =
Distic
1
Nck
∑Nck
l=1 Distlc
,
where i and c are the low-wage country and the destination market we consider, re-
spectively. Distic is the distance between i and c and Nck is the number of countries
111
serving country c in good k.27 The exporter’s proximity to the destination country is
a good predictor of its initial market share. Since the level increase in market shares is
negatively correlated to the initial market share, this instrument should be negatively
correlated with the instrumented variable. Results for the first-stage regressions are
reported in Table D.3 in Appendix.
Results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Namely, Table 1 displays estimated coefficients
obtained when the only control variables are fixed effects while Table 2 adds other con-
trol variables. The first three columns in Table 1 correspond to estimates based on
the whole sample while the next three use quality indices measured from intensive
flows. Coefficients estimated on the whole sample (columns (1)-(3)) are all positive
and significant which means that the quality growth of exports is more pronounced in
those markets where the penetration of low-wage countries has increased the most. In
quantitative terms, a one standard deviation in market shares is associated with an
increase in the mean quality of exports of about 4%. This result is consistent with
Schott (2008)’s argument suggesting that the increasing penetration of low-wage coun-
tries in world trade induces developed countries to specialize in higher qualities. This
continues to hold true when changes in market shares are instrumented, as in column
(2). More importantly, the impact of low-wage countries’ competition is quantitatively
the same when identified in the country dimension, with sector fixed effects used as
controls as in column (3). In that case, the coefficient is less significant, which is not
surprising given that the degrees of freedom are strongly reduced, but its magnitude is
almost unchanged.
The descriptive statistics presented in section 4.1 underlined the important contribu-
27The distance variable is a population weighted mean of city-to-city bilateral distances, downloaded
from the CEPII’s website (http : //www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm).
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Table 1: Quality and Low-Wage Countries’ Market Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: ∆95−05 ln Quality
∆95−05 LWC Market share 0.366a 0.459b 0.343c 0.120 0.173 0.058
(0.134) (0.209) (0.186) (0.091) (0.176) (0.115)
Observations 1,170 1,169 1,170 1,170 1,169 1,170
R2 0.065 0.061 0.115 0.069 0.068 0.094
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Estimation Method OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS
Sample Whole Whole Whole Intensive Intensive Intensive
Countries All All All All All All
Aggregation Method CES CES CES CES CES CES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1.
The dependent variable is the log difference of the quality index between 1995 and 2005,
computed at the ISIC (revision 2) level for each destination country. “∆95−05 LWC Market
share” denotes the 1995-2005 change in market shares for low-wage countries. The IV
procedure uses as instruments for the change in market shares the country’s relative distance
to the destination country and the change in its world share of sectoral exports. All market
shares are computed excluding France.
113
Table 2: Quality and Low-Wage Countries’ Market Shares: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var: ∆95−05 ln Quality
∆95−05 LWC Market share 0.332a 0.374a 0.373a 0.357a 0.368a
(0.124) (0.134) (0.143) (0.134) (0.134)
Quality ladder 0.005c
(0.003)
∆95−05 log(Herfindahl Index) -0.007
(0.034)
∆# varieties 0.081b
(0.038)
Observations 1170 1170 1123 1170 1170
R2 0.065 0.066 0.068 0.066 0.073
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummies No No No No No
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole
Countries All All All All All
Aggregation Method Translog CES CES CES CES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1.
The dependent variable is the log difference of the quality index between 1995 and
2005, computed at the ISIC (revision 2) level for each destination country. “∆95−05
LWC Market share” denote the 1995-2005 change in market shares for low-wage coun-
tries. The quality ladder is an indicator of vertical differentiation estimated at the
ISIC level by Khandelwal (2010). The Herfindahl index is computed for each destina-
tion and sector from trade data of bilateral exports to this destination. We consider
the change in the Herfindahl index between 1995 and 2005. ∆# varieties is the vari-
ation in the number of varieties composing the sectoral export basket which quality
is measured. All market shares are computed excluding France.
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tion of extensive margin adjustments in driving aggregate quality changes. We now ask
whether the positive effect of low-wage countries’ competition still prevails once quality
changes are solely measured at the intensive margin. More specifically, Columns (4)-(6)
in Table 1 reproduce the exact same estimations using quality indices computed on the
sub-sample of intensive flows. Estimated coefficients are much lower than the ones ob-
tained on the whole sample and turn non-significant whatever the specification. These
results suggest that the impact of low-wage countries’ competition on the aggregate
quality of French exports mainly works through extensive adjustments.
Table D.4 in Appendix tests the robustness of these results to the sample of countries
we consider. We replicate the regressions of Table 1, focusing on France’s 14 main part-
ners, namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. In comparison with the
whole sample, this focuses on countries i) that are relatively homogenous in terms of
development and wealth and ii) where a lot of French firms do export. This robustness
check forces us to moderate some of the previous interpretations. Results obtained on
the whole set of export flows are qualitatively similar (columns (1)-(3)). The impact of
low-wage countries increasing their market share is still positive and significant, except
with sectoral fixed effects but this is due to the very small country dimension available
for the identification. However, the coefficient obtained with the set of quality indices
computed from intensive trade flows is now positive and of the same magnitude as the
coefficient accounting for extensive adjustments (compare column (1) and (4) in Table
D.4). This suggests that competition from low-wage countries does induce extensive
and intensive reallocation patterns across firms in more developed countries.
Table 2 explores the sensitivity of the previous results to our measure of quality and the
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inclusion of additional control variables. Columns (1) and (2) thus compare OLS results
obtained with quality indices assuming preferences are translog (column (1)) and those
computed using a CES assumption (column (2)). Results are not significantly different.
In columns (3) to (6), we introduce other control variables. We first consider the
influence of vertical differentiation. Intuitively, we expect quality changes to be more
pronounced in sectors that are more differentiated in terms of quality since the scope of
potential adjustments is then larger. Neglecting the impact of vertical differentiation
may induce spurious correlation in Table 1 if those sectors that are more differentiated
are also the ones where market shares of low-wage countries increased the most. We
account for this possibility in Column (3) of Table 2 using as control the indicator of
vertical differentiation estimated by Khandelwal (2010).28 As expected, this indicator
enters the estimation with a positive sign, even though the effect is quantitatively
small. However, its presence does not affect our main result that increased penetration
of low-wage countries induces the quality content of French exports to go up.
Column (4) of Table 2 then controls for a measure of the Herfindahl index computed
for each sector and country using trade data.29 The variable is meant to capture the
degree of competition faced by French firms in their export market. In particular,
quality changes may be driven by the overall market becoming more concentrated. If
it is the case, the impact of low-wage countries increasing their market share will be in
part driven by the consequence it has in terms of the general market structure rather
28Khandelwal uses a cross-country identification method to estimate the mean quality of a country’s
exports in the US, at the highly disaggregated product-level. He then assimilates the maximum quality
gap across exporting countries within a given sector to a measure of quality differentiation. A longer
“quality ladder” thus corresponds to a sector that is more prone to vertical differentiation.
29The Herfindahl index is computed using COMTRADE export data and the following formula:
Herfkc ≡
∑
i
Mshick
2
where Mshick is the market share of country i in the total imports of country c in sector k.
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than the within-industry specialization. This does not seem to be the case, however.
The impact of a change in the Herfindahl index is found non-significant. Moreover, the
coefficient on low-wage countries’ market share remains unchanged.
Finally, Column (5) in Table 2 controls for the change in the number of varieties
exported by France in the market under consideration. To some extent, this accounts
for the magnitude of extensive margin effects captured in the quality index. This
variable also captures changes in the intensity of competition between French firms,
that may impact the quality composition of the country’s exports. The variable has a
positive and significant effect on quality changes: new firms participate in the quality
upgrading of the French export basket. However, this is not the whole story since the
impact of low-wage countries’ competition is still positive and significant once changes
in the number of French suppliers are accounted for.30
The impact of low-wage countries increasing their market share on the quality pat-
tern of French exports thus seems quite robust. Using these estimates, it is possible
to quantitatively assess the magnitude of quality changes that result from low-wage
countries’ competition. To that aim, we compute the predicted change in quality from
estimated coefficients and observed adjustments in market shares. Between 1995 and
2005, observed changes in low-wage countries’ market shares are predicted to increase
the quality of France’s exports by 2%. Alone, China is responsible for a 1.7 percentage
point increase in quality. This means that more than 15% of the quality growth of
French exports is explained by tougher competition from China.
30We also tried interacting the previously described control variables with the change in low-wage
countries’ market shares. Results, available upon request, were never significant though.
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4.2.2 Other Countries’ Competition
Over the period 1995-2005, China, and more generally low-wage countries, have in-
creased their market share in almost all sectors. Therefore, the previously described
results cannot explain why France has experienced a decrease in the quality compo-
sition of its exports to some destinations or sectors. In our model, the only way the
mean quality of Northern exports can decrease is if they face increased competition
from high-quality firms. For instance, it may be that French exporters are exposed to
competitive pressures from German firms in some markets (say Eastern European coun-
tries). Given that German firms are well-known to produce high-quality goods, such
competitive pressures are not expected to drive quality up in France’s exports. These
markets may instead be relatively more difficult for high-quality French producers, in
which case the aggregate quality of exports may decrease.
To consider this possibility, we build a second measure of “quality competition” that
accounts for competition from high-wage countries. In each sector and destination we
identify the country which experienced the highest market share increase (measured as
the difference between its market shares in 1995 and 2005). This country is the “main
competitor”. We then build two dummy variables indicating whether this competitor is
a high-wage or a low-wage country.31 We expect the impact of competitive pressures on
quality to be different when exerted by low-wage countries, that presumably produce
low-quality goods, or by high-wage countries, that are more likely to export high-quality
31High-wage country are those with a GDP per capita higher than 90% of the US one. GDP per
capita data are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and market shares are
computed using ComTrade import flows declarations.
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varieties. To test this intuition, we estimate the following equation:
∆95−05 lnQltykc = α 1lwcMainCompkc
+ β 1hwcMainCompkc +Xkc + kc, (3)
where ∆95−05 lnQltykc is the change in quality, 1lwcMainCompkc is a dummy variable
equal to one if the main competitor is a low-wage country, 1hwcMainCompkc is a
dummy variable equal to one if the main competitor is a high-wage country, and Xkc
are control variables.
Results are presented in Table 3. Considering the whole sample first (columns 1-2),
we find that, when the main partner is a low-wage country, the impact of competition
on quality is positive. This is consistent with previous results. Moreover, the negative
coefficient obtained for competition exerted by high-wage countries means that the
opposite mechanism is also at play in the data. Namely, more competition from a
high-wage country reduces the quality content of exports. This result holds true with
and without sector fixed effects (compare columns 1 and 2).
Once again, these results are mostly driven by the extensive margin of trade. When the
analysis is restricted to the intensive sample as in columns (3)-(4) of Table 3, the impact
of competition from high-wage countries turns out non-significant and the magnitude
of the coefficient on competition from low-wage countries is reduced by half.
Overall these results suggests that i) the direction of quality changes depends on the
nature of competition faced by French firms in foreign markets, and ii) the quality up-
grading we observe in the data is essentially driven by low-wage countries’ competition.
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Table 3: Quality and Competition from High and Low-Wage Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: ∆95−05 ln Quality
Main Comp. high-wage cty -0.080b -0.097b 0.002 0.014
(0.039) (0.037) (0.027) (0.031)
Main Comp. low-wage cty 0.062b 0.062b 0.039b 0.037c
(0.025) (0.027) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 1170 1170 1170 1170
R2 0.066 0.117 0.071 0.097
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummies No Yes No Yes
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample Whole Whole Intensive Intensive
Countries All All All All
Aggregation Method CES CES CES CES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1.
The dependent variable is the log difference of the quality index between 1995
and 2005, computed at the ISIC (revision 2) level for each destination coun-
try.“Main Comp high-wage cty ” is a dummy equal to one if the main competitor
is a high-wage country. “Main Comp low-wage cty ” is a dummy equal to one
if the main competitor is a low-wage country.
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5 Conclusion
In a world of within-product specialization along the quality dimension, competition
in international markets has an heterogeneous impact on vertically differentiated pro-
ducers located in a given country. Competitive pressures exerted by standardized good
producers in low-wage countries are felt more strongly by low-quality producers than
by high-quality firms located in rich countries. This asymmetry triggers a reallocation
of demand within countries between producing firms.
Our paper discusses the impact that the asymmetry has on the quality composition
of a country’s exports. Using a simple model of vertical differentiation, we show that
increasing competition from low-quality producers should induce a quality upgrading
in rich countries’ aggregate exports. We evaluate the pertinence of this mechanism
using bilateral export data covering the universe of French manufacturing firms.
We show that the quality of the French export basket has increased by more than 11%
between 1995 and 2005. Quality upgrading is particularly pronounced in sectors and
countries where French firms face increasing competitive pressures from low-quality
producers. Interestingly, higher competition from high-wage countries lead to a de-
crease in the quality content of French exports. The flight to quality is consistent with
within-industry specialization along the vertical dimension.
The quality upgrading identified in the data has important consequences, notably from
a policy standpoint. The fear of Chinese products dominating the world production
of manufacturing goods has been an important concern in most developed countries
over the past two decades. Evidence in favor of within-industry specialization however
suggests one way for countries to maintain their market share in world exports while
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increasing the value added content of their exports. Investing in high-quality production
should indeed help countries to insulate from the competition of low-wage countries.
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A Solution of the Model
The best response functions for the high, medium and low-quality producers are defined
as
BRH =
cH
2
+
1
2τH
[τMpM + α sup]
BRM =
cM
2
+
1
2τM
[ατLpL + (1− α)τHpH ]
BRL =
cL
2
+
1
2τL
[τMpM − (1− α) inf] .
The Nash equilibrium yields the following optimal prices:
pH =
2
3
cH − α
6
cH +
τM
3τH
cM +
ατL
6τH
cL +
α(4− α)
6τH
sup−α(1− α)
6τH
inf
pM =
2
3
cM +
(1− α)τH
3τM
cH +
ατL
3τM
cL +
α(1− α)
3τM
(sup− inf)
pL =
2
3
cL − 1− α
6
cL +
τM
3τL
cM +
(1− α)τH
6τL
cH +
α(1− α)
6τL
sup−(1− α)(3 + α)
6τL
inf .
Prices equal marginal cost plus a markup. Markups positively depend on the costs of
the firm’s competitors as well as the size of the market (implicitely defined by sup and
inf). Markups negatively depend on the own cost of the firm: Firms incompletely pass
their cost through prices. The magnitude of cost pass-through depends on the market
power the firm benefits from thanks to vertical differentiation.
Integrating this into the demand functions, one obtains the equilibrium sales of each
firm, as a function of trade costs, marginal costs and the income distribution parame-
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ters:
DH = −2 + α
6α
τHcH +
1
6
τLcL +
1
3α
τMcM +
1− α
6
(sup− inf) + 1
2
sup (A.1)
DM = − 1
3α(1− α)τMcM +
1
3(1− α)τLcL +
1
3α
τHcH +
1
3
(sup− inf) (A.2)
DL = − 3− α
6(1− α)τLcL +
1
3(1− α)τMcM +
1
6
τHcH +
α
6
(sup− inf)− 1
2
inf . (A.3)
Case 1: The Southern firm produces the lowest quality: Consider the case in
which the lowest quality (L) is produced by the Southern firm while the two Northern
firms respectively produce the medium and high qualities. Starting from a situation
in which demands addressed to each firm are all strictly positive, one can show that a
reduction in the ad-valorem cost faced by the Southern firm (∆τ ∗ = ∆τL < 0)) reduces
the demand addressed to each Northern firm, but the demand loss is stronger for the
medium quality producer:
0 <
dDH
dτ ∗
=
cL
6
<
dDM
dτ ∗
=
cL
3(1− α) .
Under some circonstances, one or both firms can even be pushed out of the market.
This happens if the trade cost drop is large enough in which case ex-post sales are
negative. Calling ∆τ ∗ the absolute drop in the South ad-valorem cost, this means,
respectively for the medium- and the high-quality firms:
DM(τ
∗ −∆τ ∗, τ, cL, cM , cH , sup, inf, α) < 0
DH(τ
∗ −∆τ ∗, τ, cL, cM , cH , sup, inf, α) < 0.
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Using the demand functions (A.1)-(A.2), we find that, following the price shock, the
medium-quality firm exits the market if the drop in transport costs is larger than
∆¯τ ∗M = τ ∗ − τcM
αcL
+
(1− α)τcH
αcL
+
(1− α)(sup− inf)
cL
,
while the high-quality firm exits if the drop exceeds
∆¯τ ∗H = τ ∗ +
2τcM
αcL
− (2 + α)τcH
αcL
+
(1− α)(sup− inf)
cL
+
3 sup
cL
.
Following a trade cost reduction, the medium-quality producer is the first one to exit
the market if:
∆¯τ ∗H > ∆¯τ ∗M
⇔ τ(cH − cM) < α sup,
i.e., if the high-quality firm has a large “exclusive demand” (large sup), if the cost
differential is moderated (cH − cM is low enough) or if the two Northern qualities are
not strong substitute (α is high).
Case 2: The Southern firm produces the medium quality: Consider now the
situation in which the Southern firm is endowed with the median quality and benefits
from a trade cost reduction (∆τ ∗ = ∆τM < 0). Once again, both Northern firms suffer
from a sales drop as a result of the Southern firm becoming more competitive:
dDH
dτ ∗
=
cM
3α
and
dDL
dτ ∗
=
cM
3(1− α)
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For the shock to redistribute Northern market shares in favor of the high-quality firm,
it has to be true that
dDH
dτ ∗
<
dDL
dτ ∗
⇒ α > 1
2
.
The redistribution thus benefits the high-quality producer if the Southern firm is closer
to the low-quality firm in terms of the quality level of its product.
A large fall in the Southern firm trade cost may again induce extensive margin adjust-
ments. This happens if
DL(τ
∗ −∆τ ∗, τ, cL, cM , cH , sup, inf, α) < 0
DH(τ
∗ −∆τ ∗, τ, cL, cM , cH , sup, inf, α) < 0.
The low-quality French producer exits the market if the trade cost drop exceeds
∆¯τ ∗L = τ ∗ − (3− α)τcL
2cM
+
(1− α)τcH
2cM
+
α(1− α)
2cM
(sup− inf)− 3(1− α)
2cM
inf,
while the high-quality producer is pushed out of the market if ∆τ ∗ is larger than
∆¯τ ∗H = τ ∗ − (2 + α)τcH
2cM
+
ατcL
2cM
+
α(1− α)
2cM
(sup− inf) + 3α
2cM
sup .
Following a trade cost reduction, the low-quality Northern producer is the first one to
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exit the market if
∆¯τ ∗H > ∆¯τ ∗L
⇔ τ(cH − cL) < α sup +(1− α) inf
⇔ α > τ(cH − cL)− L
sup− inf .
Again, if the Southern firm is close enough from the low-quality producer in the North
(i.e., if α is large enough), this firm is more likely to exit the market than its high-quality
competitor.
Case 3: The Southern firm produces the high-quality: Following the price
shock (∆τ ∗ = ∆τH < 0), both Northern firms suffer from a drop in their sales:
dDM
dτ ∗
=
cH
3α
> 0 and
dDL
dτ ∗
=
cH
6
> 0.
However, the medium-quality firm (i = M) is more strongly affected as dDM
dτ∗ >
dDL
dτ∗ .
The fall in Southern trade costs induces adjustments at the extensive margin if
DL(τ, τ
∗ −∆τ ∗, cL, cM , cH , sup, inf, α) < 0
DM(τ, τ
∗ −∆τ ∗, cL, cM , cH , sup, inf, α) < 0.
The medium-quality producer exits the market if the trade cost drop exceeds
∆¯τ ∗M = τ ∗ − τcM
(1− α)cH +
ατcL
(1− α)cH +
α
cH
(sup− inf).
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The low-quality firm is pushed out of the market if it exceeds
∆¯τ ∗L = τ ∗ +
2τcM
(1− α)cH −
(3− α)τcL
(1− α)cH +
α
cH
(sup− inf)− 3
cH
inf .
Following a trade cost reduction, the medium-quality French producer is the first one
to exit the market if
∆¯τ ∗L > ∆¯τ ∗M
⇔ τ(cM − cL) > (1− α) inf .
The medium-quality firm exits first if the market for the low-quality firm is sufficiently
large (inf small), if the two Northern qualities are not close substitutes (α large) or if
the cost gap between the firms is not too small.
B Alternative quality index
The "KSW" quality index is computed as follows. First, we follow Khandelwal et al.
(2011) and estimate relative quality at the firm, product, destination and time level.
To do so, we start from the simple demand equation for a product in a standard CES
model with quality:
Qft = P
−σ
ft Λ
σ−1
ft I
σ−1
t Yt (B.1)
where Q is the quantity produced by firm f at time t for country j, P is its price, Λ
the quality it produces, I is the price index in the economy, Y is the revenue in the
economy, and σ is the elasticity of substitution. Taking the logs (lower case letters are
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the logs of capital letters), and re-arranging yields:
qfjt − σpfjt = (σ − 1)λfjt + (σ − 1)ijt + yjt (B.2)
One knows both q and p. Following KSW, one can also calibrate σ to 4. A within
transformation (for instance a regression of the left hand side on destination×year fixed
effects) allows one to get rid of ((σ − 1)ijt + yjt). The residual is (σ − 1)(λfjt − λ.jt).
Where λ.jt is the average quality sold in destination j at time t. This provides us with
a relative measure of quality for each firm, product, destination and year.
Then I aggregate it using the across term of a Foster et al. (2008) decomposition. The
Foster Haltiwanger Syverson (FHS) aggregation formula is the following:
∆λ.jt =
∑
f∈I
(θ¯fj∆λfjt) +
∑
f∈I
(∆θfjt(λ¯fj − λ¯.j)) (B.3)
+
∑
f ∈ N(θfjtλfjt − λ¯.j)−
∑
f ∈ X(θfjt−1λfjt−1 − λ¯.j) (B.4)
(B.5)
where the LHS term is the change in the average quality between t and t− 1, the first
RHS term is the within-firm change in quality, the second RHS term is the reallocation
across incumbents, the third term is the relative quality of entrants, and the last term
is the relative quality of exiting firms. The aggregate quality sold in country j at date
t is λ.jt. θ is the value market-share of firm f , in country j at time t. The upper bar x¯
denotes simple average over two years. I is the group of incumbent firms, N the group
of entrants, and X the group of exiting firms. We see that our measure of relative
quality allows us to compute the composition terms (terms 2, 3, 4 on the RHS), but it
does not allows us to compute the within-firm quality change.
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This yields quality changes at the product level for every destination over the period
1995-2005. They are first compared at the product level with the quality index de-
scribed in the paper and computed at the same level. Then, product-level changes are
aggregated using a standard Tornqvist formula.
C Figures
Figure C.1: Changes in the quality composition of French exports, a comparison of
methods
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The figure plots the aggregate quality index computed using the Boorstein Feenstra
method and the aggregate index computed using an alternative method based on in-
sights from Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (KWS) method. The two indices measures
quality changes driven by a reallocation of market shares across firms. In particular,
the "KSW" index does not include within firm quality changes. The correlation is 0.99.
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Figure C.2: Evolution in the Number of French Export Flows
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Notes: The dashed line depicts the (net) flow of entries, normalized to 100 in 1995.
131
Figure C.3: Correlation of Local Currency Prices and the Effective Exchange Rate
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Notes: The solid and dotted lines correspond to the measured evolution of prices, computed
over the whole sample (solid line) and the intensive sample (dotted line). They are compared
to the evolution in France’s effective nominal exchange rate (dashed line). The effective
exchange rate is computed using bilateral exchange rates taken from the IMF-IFS database
and trade weights from UN-ComTrade.
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Figure C.4: Evolution of quality, by sector
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Notes: Quality indices calculated, by sector, over the whole sample of export flows (solid
line) and the sub-sample of intensive flows (dashed line).
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Figure C.4: Evolution of quality, by sector (Continued)
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Notes: Quality indices calculated, by sector, over the whole sample of export flows (solid
line) and the sub-sample of intensive flows (dashed line).
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D Tables
Table D.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. pctle 5 pctle 95 N
CES indices
Quality (Int + Ext) 118.2 73.9 52.2 211.1 1,453
Quality (Int) 106.8 53.4 63.4 154.2 1,453
Price (Int + Ext) 107.5 39.7 61.6 173.7 1,453
Price (Int) 111.4 33.7 71.9 169.1 1,453
Unit Value (Int + Ext) 121.2 80.0 53.9 225.9 1,453
Unit Value (Int) 117.5 58.0 60.9 203.9 1,453
Translog indices
Quality (Int + Ext) 118.5 86.4 54.8 213.6 1,453
Quality (Int) 105.2 41.6 66.3 149.9 1,453
Price (Int + Ext) 108.0 44.4 59.5 181.0 1,453
Price (Int) 110.4 30.7 74.5 162.9 1,453
Unit Value (Int + Ext) 118.7 69.5 57.5 205.4 1,453
Unit Value (Int) 115.3 50.3 62.7 190.7 1,453
Notes: These summary statistics are computed over the distribution of sector- and
destination-specific indices for 2005 (Qkc,05 with Qkc,1995 = 100). Sectors are defined in
the ISIC revision 2 nomenclature. The decomposition is either performed on the whole sam-
ple (“Int + Ext” rows) or on the subsample of intensive flows (“Int” rows). Interpretation:
Over 1995-2005, the mean growth rate of quality, averaged across markets and sectors, is
equal to 18.2%. The corresponding average price increase is equal to 7.5%. In the meantime,
unit values were increasing by 21.2%.
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Table D.2: Variance Decomposition
Source Partial SS dof MS F Prob > F
CES
Model 42573.5 38 1120.4 2.38 .000
Country FE 7020.9 13 540.1 1.15 .318
Sector FE 35552.6 25 1422.1 3.02 .000
Residual 152917.1 325 470.5
Total 195490.5 363 538.5
Translog
Model 47210.1724 38 1242.4 2.07 .000
Country FE 10389.6 13 799.2 1.33 .191
Sector FE 36820.5 25 1472.8 2.46 .000
Residual 194662.4 325 599.0
Total 241872.6 363 666.3
Notes: Variance decomposition obtained from the following regression:
Qkc2005 =
∑
k
δkFEk +
∑
c
αcFEc + εkc
where Qkc2005 is the 2005 quality index computed for the ISIC sector k in destination market
c, {FEk} is a set of sector fixed effects and {FEc} a vector of country fixed effects.
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Table D.3: First Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var: ∆ Market Share
∆ Mks global 0.804a 0.614a 0.718a
(0.049) (0.079) (0.060)
Relative distance -0.002a -0.000c -0.065a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
Country sample All LWCs All LWCs but China China
Observations 13213 12813 400
R2 0.475 0.191 0.391
F-stat 102.2 22.7 94.9
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses with a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05
and c p < 0.1.
The change in low-wage countries’ market shares for sector k and desti-
nation c is explained by the total change in the country’s market share in
sector k, computed over all destination countries but c, (“∆ mks global”)
and the distance between the country and c, in relative term with re-
spect to the “mean” exporter to that destination (“Relative distance”).
In columns 2 and 3, the regression is run separately for China and for
other low-wage countries.
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Table D.4: Quality and Low-Wage Countries’ Market Shares, Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: ∆95−05 ln Quality
∆95−05 LWC Market share 0.261b 0.436b -0.003 0.325a 0.167 0.192
(0.131) (0.195) (0.197) (0.112) (0.163) (0.163)
Observations 364 364 364 364 364 364
R2 0.045 0.045 0.208 0.072 0.050 0.182
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Estimation Method OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS
Sample Whole Whole Whole Intensive Intensive Intensive
Countries Top14 Top14 Top14 Top14 Top14 Top14
Aggregation Method CES CES CES CES CES CES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1.
The dependent variable is the log difference of the quality index between 1995 and 2005,
computed at the ISIC (revision 2) level for each destination country. “∆95−05 LWC Market
share” denote the 1995-2005 change in market shares for low-wage countries. The IV pro-
cedure uses as instruments for the change in market shares the country’s relative distance
to the destination country and the change in its world share of sectoral exports. All market
shares are computed excluding France.
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Chapter 4
Globalization of Inflation: Micro
Evidence on the Imported Input
Channel
1 Introduction
Domestic production involves a substantial amount of imported inputs. Manufacturing
industries exhibit shares of foreign inputs ranging from 20 to 67% of total costs.1 For
this reason, vertical production linkages are crucial in explaining the international
transmission of shocks in open macroeconomics.2In relation to this issue, the intensive
use of imported inputs calls into question the sensitivity of domestic prices to foreign
ones. The strength of these effects depends on the extent to which changes in imported
costs are transmitted to domestic prices. Despite its central role, direct evidence on
1See Goldberg et al. (2010). These figures are averages across OECD countries.
2di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) found vertical linkages accounts for 30% of trade-induced
business cycle correlation.
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this transmission at the firm level is very scarce.
In order to fill this gap, this paper investigates how movements in the price of imported
inputs are passed on to domestic output prices.
This analysis relies on a novel dataset that reports monthly individual quotes for the
price of imported inputs as well as production prices. Namely, we matched at the
firm level the micro prices collected by INSEE (the French statistical agency) in order
to compute the French price indices for production, imports and exports. Thus, we
observed the production prices of goods sold in the French market and abroad for
approximately 500 manufacturing firms, and the price of their imported inputs. We
documented four main results. First, on average, the elasticity of domestic prices to the
prices of imported inputs is 12%. One key reason for the incompleteness of this transfer
is related to the share of imported inputs used in the production process. However,
there is an important heterogeneity across sectors that remains unexplained. Second,
the level of transmission is much lower among firms that import inputs from a related
party. Third, movements in imported costs are passed on to the same extent to both
domestic and export prices. Finally, we show that, on average, 9% of the volatility in
production prices at the sector level is driven by imported cost shocks relating to the
costs of inputs. Once again, there is significant heterogeneity across sectors, with the
volatility explained by imported input prices ranging between 0 and 40%.
In order to measure firm-specific imported input price shocks, we averaged out import
prices at the firm level. This provided us with a measure of imported costs. Changes
in firms’ imported costs and in their production prices were observed for every period,
thereby allowing us to estimate the elasticity of price changes with regard to changes
in imported costs. As prices are sticky, we estimated the level of pass-through which is
conditional on observing a change in the output price. After controlling for competitors’
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prices, labor costs, sectoral production prospects and unobserved firm characteristics,
we found that after a 10% jump in imported costs, domestic prices increase by 2.5%.
Intuitively, the pass-through of firms’ imported costs depends on the share of imports in
total costs. We confirmed this using sector-level information from input-output tables.
Interestingly, we did not find that output prices react asymmetrically to increases or
decreases in imported costs. We also compared the pass-through of imported prices for
arm-length transactions and intragroup transactions. The estimated degree of elasticity
is significantly lower (and even non-significant in some specifications) for intragroup
import prices.
Next, we checked the robustness of our results to the potential endogeneity of imported
costs. Typically, a higher degree of demand for the output may lead to an increase in de-
mand for inputs, driving the price of both inputs and output up. In our regressions, we
controlled for changes in sectoral characteristics, including changes in sectoral demand.
However, we did not have information concerning firm-specific demand. We argue that
any instrumentation strategy would require firm-specific instruments. As we could not
build such firm-specific instruments, we followed a different strategy and focused on
input prices that we consider to be exogenous to the firm. In order to do so, we used
the nature of the transaction associated with every import price that is reported in
our dataset. In particular, we assumed that the prices of inputs that importing firms
declare as not being specific to one supplier are exogenous. Our assumption is that
if a firm can import a given input from different suppliers, this means that the good
is highly standardized. In addition, we can reasonably assume that the price of such
internationally traded goods will not be affected by changes in the demands of a given
firm.3 By exploring exogenous input price changes, we found an elasticity of domestic
3In the same vein, we could focus on goods that are classified as non-differentiated, according to
the Rauch classification. These good are less likely to react to firm-specific changes in demand.
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prices to imported input prices of 12%.
Furthermore, our data report not only domestic but also export prices. Focusing on
firms that sell their products both domestically and abroad, we asked whether imported
costs are passed on in different ways in different markets. Differences could exist
because of the presence of exchange rates, differences in market shares or differences in
the competitive pressure faced by firms. In our sample, we did not find any significant
differences in pass-through between domestic and export prices.
Finally, we attempted to generate a more macro view of our micro estimates. In other
words, we asked what share of the volatility of sectoral prices can be explained by
imported input prices. On average, 9% of the volatility in sectoral prices is explained
by imported inputs. However, this hides significant variance across sectors. Specifically,
in the manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products, imported inputs account for
40% of price volatility. By contrast, for basic pharmaceutical products, changes in the
price of imported inputs do not explain the sectoral volatility of prices at all.
Literature review. This paper forms part of the burgeoning literature on individual
prices (Dhyne et al., 2005; Bils and Klenow, 2004; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).
While these papers focus on the dynamics of price changes, our paper deals with the
determinants of those price changes. In this respect, this paper is related to the work
of Fougere et al. (2010), who look at the impact of changes in the minimum wage
on restaurant prices. It is also closely linked to the works of (Nakamura and Zerom,
2010) and (Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2007), who perform structural estimations of the
determinants of incomplete pass-through in the coffee and beer industries respectively.
In contrast to these papers, we study firm-specific import cost shocks for a wide range
of industries.
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In addition to their scope (the entire manufacturing industry), our data present several
other advantages. First, very few datasets combine information about production and
import prices at the firm level. Information on import prices at the firm level is often
approximated by unit values, based on custom data. In addition to the drawbacks
linked to the quality of unit values, such data do not provide information on domestic
prices or domestic unit values.4 Second, while studies based on data regarding indi-
vidual production prices exist, to our knowledge, these data have never been merged
with information about the price of imports at the firm level. Third, the data allow
us to disentangle intra-firm prices from arm-length transactions, which cannot be done
in studies using aggregate sectoral data. The distinction we have drawn between in-
tragroup prices and arm-length prices relates our work to that of (Neiman, 2010) and
(Bernard et al., 2010).
Most of the literature on cost pass-through usually focuses on exchange rate pass-
through (Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2007). This offers several advantages. In particular,
exchange rates are often viewed as exogenous shocks, and they are widely available and
apply to most trade prices. However, they present two main drawbacks in comparison
to the use of firm-specific imported input price changes. First, exchange rates have
a direct impact on trade prices. However, the dynamics of trade prices and domestic
prices may be different (Schoenle, 2010), and therefore the pass-through estimated from
trade prices may not be similar to the cost pass-through of domestic prices. Second,
the exchange rate is a particular cost. Firms may insure against it through formal
insurance or through their sourcing strategies. Therefore, conclusions about exchange
rate pass-through may not apply to other costs, such as the cost of intermediate inputs.
Our paper is also in line with recent empirical works linking globalization and infla-
4Trade data are recorded at very low levels of aggregation, which allows researchers to compute
unit values. There is no counterpart for domestic production.
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tion. For instance, using sectoral data, (Goldberg et al., 2010) evaluate the relative
importance of the channels through which domestic inflation responds to movements in
exchange rates and import prices. Through a calibration exercise, they show that the
imported cost channel is the most important, with imported inputs explaining about
two third of the sensitivity of domestic prices to foreign prices. (Auer and Fischer,
2010) analyze the specific impact of imports from China on sectoral inflation in the
US. They found that imports from China exert a downward pressure on US sectoral
inflation. In the same vein, (Benigno and Faia, 2010) show that greater international
pressure has a positive impact on pass-through. Instead of looking at the impact of
changes in market shares on domestic prices at the sector level, we analyzed the impact
of imported input prices on domestic prices at the firm level.5
Finally, this paper contributes to the recent trade literature which focuses on imports at
the firm level. Most of this literature has underlined the beneficial impact of imported
intermediate inputs on firms’ productivity (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Goldberg et al.,
2010). In the same vein, Gopinath and Neiman (2011) use micro data to explore the
mechanisms of trade adjustment during the Argentine crisis and to simulate the impact
of an imported input cost shock on aggregate TFP. In this paper, we provide new
evidence of the pricing behavior of importing firms and the transmission of imported
cost shocks, using monthly information on individual prices and costs.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 3 presents
both aggregate facts and evidence on the dynamics of individual prices. Section 4
describes the empirical strategy. Section 5 displays the results. Section 6 examines the
aggregate implications of the results. Finally, Section 7 outlines the conclusions.
5Note that our data do not provide any information on the origin of imports. Therefore, the specific
impact of China or other low-wage countries on production prices cannot be studied.
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2 Data
We use three datasets in this paper. The first, OPISE, is a confidential dataset provided
by INSEE that reports the series of individual production prices and import prices
that are used to construct the French Producer Price Index, the French Import Price
Index and the French Export Price Index. This dataset has previously been used by
Gautier (2008). The author provides empirical evidence on the frequency and the size
of production price changes over the period 1995-2005.
The second dataset combines domestic and export French price indices at different
levels of disaggregation, as well as information on labor costs and production prospects
at the sector level. All of this information can be extracted from the INSEE website.
Third, we use the French input-output matrix for 2005 to measure the share of imported
costs into production at the sectoral level.6
2.1 OPISE
Information on individual prices was taken from the OPISE database, which was built
by INSEE in order to construct the French Producer Price Index (PPI). INSEE surveys
around 5500 firms and collects approximately 34,000 individual prices every month.
Both manufacturing and service sectors are surveyed. We used data on manufacturing
only, which represent 4300 firms and 30,000 individual prices. With regard to manu-
facturing, three types of price are collected: the prices of goods produced in France and
sold on the domestic market (which are referred to as domestic prices); the prices of
goods produced in France and sold in foreign markets (which are referred to as export
prices) and import prices. We obtained information for the period from January 2005
to August 2010.
6Input-output matrices are available on the OECD website.
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Coverage. The selection of individual prices collected by INSEE is carried out in two
steps. The first step consists of selecting the firms to be surveyed. Statistical engineers
study the structure of each industry in the domestic, export and import markets. Using
the EAE database (a French survey which describes the total sales of firms, by industry,
in the domestic and foreign markets), statistical engineers select the largest firms in
the industry. They select firms with cumulative sales which account for more than 70%
of the industry. In 2005, the coverage of the survey for the manufacturing industries is
98% (in terms of sales) for domestic prices and at 90% for export prices.
Bias. By construction, the survey is representative of the pricing behavior of the
largest firms. This may be an issue if we want to find systematic patterns in the pricing
of firms. I guess the problem is lessened in the analysis for two reasons. First, the French
Producer Price Index is computed using this sample of firms. Therefore, if we want
to understand empirically the determinant of prices changes driving inflation we must
focus on this reduced sample of firms. Second, we focus on importing firms. Evidence
on the behavior of importing firms tend to suggest that importers are relatively large
firms (eg. Blaum et al. (2010) on French firm-level data). Hence, the sample of firms
considered in the analysis is likely to be representative of the pricing behavior of French
importers.
Individual prices. The second step is to choose the individual prices to survey. The
policy of INSEE is to survey the price of representative transactions. Representative
transactions are chosen during a personal visit from an engineer-pollster. The following
points are taken into consideration: the relative importance of the various goods pro-
duced by the firm; the transactions which are the most representative of price changes;
and how to obtain comparable information on transactions over time. If the firm has
147
the same pricing policy for all of its products and all of its transactions, then only one
representative transaction will be collected. However, if the pricing policy depends on
the product or the market being served, several prices will be collected each month.
During the visit, some extra information is compiled by the pollster, such as a descrip-
tion of the product, the nature of the transaction, the currency used and the value of
sales. For instance, INSEE differentiates between intragroup and arm-length transac-
tions. Intragroup transactions refer to transaction occurring between parties owned at
more than 50% by the same enterprise. This distinction exists for import and export
prices only, while domestic prices relating to intragroup transactions are not collected.
These details are updated every five years. The individual weights of series in the PPI
are computed from the sales declared during the visit and change every five years as
well.
The goal of this survey is to collect individual time series data regarding prices and
then aggregate them in order to construct the PPI. Therefore, it is important to have
time series of individual prices. Time series of individual prices and the study of
representative transactions are often hard to reconcile. In fact, transactions defined
as the sale of one given product to a given customer do not occur every month and
often disappear quickly. Therefore, the reported prices are sometimes mix prices. Mix
prices refer to a mix of different products which are sold to a given buyer, or more
generally a mix of the same product sold to different buyers. For import and export
prices, the price can be a country mix. This type of mix refers to cases in which the
good is imported/exported at different prices from/to different destinations but by/to
the same supplier/buyer.
In our data, these different types of mix are indicated for each series. We grouped the
series into two types. First, pure prices, country mix prices and product mix prices
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were grouped together. These transactions are specific to a certain buyer and a certain
supplier. The second series does not reflect the price of a specific transaction between
a buyer and a supplier. We used this distinction to classify import prices. Namely, we
argue that if firms report that a transaction is not specific to a certain supplier; this
means that the imported good is sufficiently standardized. In such cases, the buyer
does not have to build a specific relationship with the supplier.
Price collection At the end of each month, firms are invited to indicate the price
of the selected transactions by mail (55%) or via the Internet (45%).7 The average
monthly rate of response is 85%. Firms that do not report individual prices are subject
to judiciary pursuits. If price reports are considered to be "outliers", pollsters telephone
the firms and check the reasons behind the difference between the reported price and
the price reported in the previous month.
Prices. Individual production prices are mill prices reported net of VAT and include
sales and discounts. The price reported for products sold on foreign markets is the
free on board (FOB) price. The price of imported goods takes into account costs,
insurance and freight. For import and export prices, we do not know the precise
origin/destination of the transaction. However, we know for some imports and exports
whether the destination/country of origin is in the European Union. Finally, for reasons
of confidentiality, we do not have access to the true price level. All series are multiplied
by a constant (which is different for each series). This is not a problem, as in our
specifications, we consider price changes, which are unaffected by the constant shifts
in price levels.
7There is not a two-step procedure as there is for BLS data in which firms are first asked whether
or not they changed their price.
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2.2 Sectoral and aggregate data
Our estimation strategy makes use of several control variables at the sector level. In
order to control for competitors’ prices, we built a sectoral price index that excludes
firms’ own prices from our data. In order to take into account changes in the demand
addressed to the firms, we used the sectoral production index provided by INSEE at
the two-digit level of the NACE nomenclature. We further controlled for labor costs,
at the same level of disaggregation, which were also provided by INSEE. Under certain
specifications, we controlled for ’the share of the total output made up of imported
inputs at the sectoral level. This information came from the input-output OECD
tables for 2005. At times, we also used the sectoral Herfindalh index.8
3 Stylized Facts
3.1 Aggregate data
In order to provide an idea of the inflationary environment in the French manufacturing
industry, we begin by documenting the trend in aggregate prices over the period 2005-
2010. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the import, export and domestic price indices for
France. All three series are computed from prices in euro. We can see that the three
series are positively correlated. Interestingly, the export price series exhibits a lower
degree of volatility than the import and domestic series. For the three series, we can
observe a striking drop in prices in mid-2008, when the full effects of the 2008 crisis
were felt in France. Figure 2 plots the relative export price index against the nominal
effective exchange rate (NEER). The relative export price index is computed as the
ratio of export price changes to domestic price changes. The NEER was devised by
8I thank Claire Lelarge for providing me with this index.
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Figure 1: French domestic and trade price indices
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Source: INSEE.
the Bank of International Settlement. It is computed as the trade-weighted average of
bilateral nominal exchange rates. We can see a strong negative correlation between the
two series, suggesting that the real price of exports decreases in response to appreciation
of the euro against other currencies. Figure 3 compares the official price index with
the price index computed using our data and the weights reported in the dataset.
More specifically, the price index is computed using the entire data sample, but also
using the prices for the restricted sample of firms that reported both production prices
and import prices. This latter sample is the one used in our empirical analysis. We
observed a strong correlation between the three series. The correlation coefficient
between the reconstructed indices and the official price index is 0.95 for the index
which uses the entire dataset and 0.9 for the index built from the restricted sample.
We also investigated the correlation between the official indices and the reconstructed
indices at the industry level. The correlation between the official sectoral indices and
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Figure 2: Real export prices and nominal exchange rate
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Source: The nominal effective exchange rate is from the Bank of International
Settlements. For France, it is computed over 58 countries as a weighted average
of bilateral exchange rates of the euro using the Turner and Vant dack weighting
scheme. See: http : //www.bis.org/statistics/eer/index.htm. The real export
price is computed as the ratio of export to domestic price indices. These two indices
are from the INSEE.
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Figure 3: Official vs reconstructed price indices
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This figure compares inflation in the manufacturing industry measured by the IN-
SEE with the inflation we obtain using our individual data. The dashed line is the
price index computed from all the whole dataset. The dotted line is the price index
computed from the sample of firms reporting both production prices and import
prices.
the indices built from the whole sample has a coefficient of 0.8. This drops to 0.6 for
the sample restricted to firms reporting both domestic and import prices. This lower
correlation is mainly driven by the furniture industry, which exhibits a very small
correlation of 0.2.
3.2 Item level data
We obtained access to the universe of manufactured products surveyed by INSEE from
January 2005 to September 2010, i.e., 1,332,033 observations. We excluded series which
lasted for less than 12 months. We also excluded all observations for which we did not
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have information about the sectoral classification of the product.9
We were left with 1,063,961 observations. Around 60% of the observations referred to
domestic prices, 20% were export prices and the remaining 20% were import prices. It
is worth noting that 9% and 25% of export and import prices respectively corresponded
to intragroup transactions. Table 1 presents the average number of observations per
month which were available for each year in our sample. We can see that the number
of domestic prices increased by 40%, the number of export prices multiplied by 2.8 and
the number of import prices multiplied by four.
Table 1: Average monthly number of observations
Year Domestic Exports Imports Total
2005 6,961 1,435 915 9,310
2006 8,521 2,351 2,501 13,373
2007 9,716 3,207 3,083 16,006
2008 10,650 3,938 3,695 18,283
2009 10,694 4,263 4,064 19,021
2010 9,459 3,823 3,612 16,895
Notes: This table reports the average number of observa-
tions collected every month for years 2005 to 2010. We dis-
entangle observations for prices of good produced in France
and sold in France (domestic), goods produced in France
and sold abroad (exports) and goods produced abroad and
sold in France (imports). The last column is the sum of the
three others.
The dataset consists of 27,547 price series, reported by 4456 firms. Among these firms,
37% reported domestic prices only, 22% reported import prices only and more than
9% reported the price of their imports and their domestic prices. More than half also
reported their export prices (see Table 2). Firms reporting domestic prices did so for
9There was a change in the nomenclature in 2008. We were able to obtain information about the
CPF4 2008 revision of surveyed prices for 89% of observations.
154 CHAPITRE 4 : Globalization of Inflation
an average of 4.3 products. The average number of exported and imported products
was 3.4 and 3.7 respectively (see Table 3). The maximum period for which we observed
a price was 69 months. The average number of months for which we observed a price
was 42 for domestic prices, 34 for export prices and 35 for import prices.
Table 2: What prices do firms report?
Status # of obs. Percent
Domestic only 1,310 35.07
Exports only 107 2.86
Imports only 699 18.71
Dom.& Exp. 1,040 27.84
Dom. & Imp. 216 5.78
Imp. & Exp. 36 0.96
Dom. & Imp. & Exp. 327 8.76
Total: 3,735 100
Notes: This table reports the number and the share of firms
that report domestic, export and import prices.
Table 3: Number of products per firms
Status P10 P90 Median Mean Standard Deviation
Domestic 1 9 3 4.5 4.4
Exports 1 7 2 3.5 3.4
Imports 1 8 3 4.0 5.2
Notes: This table reports the 10th and 90th percentiles, the median, the mean
and the standard deviation of the number of products reported by firms re-
porting domestic, import or export prices.
Table 4 presents the currency used in the transactions for the different trade prices.
One can see that the vast majority of both import and export transactions are in euro.
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Table 4: Currency of transactions
Exports Imports
Currency Euro area Rest of the world Euro area Rest of the world
EUR 0.92 0.03 0.86 0.80
USD 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.08
Other 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01
Non reported 0.06 0.87 0.09 0.12
Notes: This table reports the share of export and import transactions denominated
in Euro, in US Dollar, and in other currencies in our sample. Observations for which
we do not have information are classified as "non reported".
Table 5 documents the frequency and the implied duration of price changes. The
frequency is a simple average of frequencies computed at the item level. The implied
duration is the inverse of the frequency. These frequencies are provided at the sector
level for domestic, export and import prices. Two facts emerge from this table. First,
we can observe an important heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes across
sectors. For instance, prices change on average every 1.3 months for food products
and every 22 months for basic pharmaceutical products. This heterogeneity is in line
with previous studies (see Nakamura & Steinsson 2008). Second, by comparing the
sectors in which prices were reported for domestic, import and export prices, we can
see that, on average, export and import prices are stickier than domestic prices. This
is particularly true when considering durable products.
Figure 4 plots the monthly proportion of price changes over time. We can see that
the proportion of positive price changes is slightly higher than the proportion of neg-
ative changes. Interestingly the share of price changes appears to be stable over time,
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suggesting that, at the aggregate level, prices are staggered. It is worth noting that
we can observe a strong seasonal pattern in the dynamics of individual prices. At the
beginning of each year, the share of price changes increases. These price changes are
mostly positive.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Measuring the sensitivity of domestic prices to imported
input prices
This section details the strategy we used to measure the sensitivity of domestic prices
to imported input prices. In order to estimate this elasticity, we ran the standard
pass-through regression, which is traditionally used to quantify exchange rate pass-
through. As our prices exhibited substantial stickiness, we followed on from the work
of Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) by measuring pass-through which is conditional on
observing a change in the price of output. Therefore, changes in the dependent variables
are explained by changes in our explanatory variables since the last output price change.
The main determinants of price change are labor costs, input price, competitor’ prices
and production. Competitors’ prices are a proxy for both competition and the price of
domestic intermediate inputs. Actually, most of inputs used by firms are produced by
firms belonging to the same industry. We estimate that the following equation:
∆t,τpfkpt = α∆t,τzft + β∆t,τXkt + Ttufkp + fkpt (1)
where f, k, p, t represent the firm, its sector, its product and the period respectively.
The period [t − τ, t] is the period which has elapsed since the previous price change.
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Figure 4: Share of price changes over time
Domestic prices
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
20
05
m1
20
06
m1
20
07
m1
20
08
m1
20
09
m1
20
10
m1
Share of price changes Sh. of pos. price changes
Sh. of neg. price changes
Export prices
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
20
05
m1
20
06
m1
20
07
m1
20
08
m1
20
09
m1
20
10
m1
Share of price changes Sh. of pos. price changes
Sh. of neg. price changes
Import prices
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
20
05
m1
20
06
m1
20
07
m1
20
08
m1
20
09
m1
20
10
m1
Share of price changes Sh. of pos. price changes
Sh. of neg. price changes
The graphs plots the monthly share of price changes, positive price changes and
negative price changes for domestic sales, exports, and imports. The first month
(01/2005) of the sample is dropped because changes cannot be computed.
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∆t,τY is the change in variable Y between the dates t and t− τ . p is the logarithm of
the output price, z is the logarithm of the price of imported inputs, X is a vector of
control variables, T is a time dummy and u is a firm-product fixed effect.
Pass-through is complete if changes in imported costs are transferred in their entirety to
output prices, e.g., if α is equal to one. For several basic reasons, we do not expect this
pass- through to be equal to one. First, the extent of pass-through should be limited
by the share of imported inputs entering into the production process. For instance, if
imported inputs account for 25% of a firm’s costs, we do not expect more than 25% of
changes in imported costs to be passed on to prices. In order to measure this effect,
we interact the change in imported input prices with the share of imported inputs in
the firm’s industry.10 The regression therefore becomes:
∆t,τpfkpt = α∆t,τ log(zft)× iok + ηiok + β∆t,τXkt + ufkp + fkpt
where io is the share of imported inputs used in industry k. The sensitivity of output
prices to input prices depends on the share of imported inputs used in the industry,
which is given by α. This channel is close to the local cost channel emphasized by the
exchange rate pass-through literature.
Another channel that could reduce or increase pass-through is the substitution of for-
eign with domestic inputs and vice versa. In particular, if the price of imported inputs
increases, firms could substitute them with domestic ones. This mechanically reduces
pass-through. Conversely, if the prices of imported inputs decrease, firms could substi-
tute their domestic inputs with foreign ones, which is expected to increase pass-through.
Therefore, this substitution effect has an asymmetrical impact on pass-through: im-
ported input price increases are transmitted to a lesser degree than in a configuration
10We have no information on the share of imported inputs at the firm level.
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without substitution, and imported input price decreases are transmitted to a greater
extent. A basic test of this effect is therefore to measure whether prices react asym-
metrically to price increases and decreases.
Pass-through may also be reduced if firms adjust their markups following a change
in their costs. A basic way to account for this effect is to control for the level of
competition in the industry. We have done so in some specifications by combining the
Herfindahl index with the input price changes. We expect the degree of pass-through
to be lower in industries with a strong level of competition.
The final traditional channel which explains incomplete pass-through is non-constant
marginal costs. If a change in the price of inputs is associated with a change in the quan-
tities of output produced by the firm, and if the firm experiences increasing marginal
costs, then this could affect the pass-through. The impact of this channel on the degree
of pass-through is unclear in our case.
Our data distinguish between the production prices of goods produced in France and
sold in France, and goods produced in France and sold abroad. We call the latter
export prices. One way to contrast the transfer of input price changes to domestic
and export prices is to run regression (2) on domestic and export prices separately.
However, differences in the estimated coefficients may be due to differences in firms’
pricing behaviors, but also to composition effects. In particular, not all firms export,
and exporting firms do not sell the same bundle of products on the domestic and export
markets. In order to deal with such between-firm composition effects, we proceeded in
two steps. First, we aggregated prices at the four-digit sector level for each firm. We
did so in order to be sure that we were comparing price changes for firms selling the
same type of goods domestically and abroad. Second, we focused on firms selling the
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same type of goods in both the domestic and foreign markets. Then, we estimated:
∆t,τp
m
fkt = α (∆t,τzft) + αexp (1−D) (∆t,τzft) + β∆t,τXmkt + ufk + fkt (2)
Where the superscript m indicate whether the price is for a good sold domestically or
abroad and D is a dummy equal to one if it is a domestic price. The average effect of
a change in imported costs is given by α. The difference in the effect on domestic and
export prices is given by αexp.
4.2 Endogeneity
Within our specifications, endogeneity may arise because of an omitted variable. In
particular, an idiosyncratic demand shock to the firm may affect the price of both
inputs and outputs. On the one hand, following a positive demand shock, a firm should
increase its output price. On the other hand, this increase in demand for output should
induce higher profits and an increase in the demand for inputs. Therefore, input prices
could increase for two reasons. First, if the price of inputs is set after a bilateral bargain
is struck between the supplier and the firm, higher profits may lead to an increase in
the price of inputs, as long as the supplier has some bargaining power. The second
mechanism simply states that the firm’s demand for input increases, which increases
the price of input.
In such cases, failure to take into account this omitted variable would lead to an upward
bias in our pass-through estimate. It is worth noting that other mechanisms suggest
that, in fact, we are facing a downward bias. In particular, the increase in demand for
inputs may lead to lower prices for these inputs if some forms of second-degree price
discrimination occur. The firm demands more input, bargains over the price of this
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input, and finally manages to get a lower price per unit because it buys more units.
Importantly, the mechanisms which lead to an upward bias suggest some specificity
in the relationship between buyers and sellers. If the input is standardized: (i) no
bargaining occurs between the supplier and the buyer that could induce a price increase
after an increase in demand for the input; and (ii) the idiosyncratic increase in demand
from the buyer is not likely to raise the price of a standardized input. Therefore, our
strategy for getting rid of endogeneity is to focus on inputs that do not involve any
specific link between the buyer and the seller. We consider that changes in the price of
these inputs may be considered as exogenous for the firm.
In order to do so, we need to disentangle specific and non-specific transactions. Sta-
tistical agencies want to follow the price of representative transactions (i.e., the same
product traded between the same two parties every month). Nevertheless, particularly
for imports, firms sometimes report that they import the same product from a differ-
ent supplier every month, or from different suppliers every month. This means that
these products are fairly well standardized, and that there is no specific relationship
between the supplier and the buyer. Thus, changes in the price of those inputs may
be considered as exogenous to firms. Fortunately, INSEE reports whether or not the
transaction is specific to a supplier. Therefore, we focused on the sample of inputs
which were imported through non-supplier-specific transactions. We believe that, for
this sample, changes in the price of imported inputs are exogenous to firms.
An alternative way to focus on inputs which undergo exogenous changes in price is to
use the Rauch classification. This classification categorizes goods into three types: dif-
ferentiated products; reference prices and homogenous goods. We expect price changes
for reference and homogenous inputs to be exogenous to firms.
Another methodology that could be used to deal with endogeneity is to find an instru-
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ment correlated with changes in input prices. It appears to be very difficult to build
valid instruments from our dataset. The best instrument we devised would have been
both firm- and time-specific. The only variable in our database that is firm-specific
and which is not correlated directly with output prices is the lagged values of import
price changes. However, in our data, changes in input price are barely correlated with
their lagged values. We therefore chose to use sector- and time-specific instruments.
However, these instruments (such as exchange rate movements) also affect competi-
tors’ input prices and, in turn, competitors’ output prices. Therefore, our instruments
would affect output price not only through the input price, but also through competi-
tors’ prices. This significantly limits the validity of this type of instrument. For this
reason, we decided to focus on inputs for which we considered price changes to be
exogenous.
5 Results
5.1 Imported costs pass-through into domestic prices
Initial results. The main results are displayed in Tables 6 and 7. These tables report
the results for imported inputs for arm-length transactions and exogenous arm-length
transactions respectively.
In the first columns, changes in output prices are explained by changes in firms’ im-
ported input prices (since the previous output price change) and sector-period fixed
effects. For each period, they measure changes in firms’ environment that are sector-
specific. In all regressions, reported standard errors are clustered in the firm×period
dimension, which is the dimension of the main explanatory variable. The first column
of Table 6 shows that 29% of changes in imported costs are transferred to domestic
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prices. This effect is significant at the 1% level. This finding holds when considering
non-specific "exogenous" arm-length transactions (Table 7, column 1). The coefficient
is lower but highly significant (0.13). This suggests an upward bias when considering
non-exogenous changes in cost.
Columns 2 to 4 of Tables 6 and 7 introduce sector-specific determinants of price changes.
Namely, we added changes in competitors’ prices, labor costs and production (columns
2 and 3), as well as changes in competitors’ imported costs (column 4). All of these
specifications include product×firm fixed effects and period fixed effects. As expected,
competitors’ prices have a strong positive and significant effect on output prices in all
of our specifications. The effect of labor costs is positive but never significant. This
can be explained by the fact that an important source of wage variation is changes
in the minimum wage, which is set at the national level. This variation is therefore
captured by our period fixed effects. Changes in our index of production have a very
low coefficient that is never significantly different from zero. For arm-length domestic
prices (Table 6, column 2), the estimated elasticity of prices to imported costs is close
to 0.24. For what we refer to as exogenous arm-length changes in import prices, the
effect is much smaller than in the previous specification. Namely, we found that 13%
of imported input price changes are passed on to domestic prices.
In the different specifications, the estimated elasticity of competitors’ prices is twice as
large as the elasticity of price changes to imported inputs. In order to avoid misinter-
pretations of this gap in magnitude between the two coefficients, we display in column
3 of Tables 6 and 7 the results of regressions of the same variables but which have
been standardized. Thus, we can interpret the coefficients as reflecting the impact of
one standard deviation of the explanatory variables on the explained variable. When
considering all arm-length transactions, we found that almost 14% of one standard
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deviation in imported prices is passed on to domestic prices. Interestingly, 14% of one
standard deviation in competitors’ prices is passed on to domestic prices, reversing the
magnitude of the previous coefficients. However, this is not robust to the sample of
exogenous price changes. In this case, 5.9% of one standard deviation of imported costs
is passed on to domestic prices, compared to 13.6% for competitors’ prices.
In the fourth column of these tables, we controlled for the change in competitors’ import
prices. This variable is not significant and does not influence the other coefficients.
Arm-length vs intra-group transactions. Previous estimates have focused on
arm-length transactions. Nevertheless, a large part of international trade occurs within
firms. We reproduced previous estimates, but focused on changes in the prices of
imports from related parties. When controlling for sectoral fixed effects, it became
apparent that changes in costs are not transmitted to domestic prices (Table 8, col. 1).
As the sample of intra-firm transactions was vastly reduced, it may be that the very
small and non-significant effect we found was due to the lack of variance, as it was all
captured by the industry×period fixed effects. When this strong fixed effects structure
is relaxed (columns 2-4), the coefficient becomes significant. However, the estimated
effect is much smaller than for arm-length transactions. This suggests that around
6.5% of imported costs are passed on to domestic prices when the transaction occurs
within related parties. A striking (and unexplained) result is the negative impact of
changes in production for this sample in all of the specifications.
5.2 Heterogeneity in imported costs pass-through
Until now, we have measured the average impact of imported costs on domestic prices.
However, we expect the degree of transmission to differ between industries, because
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of differences in the structure of production or the nature of competition. We study
this heterogeneity in the following paragraphs. The results are listed in Table 9 for all
arm-length prices and in Table 10 for exogenous arm-length price changes.
Asymmetry. The first columns of Tables 9 and 10 investigate whether positive and
negative import price changes are passed on to the same extent to output prices. For all
arm-length transactions (Table 9, col. 1), the coefficients of both import price increases
and import price decreases are positive, but the coefficient of price decreases were not
precisely measured. The coefficient for price decreases is 1.5 times as large as the
coefficient for price increases. However, standard errors are large, and we cannot reject
the equality of the coefficients (F-stat = 1.53). For exogenous changes in import prices,
both coefficients remain positive and significant. Furthermore, the gap between the two
is much lower, and one cannot reject the equality of the coefficients (F-stat = 0.26).
Thus, our results suggest that overall, firms pass on positive and negative cost shocks
to their domestic prices to the same extent. As previously discussed, this symmetry
suggests that no major substitution of imported and domestic inputs occurred.
Sector characteristics. The first sectoral characteristic for which we controlled was
’the share of total production costs made up of imported inputs. In order to do so, we
pre-multiplied the changes in imported costs by the share of imported inputs in sectoral
production. The second column of Table 9 presents the results for the entire sample
of arm-length transactions. The estimated elasticity of domestic prices to imported
input price changes multiplied by the sectoral share of imported inputs is 1.474. The
standard error is large, and the coefficient is not statistically different from 1. This
suggests that the aforementioned incompleteness of pass-through was driven mainly by
the share of imported inputs in firms’ total costs. The first column of Table 10 reports
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the estimation for the sample of exogenous imported price changes. The elasticity value
is 0.76, which is much higher than in the regressions which did not take into account
the share of imported inputs. Overall, these results suggest that a large part of the
incompleteness of the pass-through of imported costs is due to the share of imports
used in the production process.
The second characteristic we wanted to control for is the structure of competition. We
did so by interacting changes in imported costs with the Herfindahl index of the sector.
The third columns of Tables 9 and 10 both show that the effect is not significant. This
suggests that the structure of sectoral competition does not affect the pass-through of
imported costs into domestic prices.
Sensitivity to the frequency of price changes. Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010)
show that exchange rate pass-through is higher for goods which undergo frequent price
changes. We tested whether or not such a correlation could be found in our data. We
also investigated whether or not pass-through depends on the frequency of changes to
the price of the imported inputs. We computed the frequency of price changes at the
item level, dividing the number of price changes by the number of observations in the
series. These frequencies were then interacted with imported costs changes.
In Table 9, columns 4 and 5 present the results for all arm-length prices. The coefficients
of these interaction terms are positive, but only the coefficient of the frequency of input
price changes is significant. This suggests that: (i) firms which change their prices more
often do not pass on a larger share of changes to imported costs; but (ii) firms tend
to pass on a larger share of cost changes when the price of their inputs changes more
frequently. However, the coefficients are much smaller and no more significant when
focusing on the sample of exogenous price changes (Table 10, columns 4 and 5).
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Heterogeneity across industries Table 11 lists the coefficients of the imported inputs we
estimated for different sectors, depending on the type of import (arm-length, exogenous,
intra-firm). A first glance at this table reveals that there is an important heterogeneity
in the degree of transmission of imported costs to domestic prices. Overall, we can also
see that the degree of transmission is much lower for intra-firm than for arm-length
transactions. We will now describe the results for exogenous arm-length transactions,
which are the most representative in our view. First, most of the estimated coefficients
are not significant. This weak statistical significance is explained in some cases by the
very low number of observations which were used to measure pass-through. This is the
case in sectors in which most transactions for imports involve a specific supplier: motor
vehicles, computers, electronic, optical, and pharmaceutical products. By contrast, for
the chemical industry, food and beverages, electrical equipment, metal products and
textiles and apparel, the level of pass-through is above 8% and the estimated coefficient
is highly significant.
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Table 5: Frequency and monthly duration of price changes
Domestic Exports Imports
Sector Freq. Dur. Freq. Dur. Freq. Dur.
Extraction of petroleum and gas 1.0 1.0
Mining of coal and lignite 0.9 1.1
Mining of metal ores 0.9 1.1
Water collection, treatment and supply 0.2 4.9
Manuf of tobacco products 0.1 10.0 0.1 7.6
Other mining and quarrying 0.8 1.3 0.6 1.6
Printing and reprod. of recorded media 0.1 11.3 0.1 10.4
Repair and installation of machinery 0.1 8.2 0.3 3.2
Electricity, gas, steam and ac supply 0.4 2.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Basic metals 0.8 1.3 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.1
Basic pharmaceutical products 0.0 22.0 0.1 13.0 0.1 19.6
Chemicals and chemical products 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.7 0.4 2.7
Coke and refined petroleum products 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.5
Computer, electronic and optical prod. 0.4 2.3 0.4 2.8 0.3 3.0
Electrical equipment 0.7 1.3 0.3 3.9 0.3 3.8
Fabricated metal products 0.5 2.0 0.3 3.5 0.2 5.3
Furniture 0.3 3.0 0.3 3.4 0.1 17.5
Leather and related products 0.2 6.6 0.2 4.9 0.3 2.9
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.3 3.8 0.2 6.0 0.1 10.9
Motor vehicles and trailers 0.2 6.4 0.1 8.1 0.2 6.2
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.7 1.4 0.5 2.0 0.2 5.3
Other transport equipment 0.2 4.7 0.2 5.9 0.1 14.4
Paper and paper products 0.5 2.2 0.6 1.8 0.3 3.8
Rubber and plastic products 0.4 2.5 0.4 2.4 0.1 10.0
Textiles 0.5 1.9 0.5 2.0 0.2 6.4
Wearing apparel 0.2 5.7 0.1 15.3 0.3 3.8
Wood products, except furniture 0.3 3.1 0.6 1.6 0.2 4.8
Beverages 0.7 1.4 0.5 2.0 0.1 13.4
Food products 0.8 1.3 0.6 1.6 0.3 3.1
Other manufacturing 0.6 1.6 0.2 4.0 0.4 2.8
Average 0.53 3.3 0.38 4.6 0.36 5.2
Notes: This table reports the frequency of price changes and the implied duration for 2 digit sectors. Frequencies are
first computed at the item level, and then aggregated at the sectoral level. Implied duration is simply the inverse of the
frequency. The total average frequency and duration are computed as the average of these two variables for sectors where
we have information about domestic, export and import prices.
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Table 6: Domestic prices and imported input prices
(∆ log. output price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inputs 0.292∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗
(0.110) (0.088) (0.051) (0.096)
Labor costs 0.382 0.061 0.292
(0.299) (0.048) (0.358)
Comp. prices 0.322∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.023) (0.073)
Production 0.005 0.015 0.005
(0.008) (0.022) (0.010)
Comp. costs 0.035
(0.025)
Fixed effects sect.×period period - firm×product
Std var. No No Yes No
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 25,897
R2 0.063 0.025 0.025 0.029
rho 0.779 0.380 0.380 0.380
This table investigates the impact of imported input prices on domestic output prices i)
within firm by including firm fixed effects and controlling for sector×period fixed effects (col.
1) and ii) within firm-product pairs by including firm×product fixed effects and period fixed
effects (col. 2-4). It focuses on the entire sample of arm-length transactions. The dependent
variable is the first difference in the logarithm of output prices computed for each product
firm and month. Explanatory variables are the changes in the prices of imported inputs
(Inputs), the change in competitors prices within 2-digit sectors (Comp.prices), the change
in competitors’ costs within 2-digit sectors (Comp.costs), the change in labor cost and the
change in sectoral production (production). A Y ES line Stdvar. means that variables have
been standardized. Changes in explanatory variables are changes since the last price change.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered in the firm×period dimension. c, b, a indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table 7: Domestic prices and exogenous imported input prices
(∆ log. output price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inputs 0.131∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.026) (0.012) (0.029)
Labor costs 0.362 0.058 0.261
(0.342) (0.055) (0.409)
Comp. prices 0.312∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.024) (0.075)
Production -0.004 -0.011 -0.008
(0.006) (0.016) (0.007)
Comp. costs 0.024
(0.026)
Fixed effects sect.×period period - firm×product
Std var. No No Yes No
Observations 25,144 25,144 25,144 19,292
R2 0.021 0.027 0.027 0.036
rho 0.592 0.462 0.462 0.487
This table investigates the impact of imported input prices on domestic output prices i)
within firm by including firm fixed effects and controlling for sector×period fixed effects
(col. 1) and ii) within firm-product pairs by including firm×product fixed effects and period
fixed effects (col. 2-4). It focuses on the entire sample of arm-length transactions that we
consider as exogenous for the firm. The dependent variable is the first difference in the log-
arithm of output prices computed for each product firm and month. Explanatory variables
are the changes in the prices of imported inputs (Inputs), the change in competitors prices
within 2-digit sectors (Comp.prices), the change in competitors’ costs within 2-digit sectors
(Comp.costs), the change in labor cost and the change in sectoral production (production).
A Y ES line Stdvar. means that variables have been standardized. Changes in explana-
tory variables are changes since the last price change. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are
clustered in the firm×period dimension. c, b, a indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table 8: Domestic prices and imported input prices, related parties
(∆ log. output price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inputs -0.018 0.065∗ 0.024∗ 0.054
(0.031) (0.034) (0.013) (0.036)
Labor costs 0.264 0.042 -0.046
(0.360) (0.057) (0.368)
Comp. prices 0.480∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.049) (0.119)
Production -0.024∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.011) (0.031) (0.013)
Comp. costs 0.100∗
(0.059)
Fixed effects sect.×period period - firm×product
Std var. No No Yes No
Observations 12,296 12,296 12,296 9,674
R2 0.007 0.034 0.034 0.028
rho 0.401 0.248 0.248 0.233
This table investigates the impact of imported input prices on domestic output prices i)
within firm by including firm fixed effects and controlling for sector×period fixed effects
(col. 1) and ii) within firm-product pairs by including firm×product fixed effects and pe-
riod fixed effects (col. 2-4). It focuses on imports from related parties. The dependent
variable is the first difference in the logarithm of output prices computed for each product
firm and month. Explanatory variables are the changes in the prices of imported inputs
(Inputs), the change in competitors prices within 2-digit sectors (Comp.prices), the change
in competitors costs within 2-digit sectors (Comp.costs), the change in labor cost and the
change in sectoral production (production). Positive and negative changes in imported in-
puts prices are disentangle in variables Max(0, Inputs) and Min(0, Inputs). A Y ES line
Stdvar. means that variables have been standardized. Changes in explanatory variables are
changes since the last price change. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered in the
firm×period dimension. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table 9: Domestic prices and imported input prices, interaction terms.
(∆ log. output price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Max(0,Inputs) 0.188∗∗
(0.076)
Min(Inputs,0) 0.291
(0.182)
Sh. IO × Inputs 1.474∗∗∗
(0.553)
Inputs 0.343∗∗ 0.107 -0.033
(0.149) (0.070) (0.084)
HHI × Inputs -1.043
(0.805)
Freq(Outputs) × Inputs 0.164
(0.170)
Freq(Inputs) × Inputs 0.403∗
(0.234)
Fixed effects period - firm×product
Observations 33,120 31,363 29,171 33,120 33,120
R2 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.028
rho 0.380 0.372 0.394 0.380 0.382
This table investigates the impact of imported input prices on domestic output
prices within firm-product pairs by including firm×product fixed effects and pe-
riod fixed effects. It focuses on arm-length transactions. The dependent variable
is the first difference in the logarithm of output prices computed for each product
firm and month. Explanatory variables are the changes in the prices of imported
inputs (Inputs), the changes in imported input’s prices interacted with the share
of imported inputs in total costs at the sectoral level (Sh.IO), with the sectoral
Herfindahl index (HHI), and the frequency of output and input price changes
(Freq(Outputs) and Freq(Inputs)). In the first column, we separate out posi-
tive and negative changes in imported inputs prices: variables Max(0, Inputs) and
Min(0, Inputs). We also control for the change in competitors’ costs within 2-digit
sectors, the change in labor cost and the change in sectoral production. Changes
in explanatory variables are changes since the last price change. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are clustered in the firm×period dimension. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table 10: Domestic prices and exogenous imported input prices, interaction terms.
(∆ log. output price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Max(0,Inputs) 0.136∗∗∗
(0.039)
Min(Inputs,0) 0.117∗∗
(0.049)
Sh. IO × Inputs 0.755∗∗∗
(0.178)
Inputs 0.109∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.042) (0.065) (0.065)
HHI × Inputs 0.373
(0.363)
Freq(Outputs) × Inputs -0.079
(0.082)
Freq(Inputs) × Inputs 0.041
(0.088)
Fixed effects period - firm×product
Observations 25,144 23,877 21,775 25,144 25,144
R2 0.027 0.025 0.021 0.028 0.027
rho 0.462 0.447 0.494 0.462 0.462
This table investigates the impact of imported input prices on domestic output
prices within firm-product pairs by including firm×product fixed effects and period
fixed effects. It focuses on arm-length transactions with exogenous prices changes.
The dependent variable is the first difference in the logarithm of output prices com-
puted for each product firm and month. Explanatory variables are the changes
in the prices of imported inputs (Inputs), the changes in imported input’s prices
interacted with the share of imported inputs in total costs at the sectoral level
(Sh.IO), with the sectoral Herfindahl index (HHI), and the frequency of output
and input price changes (Freq(Outputs) and Freq(Inputs)). In the first column,
we separate out positive and negative changes in imported inputs prices: variables
Max(0, Inputs) andMin(0, Inputs). We also control for the change in competitors’
costs within 2-digit sectors, the change in labor cost and the change in sectoral pro-
duction. Changes in explanatory variables are changes since the last price change.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered in the firm×period dimension. ∗, ∗∗,
∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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5.3 Imported costs pass-through domestic vs export prices
Previous estimates have investigated the way in which imported price changes are
passed on to domestic prices. However, firms use inputs to produce goods which are
sold in the local market but also to produce goods which are sold in foreign markets.
Domestic and foreign markets differ for several reasons: the presence of exchange rates
for non-euro countries; the intensity of competition; differences in market shares etc.
For these reasons, we could expect firms to transmit changes in their costs into domestic
and export prices in different ways. This forms the subject of Tables 12 and 13. In the
first column, we measure pass-through in the entire sample, including both domestic
and export prices. As we aggregated firms’ prices at the firm and four-digit sector
levels, this regression provided us with a way of checking that this aggregation would
not produce totally different results. In the two tables, the estimated coefficients are in
line with previous estimates. In the second column, we restricted the sample to firms
that produce goods for the domestic and foreign markets. Our strategy of identification
required us to focus on this type of firm. The coefficients have the same magnitude
as in the first column. Then, we interacted input price changes with the dummy that
is equal to one for exported prices (columns 3, 4 and 5). We also controlled for the
change in NEER (column 4) and for the interaction between the NEER, the change
in input prices and the export dummy (column 5). The only significant interaction is
the interaction between changes in the price of imported inputs and the dummy for
exports in Table 13. However, when considering exogenous input price changes, the
coefficient becomes non-significant and very small. This suggests that firms pass on
imported cost to their domestic and export prices to the same extent.
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Table 12: Domestic and export prices, and imported input prices
(∆ log. output price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inputs 0.202∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.062) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
Comp. prices 0.567∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Production -0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Labor costs 0.594∗∗ 0.536∗∗ 0.528∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.218) (0.207) (0.206) (0.202)
Export × Inputs -0.184∗ -0.185∗ -0.186∗
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
NEER -0.145 -0.144
(0.216) (0.215)
Export × Inputs × NEER 0.580
(3.412)
Fixed effects period - firm
Sample All serve domestic and export markets
Observations 12322 7091 7091 7091 7091
rho 0.157 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.071
This table investigates the difference in transmission of imported input prices to domestic
and export output prices within firm-product pairs by including firm×product fixed effects
and period fixed effects. It focuses on arm-length transactions. The dependent variable
is the first difference in the logarithm of output prices computed for each sector, firm, and
month. Explanatory variables are the changes in the prices of imported inputs (Inputs), the
change in labor costs (labor), the change in sectoral production (Production), the change in
competitors’ costs (Comp.costs), the change in the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)
faced by exporters, a dummy equal to one if the output price is exported, and interactions
between these variables. Changes in explanatory variables are changes since the last price
change. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 10%, 5%
and 1%.
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Table 13: Domestic and export prices, and exogenous imported input prices
(∆ log. output price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inputs 0.126∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Comp. prices 0.502∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Production -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Labor costs 0.554∗ 0.472∗∗ 0.478∗∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.194) (0.193) (0.191) (0.150)
Export × Inputs 0.001 0.001 -0.006
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
NEER -0.067 -0.071
(0.127) (0.123)
Export × Inputs × NEER -2.668
(3.552)
Fixed effects period - firm
Sample All serve domestic and export markets
Observations 9,192 5,305 5,305 5,305 5,305
rho 0.076 0.043 0.034 0.030 0.000
This table investigates the difference in transmission of imported input prices to domestic
and export output prices within firm-product pairs by including firm×product fixed effects
and period fixed effects. It focuses on exogenous price changes in arm-length transactions.
The dependent variable is the first difference in the logarithm of output prices computed
for each sector, firm, and month. Explanatory variables are the changes in the prices of
imported inputs (Inputs), the change in labor costs (labor), the change in sectoral pro-
duction (Production), the change in competitors’ costs (Comp.costs), the change in the
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) faced by exporters, a dummy equal to one if the
output price is exported, and interactions between these variables. Changes in explanatory
variables are changes since the last price change. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ∗,
∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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5.4 Comparison with the literature
While our paper examines the transmission of import prices to domestic ones, the
literature focuses on exchange rate pass-through. Most papers study ERPT to import
or export prices. Some papers give insight on ERPT to domestic prices.11 However, to
my knowledge, there is no paper documenting the sensitivity of production prices to
imported input costs at the firm level.12
While there is no comparable estimation in the literature, one can try to provide a
benchmark. Namely, one can ask what would be the sensitivity of the producer price
to imported inputs if the whole imported cost shock was passed on domestic prices.
To do it ones needs information on the share of import inputs in total costs, and the
proportion of arm-length transaction among imported inputs. Golbderg & Campa
(2010) find that the share of imported inputs in total costs 20% on average in the
manufacturing industry. Bernard et al (2010) find that 46% of imports occur between
related party. From this figure, the share of arm-length transaction in total imported
inputs is about 11% (1−0.46×0.2). Which is almost exactly the elasticity we estimate.
This back of the envelop computation suggests that the transmission of imported input
price changes into producer prices is total, conditional on the share of inputs used in
the production process.
Last, our distinction between arm-length and intra-firm transaction is also made by
11ERPT into domestic prices is the sum of the sensitivity of import prices to ER and the sensitivity
of domestic prices to import prices. By comparing ERPT into import and domestic prices, one can
find the sensitivity of domestic prices to import prices. (McCarthy, 2007) documents the ERPT to
aggregate import prices and producers prices for 9 industrialized countries, including France. For
France he finds that after 3 months the ERPT is almost one for import prices and is not different
from zero for production prices. From this first paper it seems that changes in import prices driven
by ER are not passed on producer prices. This is very different from what we find. However, the
data McCarthy uses (quarterly data, from 1976 to 1998) limit the relevance of a comparison with our
results. I did not find any other studies allowing such decomposition in the literature
12The only exception are Goldberg & Hellerstein (2010) and Nakamura & Zerom (2010), but they
focus on the beer and coffee industries.
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Neiman (2010) and Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010). Both find the ERPT is higher
for imports occurring between related parties. While the focus is not on ERPT, the
findings in chapter 4 go in the opposite direction. Namely, the transmission of import
price changes to domestic ones is found to be lower for intra-firm transactions.
6 Aggregate implications
6.1 Strategy
Individual price changes are mainly a result of idiosyncratic shocks. The low R2 ob-
tained for our various specifications confirms this theory. However, we could expect
these idiosyncratic shocks to cancel each other out in the aggregate data (Bergin et al.,
2010). At the sector level, we could therefore expect that a larger proportion of price
volatility would be explained by measurable variables. In particular, in this section, we
discuss what proportion of sectoral price volatility can be explained by imported input
prices. In order to address this issue, we proceeded in three steps. First, we estimated
the elasticity of output prices with regard to imported input costs by industry using
our firm-level data. Second, if a change in the output price was observed, we computed
the predicted size of this output price change which was driven solely by a change in
imported costs. Therefore, we found micro output price changes in each period, and
counterfactual price changes predicted by import price movements. In a third step, we
built two sectoral indices using actual and predicted price changes. Then, we measured
the share of sectoral price changes that is related to movements in the price of imported
inputs. Namely, we regressed the sectoral price index on the predicted-by-imports sec-
toral price index. The R2 of this regression provides us with a measure of the variance
in sectoral domestic prices which is explained by imported inputs.
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6.2 Findings
The results are presented in Figure 5. As in our sectoral estimations of the pass-
through of imported costs, we observed important heterogeneity in the proportion of
price volatility which was explained by imported inputs. The average share of the
variance in price (measured by the R2) explained by imported inputs is 0.09, but this
is driven mainly by chemical products, for which imported inputs explained 41% of
price volatility. In sectors such as rubber and plastic products and wood and paper
products, import prices also contribute to a substantial share of sector volatility (more
than 10%). In the other industries, the contribution of imported prices is much smaller.
A glance at the data suggests that the very minor contribution of the price of imported
inputs to sectoral inflation is explained by the substantial stickiness of import prices. It
appears that production prices change more frequently than import prices. Therefore,
a large proportion of price changes cannot be explained using those import prices.
More precisely, in the data, import price changes are 70% less frequent than domestic
price changes. When focusing on the sample of exogenous price changes, 80% of import
prices are stickier than domestic prices.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the transmission of imported costs to domestic prices using
highly detailed data on imported input prices and production prices at the firm level.
On average, 12% of imported input price shocks are passed on to domestic prices. How-
ever, there is a significant heterogeneity in the degree of pass-through among industries.
One explanation for this heterogeneity is that industries vary in their use of imported
inputs. However, a large part of this heterogeneity remains unexplained. Interestingly,
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Figure 5: Share of the volatility of domestic prices explained by imported inputs
Vol. Sh. IO Manufacturing of: Sh. Volatility
0.41 0.22 Chemical products
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Pharmaceutical
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Textile and apparel
Manufacture of electrical equipment
Food and beverage
Metal products
Wood and paper
Rubber and plastic products
Chemi al industry
0.14 0.26 Rubber and plastic products
0.11 0.11 Wood and paper
0.04 0.15 Metal products
0.04 0.08 Food and beverage
0.03 0.21 Electrical equipment
0.01 0.21 Textile and apparel
0 0.16 Machinery and equipment n.e.c.
0 Pharmaceutical
Mean: Mean:
0.09 0.16
This table lists the share of sectoral price volatility explained by imported input prices. The share is
measured by the R2 of a regression of the monthly sectoral price index on the monthly predicted-by-import
prices sectoral price index. R2 are listed in the first column and plotted in the fourth one. The second
column gives the share of imported inputs used in production in every sector. The third column indicates
the label of the sectors we consider.
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we did not find any evidence of heterogeneity in pass-through for domestic and export
prices. This suggests that local demand conditions are not that important for explain-
ing cost pass-through. We have also shown that price changes in transactions which
occur between related parties are much less likely to be passed on to domestic prices.
This suggests that the inflationary pressure of imports also depends on whether or not
the import occurs within firms’ boundaries.
We ended our analysis by showing that, on average, 9% of sectoral price volatility is
explained by the volatility of imported costs. Once again, there is a strong heterogeneity
across sectors. In addition to the proportion of total costs made up of imported inputs,
the volatility of demand and local costs is another mechanism that can explain this
heterogeneity. If the price of local costs or the demand is highly volatile in relative to
import prices, they may become the driving force behind domestic prices, muting the
sensitivity of production price to imported costs.
General Conclusion
My ambition in that work was to shed new lights on four important questions in
international economics; namely, the effect of distance on firms’ pricing policy, the
impact of the Euro on European economic integration, the consequences of low-wage
countries competition on firms in developed economies, and the effect of imported
inputs on domestic inflation. Along the four chapters, I have taken the option to
examine these questions using firm-level data, and more particularly, using information
on trade prices.
I hope this work contributes to four different aspects of the international
economic literature. First, Chapters 1, 2, and 4 provide new insights on the pricing
policy of importing and exporting firms. Chapter 1 finds that firms charge higher net
of transport costs prices on exports to more distant countries. This finding goes against
the prediction of almost all the textbook models of international trade. It suggests that,
when facing high transport costs, firms prefer conserving their margin rather than their
volumes. Chapter 2 shows that firms reduced their level of price discrimination toward
euro countries, after the creation of the single currency. Furthermore, large firms have
been more strongly affected by the euro. Chapter 4 suggests that conditional on the
share of imported inputs in total costs changes in the price imported inputs are almost
entirely passed on to domestic prices.
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While the major part of the trade literature has focused on the reaction of volumes,
the present thesis i) points out that firms also adjust their prices and the quality of
their products to changes in their economic environment, and ii) gives qualitative and
quantitative results on the way they adjust their prices. As illustrated in Chapter 1
for instance, those price adjustment may have important implications for consumer’s
welfare.
Second, Chapters 2 and 3 maintain the importance of the heterogeneity of firms in their
reaction following aggregate economic shocks. Chapter 2 stresses the heterogenous
impact of the creation of the euro on the price discrimination of French exporters.
Namely, large firms have reduced more their price discrimination toward Euro countries
than smaller firms. Since large firms account for a larger proportion of sales, taking into
account this heterogeneity is important to measure the aggregate impact of the Euro
on price dispersion. Chapter 3 shows that low-quality firms have been more impacted
by the rise in competition from low-wage countries. This has triggered a reallocation of
sales from low- to high-quality firms. As a result the quality content of French exports
has increased.
Thus, both chapters point to the asymmetric impact macroeconomic shocks can have
on firms belonging to the same country and the same industry. Furthermore, they
demonstrate that this heterogeneity shape macro outcomes.
Third, Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that some old models may explain this new facts.
Chapter 1 demonstrates that the positive impact of distance on prices may be rational-
ized in a CES model with additive transport costs rather than iceberg ones. While per
unit additive costs have been abandoned over years, it seems they offer a good expla-
nation for this fact, and may have important welfare implications. This is confirmed
by the recent work by Irarrazabal et al. (2010).
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Chapter 3 validates the importance of accounting for the heterogeneity in terms of
quality across firms. The proposed model, based on Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), is
very stylized but it implies patterns of substitution across products and of reallocation
across firms that are richer that in recent trade models accounting for quality.13
The structure of transport costs and the quality of goods produced on the economy
explain some patterns of trade and have important implications for consumers, workers,
and firms. It seems these two ingredients should be added in more general models, at
the cost of some tractability.
Last, Chapters 2, 3, 4 provide new insights on policy relevant topics. The effects of
the Euro, and the effectiveness of the single currency to deepen economic integration,
are closely discussed within political and academic context. In the first chapter, we
find that the Euro has significantly reduced price dispersion within the Euro area.
Importantly, we are the first to show that the effect has been felt more strongly by
large firms, implying that the effect is stronger than previously thought. This means
that the introduction of the single currency has contributed to deepen the European
economic integration.
The fear of Chinese products dominating the world production of manufacturing goods
has been an important concern in most developed countries over the past two decades.
Peter Schott (2004, 2008), Bloom et al. (2009) and others have shown that considering
the specialization of countries in high-quality / innovative products is key to figuring
out the implications of this new competition. In Chapter 3, we provide strong evidence
suggesting that competition for LWC has driven a reallocation of sales from low- to
high-quality producers, increasing the overall quality of French exports. Evidence in
13The recent paper by Auer and Sauré (2011) is a notable exception. It provides a many firms
general equilibrium model encompassing our very simple framework, and gives insightful predictions
concerning quality, growth and innovation.
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favor of within-industry specialization suggests one way for countries to maintain their
market share in world exports, while increasing the quality content of their exports.
Investing in high-quality production should indeed help countries to insulate themselves
from low-wage foreign competition.
The debate around the impact of globalization on inflation is raging in Europe and
in the US. Some structural studies have shown that the main channel through which
movement in foreign exchange rates or foreign costs affect domestic prices are imported
inputs (Goldberg and Campa, 2010). Chapter 4 contributes to this debate by providing
the first evidence on this imported input channel at the firm level. Our principal finding
is that the sensitivity of domestic prices to foreing inputs is about equal to the share
of imported inputs in total costs. However, while this share is relatively important, in
most industries the dynamic of prices is not significantly driven by imported inputs.
Our work obviously has some drawbacks, let me point out the more promi-
nent ones. In the first chapter, there are two main concerns, both related to the data.
First transport costs rather than distance should be used to explain price differences
across countries. Actually, it is more likely that firms react to transport costs; distance
being a proxy for those costs. Hopefully, better data about transport costs will allow
one to get more precise estimates. Second, unit values computed at the firm and prod-
uct level are also proxy for prices. This raises some problem in the interpretation of
the results. In particular, it is hard to say whether spatial differences in unit values
across countries are due to markups or quality differences. More structural estimates
should allow us to bring insights on this question.
In the second chapter, the main problem relies on the interpretation of the results. In
this respect developing a model consistent with this empirical fact would give some
additional insights. While the mechanisms explaining heterogeneity are described in
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this chapter, sketching a complete model would allow to draw additional predictions
and to validate or reject our intuition. Second, if the model relates price dispersion to
welfare, it could provide more concrete figures about the welfare impact of the deeper
integration revealed by the data.
The main issue in the third chapter is that we neglect within-firm quality changes.
The chapter acknowledgedly focuses on quality upgrading driven by a reallocation of
sales across firms of different quality. However, it would be nice compare this source
of quality upgrading with the quality upgrading due to firms’ reaction - in terms of
innovation - to low-wage countries competition.
The last chapter is more preliminary. A dimension I would like to explore more in detail
is the aggregate implications of imported inputs. This chapter suggests that in most
sectors the volatility of domestic prices is not driven by imported inputs. Understanding
why is some sectors imported inputs are much more important would provide insights
on the condition under which imported inputs matter for domestic inflation.
I end up this thesis with more quenstions than answers. Here are some of
the points I would like to explore in the near future.
First, as pointed out above, I have not managed in this work to disentangle markups
and quality from firm-level unit values. This could be achieve using the same data as
the ones used here and estimating a structural model. Another direction that could be
used is to focus on a specific industry in which quality is closely related to measurable
characteristics. Computers, televisions, or cars are such industry. Through hedonic
price techniques we could infer what is attributable to changes in quality and what is
due to markups. A last way to look at this question is to focus on identical goods, for
which we are absolutely confident that there is not differences in terms of quality. From
such data, one could investigate how markup changes. Comparing price dispersion to
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unit values dispersion would be a way to measure what part of the dispersion in firm-
level unit values is attributable to markups and what part is due to costs or quality
differentials.
The second dimension I would like to investigate deal with the consequences of the
specialization in terms of quality of developed countries. This specialization is at
work as shown by Hallak and Sivadasan (2009); Bloom et al. (2009) and in the third
Chapter of this thesis. But its macroeconomics consequences have not been subject to
a lot of studies. In this respect, there are two questions I plan to explore. First, does
the response of trade to changes in demand depend on the quality content of traded
goods? And second, what are the consequences in terms of macroeconomics volatility
of the quality upgrading process occurring in developed countries? More specifically,
I want to investigate how firms might be differently affected in terms of exports (and
potentially employment) by a demand shock according to the quality they produce,
and in turns how the vertical specialization of a country might impact on the volatility
of its output and employment.
A last question I would like to examine more in details is the heterogeneous adjustment
of prices following a shock. Chapters 2-3 point out the heterogenous responses of firms
following specific macroeconomic shocks (the creation of euro in Chapter 2, and the
emergence of low-wage countries in chapter 3). In Chapter 4, I have used highly detailed
data on domestic prices. In producing stylized facts on this dataset, I figured out how
heterogenous were price changes across firms. I would like to use this latter dataset
to explore the role of firms’ pricing behavior heterogeneity in shaping the response of
aggregate prices to a macroeconomic shock.
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Note de synthèse
L’environnement économique international est en permanente évolution. Ces change-
ments soulèvent de nombreuses questions tant dans les cercles politiques que dans les
cercles académiques. Cette thèse se propose d’étudier quatre questions importantes, qui
seront introduites dans les prochains paragraphes. Dans le sillage des faits économiques,
le champs de l’économie internationale évolue lui aussi. Une revue rapide des avance-
ments dans la compréhension, la vision, et la modélisation de l’économie internationale
permettra d’introduire le parti qui a été choisi dans cette thèse pour répondre aux
questions posées.
Après cette introduction, nous préciserons les problématiques développées dans ce tra-
vail et nous en décrirons les principales conclusions. Enfin, nous porterons un regard
plus détaillé sur chacun des quatre chapitres qui composent cette thèse.
Evolutions de l’environnement économique international. L’émergence de la
Chine est probablement le bouleversement le plus important de ces vingt dernières
années. Les performances économiques spectaculaires du pays le plus peuplé du monde
sont à l’origine de nombreuses craintes dans les pays développés.14 Une question souvent
14La Chine est devenue en 2010 la seconde économie la plus puissante du monde. Depuis 1980,
son PIB a été multiplié par 18. La Chine est également le premier exportateur mondial et le second
importateur mondial. Voir Feenstra et Wei (2010) pour étude poussée sur l’intégration de la Chine
dans l’économie mondiale.
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posée aux économistes concerne l’impact de la Chine - et plus généralement des pays à
bas salaires - sur l’industrie des pays développés. Il apparaît clairement que le nombre
d’employés dans l’industries manufacturière a chuté depuis le début des années 1980.
Les études les plus récentes montrent que la concurrence des pays à bas salaire (ainsi
que le progrès technique) a contribué à ce déclin.15 Cependant, il convient de noter
qu’en dépit de ce climat morose, certaines entreprises sont parvenues à tirer leur épingle
du jeu. L’industrie de la mode en France illustre parfaitement ce point. Alors que la
plupart des entreprises souffrent de la concurrence des pays asiatiques, les entreprises
de luxe de ce secteur ont connu une hausse soutenue de leurs ventes en France et à
l’export. C’est cet aspect asymétrique de la concurrence des pays à bas salaires sur les
entreprises des pays développés que nous explorons dans le troisième chapitre de cette
thèse.
Les Européens ont connu un changement radical à la fin du XXeme siècle: la création
de l’euro. Le lancement de la monnaie unique en 1999 peut être vu comme la plus
importante expérience de politique économique menée dans le monde (Baldwin 2006).
Le passage à l’Euro a soulevé de nombreuses questions de la part des entreprises et
des consommateurs. L’euro est-il responsable d’une hausse générale des prix? L’euro
pénalise-t-il la compétitivité des entreprises françaises? Au delà de ces questions impor-
tantes, il faut rappeler que le principal objectif de la monnaie unique était de renforcer
l’intégration économique européenne. Le second chapitre de cette thèse cherche à éval-
uer le succès de cette réforme. Il s’intéresse en particulier à l’impact de l’introduction
de la monnaie unique sur le degré d’intégration économique des pays de la zone euro.
Certaines transformations sont plus subtiles, voire indolores. Elles apparaissent aux
yeux du monde à l’occasion de certains événements très particuliers. La fragmentation
15Voir Sachs et Shatz (1994) ou Bernard et al. (2006).
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des chaînes de production s’apparente à ces transformations. Trop peu d’études portent
sur la question, mais toutes mettent en avant l’importance croissante de la fragmen-
tation des chaînes de production entre les états.16 Ces liens entre les entreprises et
leurs fournisseurs sont indispensables pour expliquer les dessins du commerce mondial
et pour comprendre la transmission internationale des chocs économiques. La mise à
l’arrêt des chaînes de production aux Etats-Unis et en Europe à la suite du séisme au
Japon est une conséquence visible de cette nouvelle organisation de la production.
Une question importante pour les banques centrales concerne les effets de cette dépen-
dance accrue des pays aux biens intermédiaires étrangers sur l’inflation domestique.
Le quatrième chapitre examine l’impact des biens intermédiaires importés sur la dy-
namique des prix domestiques.
Il faut concéder que certains aspects de l’environnement économique international n’ont
pas changé. Par exemple, l’effet de la distance sur les flux de commerce est resté
surprenamment fort au cours du siècle dernier.17 Pourtant, cela devait changer. En
effet, la facilitation des transports et le développement des infrastructures auraient du
contribuer à atténuer l’impact de la distance. Des dizaines d’études rapportent les
effets négatifs de la distance sur les volumes échangés et sur les décisions d’exportation
des entreprises. La distance est également une barrière forte pour les migrations, les
investissements trans-frontaliers et les flux financiers. Une dimension spécifique qui n’a
pas encore été analysée - bien qu’elle soit importante pour les consommateurs - relève
de l’impact de la distance sur les stratégies de prix des entreprises. Cette question est
examinée dans le premier chapitre.
16Hummels et al. (2001) sont parmi les premiers à avoir décrit ces "changements considérables dans
la nature du commerce international". Ils ont montrés en particulier qu’en 1990 près d’un bien exporté
sur 5 était produit à partir des biens intermédiaires importés, soit 30% de plus qu’en 1970.
17Voir Disdier et Head (2008) pour une méta-analyse démontrant l’effet fort et persistent de la
distance sur les flux de commerce au cours du temps.
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L’économie internationale change. Dans le sillage de l’économie réelle, le champ
de l’économie internationale évolue. Les changements de vision, de compréhension et
de modélisation du commerce international sont tirés par trois forces principales: i)
de nouveaux faits empiriques, ii) le développement de nouveaux outils théoriques et
empiriques dans d’autres champs de l’économie, et iii) des changements technologiques.
Notre vision du commerce international a considérablement changé ces quarante dernières
années. La principale évolution a été initié par Paul Krugman et d’autres, à la fin des
années 1970. A cette époque, un fait empirique posait problème à ces chercheurs.
Plus précisément, Balassa (1996) et Grubel et Lloyd (1971) ont montré que les pays
échangeaient des biens similaires, ce qui allait à l’encontre des prédictions des théories
classiques du commerce international.18 Le talent du Prix Nobel 2008 et le développe-
ment de modèles avec rendement d’échelle croissant en économie industrielle, ont permis
aux économistes de développer de nouveaux modèles, en accord avec ces données.
Un second changement s’est produit au cours des années 1990. Comme le remarquent
Bernard et al. (2011), l’intérêt s’est détourné des industries et des pays vers les firmes
et les produits. Cette transformation a été rendue possible par la mise à disposition
de données sur le commerce mondial au niveau des produits ou des entreprises, mais
aussi par le développement de logiciels de calcul capables d’exploiter ces données.
Les micro-données ont apporté des idées neuves sur l’hétérogénéité des entreprises en
terme de taille, de productivité, ou de participation aux exportations.19 Les résultats
principaux de ces études sont que seule une très faible partie des entreprises exporte,
et que ces entreprises exportatrices sont significativement plus grandes, plus riches et
plus productives que les autres. A la même période, dans d’autres champs tel que
18Les modèles de HOS et de Ricardo prédisent en effet que le commerce s’effectue entre industries.
En d’autres termes, les pays se spécialisent dans certaines industries et échangent des biens issue de
cette production. Le commerce est alors appelé inter industriel.
19VOir Bernard et al. (2011) pour une revue de littérature.
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la macroéconomie, les chercheurs ont commencé à introduire de l’hétérogénéité entre
les firmes dans leur modèle. A partir de nouveaux faits stylisés, en s’appuyant sur
les modèles développés en macroéconomie, Meltiz (2003) a proposé un modèle avec
hétérogénéité et sélection des firmes sur les marchés domestiques et étrangers, cohérent
avec les faits stylisés évoqués plus haut. Le modèle propose un cadre pour étudier
la réallocation des ressources au sein d’une industrie dans un contexte d’ouverture
internationale. Ce modèle a été utilisé intensivement ces 10 dernières années.
D’autres faits stylisés, basés sur des données au niveau produit, ont également renouvelé
notre vision du commerce international. L’étude de ces données a confirmé que les
pays échangent des biens similaires et a apporté des informations supplémentaires.
Premièrement, il apparaît que non seulement les pays riches mais aussi les pays en
développement échangent des biens similaires. La Chine en est un exemple frappant.
Le panier de biens qu’elle exporte vers les Etats-Unis est à 90% similaire au panier
exporté par l’Allemagne vers les Etats-Unis. Les données permettent également de
mettre en évidence que bien que la Chine et l’Allemagne exportent des biens similaires
vers les Etats-Unis, la qualité de ces biens est très différente.
Prix, qualité et commerce international. La plupart des papiers empiriques en
commerce international portent sur la valeur ou le volume des flux de commerce. Cette
approche présente deux limites. Premièrement, la plupart des modèles partagent des
prédictions similaires concernant la valeur ou les volumes des flux de commerce. Se fo-
caliser sur un de ces deux éléments uniquement ne permet de discriminer entre les mod-
èles. Deuxièmement, regarder les volumes ou les quantités ne permet pas d’appréhender
la qualité qui semble pourtant un aspect crucial du commerce international.
Dans les années 1990, plusieurs chercheurs ont commencé à étudier les prix du com-
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merce. Les valeurs unitaires sont calculées comme le ratio de la valeur d’un flux divisé
par sa quantité. Les valeurs unitaires étaient alors calculées à partir de bases de com-
merce international décrivant les flux de commerce bilatéraux classés en 5000 à 10000
produits selon les bases de données et les nomenclatures. Ces valeurs unitaires sont
des approximations de prix. Elles sont en fait des prix moyens. A partir de données
désagrégées au niveau produit, les chercheurs ont mis en lumière différents faits stylisés
remettant en question les modèles traditionnels et confirmant le rôle de la qualité pour
comprendre les tendances du commerce international. Les premiers faits stylisés ont été
mentionnés plus haut: les pays échangent des biens similaires, mais vendent ces biens
à des prix très différents.20 Ceci remet en cause la vision des années 1980 selon laquelle
les pays échangeraient des biens similaires, et suggère plutôt que les pays produisent les
mêmes types de biens mais se spécialisent dans différents niveaux de qualité. La seconde
vague de faits stylisés se rapporte à l’impact de la distance sur les prix moyens. Les
premiers modèles de commerce avec firmes hétérogènes prédisent que seules les firmes
les plus productives, fixant les prix les plus bas, parviennent à exporter vers les marchés
les plus difficiles et les plus lointains. Les données montrent le contraire. Ce sont les
firmes vendant aux prix les plus élevés qui parviennent à exporter vers les marchés
difficiles. Les différences de qualité semblent donc être une dimension importante de
l’hétérogénéité entre les entreprises.
L’étude de données de prix a également permis aux chercheurs de mesurer le degré
d’intégration économique des pays. En particulier, l’étude des écarts de prix d’un bien
entre plusieurs pays a permis d’éclairer les effets des frontières, des taux de change, ou
de la proximité culturelle sur le degré d’intégration économique des pays.
Enfin, les travaux sur la transmission des variations de change sont probablement ceux
20Voir Schott (2004) et Fontagné et al. (2008).
205
qui ont le plus fait appel aux données de prix individuelles. Jusqu’à très récemment
encore, les papiers portant sur ce sujet utilisaient soit des prix très détaillés mais pour
une industrie spécifique, soit des données moins précises mais couvrant un spectre plus
large. Plus récemment, les chercheurs ont commencé à utiliser des données d’entreprises
voir des données de prix avec une couverture importante de l’économie.21 Une direction
intéressante de recherche proposée par Berman et al. (2011) a été de mettre en évidence
l’hétérogénéité des réponses des firmes à la suite de variations de change, et de montrer
les conséquences au niveau global de cette hétérogénéité au niveau le plus fin.
Le parti adopté dans cette thèse est d’utiliser l’information sur les prix pour éclairer les
quatre questions introduites plus haut; c’est à dire l’impact de la distance sur les straté-
gies de prix des entreprises, l’effet de l’euro sur le degré d’intégration des économies
européennes, les conséquences de la concurrence des pays à bas salaires sur les en-
treprises des pays développés, et l’effet des biens intermédiaires importés sur l’inflation
domestique.
Pour les analyses empiriques, des données individuelles d’entreprises sont utilisées.
L’hétérogénéité des réactions des entreprises est examinée avec attention. En outre, à
partir des résultats obtenus au niveau fin, tout est fait pour donner au lecteur une idée
de la significativité économique des résultats et pour mettre à jour leurs implications
agrégées.
Dans les différents chapitres de ce travail, nous procédons à un aller-retour entre la
théorie et les données. En effet, les analyses empiriques sont guidées par les cadres
théoriques les plus récents. De surcroît, les résultats empiriques sont comparés aux
prédictions théoriques, ce qui permet de discriminer entre les modèles et d’offrir des
perspectives pour les modélisations futures.
21Voir Gopinath et Rigobon (2008) par exemple.
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Questions et conclusions
Je présente maintenant les questions développées dans cette thèse et les conclusions
qui peuvent être tirées de ce travail. Chacun des chapitres est ensuite décrit plus en
détail.
Quatre questions sont traitées dans cette thèses.
1. De nombreuses études ont mis en évidence l’impact prépondérant de la distance
sur les activités économiques, et en particulier sur les flux de commerce et les dé-
cisions d’exportation des entreprises. Une dimension qui a été laissée de côté em-
piriquement concerne l’impact de la distance sur les prix au niveau de l’entreprise.
Dans le premier chapitre, la question de l’impact de la distance sur les stratégies
de prix des entreprises est posée.
2. L’introduction de la monnaie unique en Europe a présenté un changement impor-
tant pour les firmes et les consommateurs. Le débat sur l’impact économique de
la monnaie unique demeure. Dans le second Chapitre, co-écrit avec Isabelle Mé-
jean, nous cherchons à évaluer si la création de l’euro a approfondi l’intégration
économique européenne.
3. La croissance de la Chine et des pays à bas salaires soulève de nombreuses ques-
tions dans les pays développés. Dans le troisième chapitre, co-écrit avec Isabelle
Méjean, nous examinons les conséquences de la concurrence des pays à bas salaire
sur le contenu en qualité des exportations françaises.
4. La fragmentation internationale des chaînes de production, et l’utilisation inten-
sive de biens intermédiaires importés montrent la dépendance accrue des pays.
Cette dépendance favorise les transmissions internationales des chocs. Dans le
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Chapitre 4, je cherche à mesurer comment les firmes ajustent leur prix domes-
tiques, en réponse aux changements de prix de leurs biens intermédiaires importés.
Les principales conclusions de ce travail sont les suivantes.
1. Les entreprises fixent des prix (nets de coûts de transport) plus élevés lorsqu’elles
exportent vers des destinations lointaines. Une part importante de la prime payée
par les consommateurs les plus éloignés est due à ce comportement des entreprises,
le reste est du aux coûts de transport plus élevés. L’impact positif de la distance
sur les prix des exportations peut être rationalisé dans un modèle avec des coûts
de transport additifs, au lieu de la structure multiplicative standard (iceberg).
2. L’euro a réduit la dispersion des prix dans l’Union Monétaire. L’euro a eu un
effet relativement plus important sur les plus grandes entreprises. Comme ces
entreprises représentent une part disproportionnée des ventes, l’effet de l’euro sur
la dispersion agrégée des prix est renforcé.
3. Entre 1995 et 2005, le contenu en qualité des exportations françaises a augmenté
de 11% au travers d’une réallocation des parts de marché des entreprises pro-
duisant des biens de basse qualité vers les entreprises produisant des biens de
haute qualité. Cette réallocation est la conséquence de la pression concurrentielle
accrue des pays à bas salaires.
4. Une hausse de 10% du prix des biens intermédiaires importés conduit les en-
treprises a augmenter leur prix de 1,2%. La sensibilité des prix domestiques aux
biens intermédiaires importés dépend de manière cruciale de la proportion de bi-
ens importés utilisée dans le processus de production. Les changements de prix de
biens intermédiaires importés depuis une filiale n’ont pas d’effets sur les prix do-
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mestiques. Enfin, il apparaît que les changements de prix des biens intermédiaires
n’expliquent qu’une petite partie de la dynamique des prix domestiques.
Résumé des chapitres
Distance et stratégie de prix des entreprises exportatrices. La récente mise
à disposition de données d’entreprises à remis en cause les modèles de commerce in-
ternational existants. L’hypothèse standard d’homogénéité des entreprises (Krugman
1980), est rejetée par les données, et relâcher cette hypothèses offre des implications
nouvelles quant à l’allocation des ressources dans l’économie. Les travaux empiriques
majeurs ont en effet mis en évidence l’hétérogénéité des entreprises tant par leur taille
ou leur décision d’exporter ou non, que par les volumes qu’elles exportent ou le nombre
de produits qu’elles vendent.22 De ces études ressort qu’un élément déterminant des
décisions relatives à l’exportation est la distance qui sépare l’entreprise de son parte-
naire. A partir de ces nouveaux faits stylisés, les théoriciens du commerce international
ont développé de nouveaux modèles expliquant la sélection dans les marchés étrangers
des firmes - et des produits vendus par ces firmes.23
Les stratégies de prix adoptés par les entreprises exportatrices demeurent une dimension
inexplorée - empiriquement et dans une moindre mesure théoriquement - par cette
littérature. En particulier, alors que l’effet des coûts de transport sur les décisions des
entreprises a été largement étudié, leur impact sur les prix a beaucoup moins attiré
l’attention. Dans les principaux modèles de commerce international les stratégies de
prix sont d’ailleurs évacuées pour favoriser la maniabilité de ces modèles.24 Une partie
22Voir Bernard et al. (2007), Bernard et al. (2010) et Eaton et al. (2004).
23Voir Melitz (2003), Melitz Ottaviano (2008), Eaton et al. (2011) et Bernard et al. (2010).
24Dans les modèles avec demande CES, concurrence monopolistique et coûts de transport iceberg
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de littérature a néanmoins proposé un cadre alternatif dans lequel les marges et les
prix des entreprises dépendent des caractéristiques du marché de destination. Une
prédiction de ces modèles est que les firmes fixent des prix (nets de coûts de transport)
plus bas vers les destinations les plus lointaines. Cependant, cette prédiction n’a jamais
été testée.
Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse, nous proposons une étude empirique et théorique
de l’impact de la distance sur les stratégies de prix des entreprises. A partir de don-
nées individuelles d’entreprises décrivant les valeurs et les quantités - détaillées pour
près de 8000 produits - exportés vers chaque destination par l’ensemble des entreprises
françaises en 2003, il est montré que les entreprises fixent des valeurs unitaires plus
élevées vers les destinations les plus lointaines. Ce résultat n’est pas sensibles à
l’inclusion de différentes variables de contrôle, ni au choix de l’échantillons de pays
de destinations. Les travaux parallèles de Manova et Zang (2011), de Bastos et Silva
(2010) et de Gorg et al. (2010) mettent eux aussi en évidence l’impact positif de la
distance sur les prix à partir de données d’entrerpises pour la Chine, le Portugal, et la
Hongrie respectivement.
L’impact positif de la distance sur les prix fixés par les entreprises semble donc être une
régularité qui ne se restreint pas aux données françaises. Qui plus est, il apparaît dans
le chapitre 1 que l’impact de la distance sur les prix a des conséquences économiques
significatives. En effet, pour les consommateurs éloignés, les prix sont plus élevés pour
deux raisons. La première, évidente, est que les coûts de transport sont plus élevés.
La seconde est que les entreprises fixent des prix nets de coûts de transport plus haut.
Démonstration est faite dans le chapitre 1 que le second canal est le plus important
pour expliquer les primes payées par les consommateurs les plus éloignés.
(Krugman 1980, Melitz 2003) les entreprises fixent le même prix net de coûts de transport vers
l’ensemble des marchés qu’elles servent.
210 Note de synthèse
D’un point de vue théorique, ce résultat est aussi particulièrement intéressant. En effet,
presqu’aucun modèle ne prédit ce lien positif entre valeurs unitaires des exportations
au niveau de l’entreprise et distance. Le fait que les entreprises fixent des prix plus
élevés peut s’expliquer principalement de deux manières: i) les firmes fixent des marges
plus hautes, ii) les firmes vendent des biens de relativement plus haute qualité, ce qui
entraîne une hausse des marges et des coûts et donc des prix. Ces deux phénomènes
sont cohérents avec l’effet Alchian Allen (1964) qui stipule que la demande relative
des biens les plus chers augmente avec les coûts de transport si ces derniers ne sont
pas proportionnels au niveau des prix des biens exportés. Plus généralement, nous
montrons qu’une condition cruciale pour modéliser le lien positif entre prix et distance
- aussi bien via les marges que via la qualité - est la présence de coûts de transport
additifs. Ceci est particulièrement intéressant car la quasi-totalité des modèles utilisent
des coûts de transport multiplicatifs, qui ne permettent pas de rendre compte du fait
stylisé évoqué ici.
Evaluer l’intégration économique de l’Union Monétaire Européenne au re-
gard de la dispersion des prix. L’Union Monétaire Européenne (UME) mise en
place en janvier 1999 concerne aujourd’hui 16 états membres et près de 330 millions
d’individus. Cette nouvelle étape de la construction européenne visait notamment à
renforcer l’intégration économique des marchés membres de l’union. Dix ans après
l’introduction de l’euro, il est à présent possible de tester si les vertus annoncées de la
monnaie unique se sont traduites dans les faits.
Dans cet article nous nous intéressons plus particulièrement à l’impact de l’euro sur
l’intégration du marché des biens. Deux méthodes s’offrent aux économistes pour
appréhender ce type d’effets. La première repose sur une étude des volumes échangés, la
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seconde sur une étude de la dispersion des prix. Une plus grande intégration économique
entre états devrait en principe accroître leur commerce mutuel. Différents travaux ont
étudié l’impact de l’euro sur le commerce intra-zone. Si des questions méthodologiques
demeurent, un consensus semble émerger, attribuant un impact positif mais faible de
l’adoption de l’euro sur le commerce (Baldwin et al. 2008). Ici, nous nous concentrons
sur la seconde méthodologie mesurant l’effet de l’intégration des marchés sur l’évolution
de la dispersion des prix. Cette méthode repose sur une hypothèse simple - commune à
de nombreux modèles macroéconomiques - la loi du prix unique (LPU). La LPU stipule
que dans un marché parfaitement intégré, les prix de biens identiques (exprimés dans
une même devise) devraient être uniformes, quelle que soit la localisation géographique
de la transaction. Ainsi, l’ampleur des déviations à la LPU fournit un indicateur du
degré d’intégration des économies
En renforçant les comportements d’arbitrage, l’union monétaire est supposée réduire
la dispersion des prix à l’intérieur de la zone intégrée. Dans ce second chapitre,
nous testons cette hypothèse en utilisant l’expérience naturelle de l’Union Monétaire
Européenne. L’étude empirique est basée sur des données individuelles de prix à
l’exportation français et une stratégie d’estimation en double différences. La vari-
able expliquée est la dispersion des prix fixés par une firme donnée sur ses différents
marchés, que nous interprétons comme une mesure de discrimination par les prix. Les
résultats montrent que l’introduction de la monnaie unique a significativement réduit
la dispersion des prix à l’intérieur de la zone euro, par rapport au reste de l’OCDE
mais aussi par rapport aux autres membres de l’Union Européenne n’ayant pas adhéré
à l’UME.
L’ampleur de cet effet est cependant assez faible de prime abord. Nous trouvons que
les prix étaient 24% plus dispersé dans la zone euro que dans les autres membres de
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l’UE. Cette dispersion s’est réduite de 3 points de pourcentage après le passage à l’euro.
Cependant, il apparaît que les stratégies de prix sont également hétérogènes entre firmes
de tailles différentes. En particulier, nous montrons que l’introduction de la monnaie
unique a eu un impact relativement plus important sur la discrimination en prix des plus
grandes entreprises. Hors, ces entreprises représentent une part disproportionné des
ventes totales. Par conséquent, l’impact agrégé, prenant en compte cette hétérogénéité
est bien plus fort. Nous montrons en effet que la dispersion des prix dans l’UME
relativement au reste de l’UE s’est réduite en moyenne de 17 point de pourcentage
après la création de la monnaie unique.
L’impact asymétrique de la concurrence des pays à bas salaires sur les en-
treprises, et ses conséquences sur la qualité des exportations françaises. Un
des phénomènes qui a fait coulé le plus d’encre ces dernières années est la part croissante
des pays émergents dans l’économie mondiale. Cette nouvelle concurrence et d’autant
plus redoutée par les pays développés qu’il apparaît que les pays en développement
produisent les mêmes types de produits qu’eux. Cependant, comme le souligne Peter
Schott (2004, 2008) il semble que les pays en développement produisent des versions de
plus basse qualité. Tout cela suggère que les pays se spécialisent, au sein des industries,
dans la production de différents niveaux de qualité.
En plus de cette spécialisation des pays, des études récentes mettent en avant l’importance
des différences de qualité, au sein des pays et des industries, entre les entreprises (voir
Crozet et al. (2011) et Verhoogen (2008)). L’interaction entre les différences de qualité
internationales et les différences de qualité entre entreprises d’un même pays n’a pas
été beaucoup étudiée. On peut pourtant s’attendre à ce que la pression concurrentielle
des pays à bas salaires affecte différemment les entreprises des pays développés selon
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la qualité qu’elles produisent.
Le troisième chapitre examine de manière approfondie l’impact des pays à bas salaires
sur les ventes relatives des entreprises françaises et ses conséquences sur la qualité
moyenne exportée par la France. Dans un premier temps, un modèle très simplifié est
mis en place pour mettre en lumière l’impact asymétrique des pays à bas salaires sur
les entreprises des pays développés. L’intuition est très simple. Les pays à bas salaires
produisant des biens de relativement basse qualité, les firmes les plus touchées par cette
concurrence dans les pays développés sont les firmes qui produisent les biens de plus
basse qualité. Par conséquent, la part des ventes des entreprises de basses qualités dans
les exportations françaises diminue ce qui accroît mécaniquement la qualité moyenne
exportée par la France.
Nous développons ensuite une stratégie empirique pour identifier les changements de
qualité moyens liés à une réallocation des ventes des firmes de basse qualité vers les
firmes de haute qualité. Nous nous appuyons en particulier sur l’indice de qualité de
Boorstein et Feenstra (1987) que nous adaptons à nos données d’entreprises. Cette
méthode nous permet de mesurer l’évolution de la qualité des exportations françaises
pour près de 30 secteurs vers plus de 40 pays au cours de la période 1995-2005. Nous
montrons qu’en moyenne la qualité des exportations françaises a augmenté de près de
11%. Cette évolution cache cependant des disparités entre les secteurs et les pays.
Nous exploitons ces disparités pour évaluer l’impact des pays à bas salaire sur la qualité
moyenne vendue par la France. Les résultats confirment que la qualité des exporta-
tions françaises a augmenté le plus dans les secteurs et vers les destinations les plus
exposés à la concurrence des pays à bas salaires. Ces résultats suggèrent une spéciali-
sation importante de la France dans les biens de haute qualité, ce qui va entraîner des
changements sur le marché du travail.
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Globalisation de l’inflation: l’impact des biens intermédiaires importés sur
la dynamique des prix domestiques. La production domestique requiert une part
considérable de biens importés. Dans les secteurs manufacturiers, entre 20 et 67%
des coûts totaux de production proviennent de biens importés.25 Pour cette raison,
les liens fournisseurs-producteurs sont indispensables pour comprendre la transmission
internationale des chocs dans nos économies. En lien avec ce constat, la part croissante
de biens intermédiaires importés questionne la sensibilité des prix domestiques aux
changements de prix des biens intermédiaires étrangers. Il existe cependant très peu
d’études mesurant l’impact des biens intermédiaires importés sur les prix domestiques.
Le Chapitre 4 propose d’étudier ce phénomène au niveau le plus fin, c’est à dire au
niveau des entreprises.
L’analyse repose sur une base de donnée construite pour cette étude. Cette base rap-
porte l’évolution mensuelle des prix domestiques et des prix à l’importation de plusieurs
milliers de biens. Cette information est collectée par l’INSEE pour construire les indices
de prix à la production, à l’import et à l’export. Nous avons pu identifier à peu près
500 firmes qui sont enquêtées par l’INSEE à la fois concernant leurs prix domestiques
et le prix de leurs importations. Ceci nous permet d’évaluer la réaction des entreprises
à un changement dans le coût de ses biens intermédiaires importés.
Pour évaluer quels mécanismes déterminent le degré de transmission des chocs de coûts,
plusieurs spécifications sont estimées. Premièrement, le rôle joué par la part dans les
coûts totaux des biens intermédiaires importés est examiné. Ensuite, l’étude porte sur
le rôle de la structures de marché, et les différences de transmission des changements
de biens importés vers les prix domestiques et les prix des biens exportés, dans le
but d’évaluer l’importance des marges variables. Enfin, une comparaison est faite des
25Voir Goldberg et Campa (2010).
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transmissions de changements de prix de biens importés vers les prix domestiques dans
le cadre de transactions intra-firmes et des transactions entre différentes entités.
En outre, une attention toute particulière est portée à la possible endogénéité des
changements de coûts des biens importés. Pour cela, nous nous focalisons sur un
échantillon de transaction pour lesquelles les entreprises déclarent que le bien peut être
acheté chez différents fournisseurs. Nous supposons alors que ce type de bien est assez
standardisé. Par conséquent, les changements de prix de ces biens importés peuvent
être considérés comme exogènes pour les entreprises.
Il y a quatre résultats principaux à cette étude. Premièrement, en moyenne, l’élasticité
des biens domestiques au prix des biens intermédiaires importés est de 12%. Une
grande partie de cette élasticité s’explique par la part de biens importés utilisés dans
le processus de production. Cependant, il existe une hétérogénéité importante entre
secteurs qui n’est pas expliquée par cela. Deuxièmement, la transmission est bien
moindre lorsque les transactions se déroulent au sein de l’entreprise. Troisièmement,
il semble que la structure du marché n’influence pas le degré de transmission. Enfin,
nous montrons que la volatilité des prix des biens importés explique environ 9% de la
volatilité des prix domestiques. Cependant, la majeure partie des dynamiques de prix
individuelles n’est pas expliquée par les mouvements de prix des biens intermédiaires.
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Prices and Quality in International Trade
The thesis uses information on prices to shed light on four questions. Chapter 1 provides
new evidence on trade prices based on firm-level data from France. It finds firms charge
higher free-on-board unit values on exports to more distant countries. This behavior
explains most of the price premium paid by distant consumers, the rest being due
to higher transport costs. This may be rationalized in models with additive rather
than iceberg transport costs. Chapter 2 examines the impact of monetary unions on
the integration of good markets. It shows the Euro has disproportionably affected
large/more productive firms. Taking into account this heterogeneity, it finds a strong
impact of the Euro on economic integration. Chapter 3 asks about the impact of
low-wage countries’ competition on the quality of high-wage countries’ exports. Over
1995-2005, the mean quality of France’s exports increased by 11%. Increasing pressures
from low-wage countries have induced a reallocation of sales from low- to high-quality
firms. Chapter 4 measures the sensitivity of domestic prices to changes in imported
inputs’ prices. The elasticity of domestic prices to imported inputs prices is 12%.
The transmission is much lower among firms importing inputs from a related party.
On average 9% of the volatility of production prices at the sectoral level is driven by
changes in imported inputs’ costs.
Prix, Qualité et Commerce International
Cette thèse utilise l’information sur les prix pour éclairer quatre questions. Dans le
premier chapitre, nous montrons que les entreprises fixent des prix (net de couts de
transport) plus élevés vers les pays les plus lointains. Ceci peut être expliqué dans
des modèles de commerce avec coûts de transport additifs plutôt que multiplicatifs.
Dans le second chapitre, nous évaluons l’impact des unions monétaires sur l’intégration
économique. Nous montrons que l’euro a touché plus fortement les grandes entreprises.
En prenant en compte cette hétérogénéité, nous trouvons un impact important de la
création l’euro sur le degré d’intégration économique de la zone euro. Dans le troisième
chapitre nous examinons l’impact des pays à bas salaire sur la qualité des exportations
des pays développés. Entre 1995 et 2005, la qualité moyenne des exportations Française
a augmenté de 11%. La pression concurrencielle des pays à bas coûts a induit une
réallocation des ventes des firmes de basse qualité vers les firmes de meilleur qualité.
Dans le chapitre 4, nous cherchons à mesurer la sensibilité des prix domestiques aux
changements de prix de biens importés. Nous trouvons une élasticité prix des biens
domestiques aux mouvements de prix de biens importés de 12%. La transmission
est bien plus faible pour les biens importés entre entreprises d’un même groupe. En
moyenne, 9% de la volatilité des prix domestiques au niveau sectoriel est expliqué par
les mouvements de prix de biens intermédiaires importés.
